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Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman
The concept of desert is familiar to everyone. We have all heard
that wrongdoers deserve punishment, that the virtuous deserve happiness,
that hard workers deserve success, that innocent victims deserve
compensation, that everyone deserves an adequate level of medical care,
that no one deserves to be born handicapped, and so on.
From these sayings, it is clear that desert is an evaluative
concept. It therefore belongs to the class of concepts that includes
rightness, justice, rationality, goodness, beauty, and others. Desert
is thus a familiar, evaluative concept.
It is ironic, then, that desert has not received anything like the
amount of philosophical attention enjoyed by the other evaluative
concepts that I mentioned. In this dissertation, I focus my attention
on desert.
I begin, in Chapter 1, by trying to explain why desert has been
neglected by philosophers. In Chapter 2 I argue that much of the
received philosophical wisdom about desert is false. Chapter 3 is
dedicated to "institutional" theories of desert. These theories make
V
desert relative to institutional rules or purposes. Chapter 4 explores
some views about the purported connection between desert and the
emotions. In Chapter 5 I argue that a well-known attempt to justify
desert-claims fails, and that this failure is the result of mistaken
views about the connections between desert and the concepts of moral
obligation and of value. One aim of Chapter 6 is to reveal the defects
of some prominent theories of desert of wages. A deeper aim is to
expose a fundamental defect in a standard way of looking at desert in
general
.
In Chapter 7, I present my own theory of desert. It contains,
among other things, a catalogue of bases for desert and an explanation
of "all-in desert" in terms of "prima facie desert" and "weight." The
structure of my theory of desert is therefore similar to the structure
of W. D. Ross’s theory of moral rightness.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
We do not merely describe the world. We evaluate it -
ineluctably, and from a variety of perspectives. We pronounce of
various things that they are good or bad, beautiful or ugly, right or
wrong, rational or irrational. These are just a few of the many
concepts we employ to evaluate the people we know, the acts we perform,
the objects we behold, the rules we make, the fates that befall us.
Another evaluative concept is desert. We use this concept to
evaluate the receipt or distribution of benefits and burdens - such as
prizes, grades, punishment, offices, apologies, compensation,
retribution, suffering, rewards, wages - and we employ the concept
liberally. Most often it crops up in our evaluations of what people
receive (or could receive) from other people, as when we say that a
student deserves a certain grade, or that a waitress deserves a certain
tip. But we also use it to evaluate what people "receive" from the
natural world, as when we express sympathy for the "undeserving victims"
of floods, famine, and earthquakes. We also invoke the concept of
desert to evaluate what the natural world "receives" from human beings,
as when it is argued that rabbits do not deserve to suffer the Draize
test for cosmetics, or that the Olympic Peninsula deserves preservation.
Appeals to desert extend even to inanimate objects, as when we declare
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that Union Carbide deserves to be sued for its role in the Bhopal
disaster, or that Oregon deserves better publicity. Indeed, once one
becomes sensitive to the concept of desert, one cannot help but be
struck by the ubiquity of evaluations made in terras of it. As George
Sher has observed, "Desert is central to our pre-ref lective thought."^
Thus it is surprising that desert, unlike the other evaluative
concepts I mentioned, has been neglected by philosophers. The available
philosophical literature on desert is more or less exhausted by a few
books and a dozen articles, almost all of which appeared in the last few
decades. Prior to the 1960 ’s, references to desert in the
philosophical literature were confined almost exclusively to debates in
the philosophy of punishment. In those debates, the concept of desert
was used to characterize a form of "retributivism" according to which
punishment is morally justifiable only if deserved.^ But even those who
endorsed this sort of retributivism offered nothing in the way of an
articulated theory of desert.^
Indeed, among the few philosophers who have written about desert,
the tendency has been as much toward ridiculing or downplaying the
concept as toward taking it seriously. One example of the former
tendency is Barbara Goodwin’s verdict that "...the concept of desert
itself is incoherent and, philosophically speaking, unfounded."^
Another is Brian Barry’s astonishing prediction: "In examining the
concept of desert we are examining a concept which is already in decline
and may eventually disappear."® Remarks such as these imply that even
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if desert is central to our pre-reflective thought, a bit of
philosophical reflection might prompt us to reject it.
The neglect of desert by contemporary philosophers is surprising
for a reason other than desert’s centrality to pre-ref lective thought.
The reason is that, in the twenty-five years since the publication of
John Rawls’s enormously influential A Theory of Justice, there has been
a tremendous outpouring of philosophical interest in the idea of
Justice.'^ But according to a venerable view, justice obtains to the
extent that people get what they deserve.® Since justice is important,
so is desert. Thus, it is natural to suppose that the recent upsurge of
interest justice would be accompanied by a similar upsurge of interest
in desert. This has not happened.
What explains this tendency among contemporary philosophers,
especially those interested in justice, to ignore or reject the concept
of desert? Part of the explanation, I think, is Rawls’s work itself.
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls appeared to argue that desert, rather than
the central concept in terms of which justice could be explained, is
instead a concept explicable in terms of a prior notion of justice.^
Rawls, accordingly, made no use of the concept of desert in the
formulation or defence of his theory of justice. Those (the many) who
were impressed by Rawls’s theory of justice may have felt no need to
discuss or invoke the concept of desert in their own work on justice.
This, however, cannot be the whole story behind the contemporary
neglect of desert. This is because some of Rawls’s severest critics
make no use of desert in their own theories of justice. Robert Nozick
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IS an excellent example of one such theorist. In Anarchy, State, and
Utopia, Nozick subjects Rawls’s theory of justice - and, in particular,
Rawls’s rejection of desert - to serious and, in my opinion, devastating
criticisms.^® Yet when Nozick turns to formulating and defending his
own entitlement theory of justice, he makes no mention of desert
whatsoever. Another example is Michael Sandel, whose penetrating
criticisms of Rawls are second only to Nozick’s, but whose own
communitarian" theory of justice is devoid of appeals to desert. The
existence of these critics of Rawls, whose theories of justice do not
depend on desert, suggests that there may be a deeper explanation of
their apparent scorn for desert.
Samuel Scheffler has recently sought such an explanation.
Scheffler’s idea is that contemporary theorists of justice have shied
away from desert because of their acceptance, perhaps tacitly, of
"naturalism." Scheffler writes:
The widespread reluctance among political philosophers to
defend a robust notion of... desert is due in part to the
power in contemporary philosophy of the idea that human
thought and action may be wholly subsumable within a broadly
naturalistic view of the world. The reticence of these
philosophers - their disinclination to draw on any... notion
of desert in their theorizing about justice - testifies in
part to the prevalence of the often unstated conviction that
a thoroughgoing naturalism leaves no room for a conception
of individual agency substantial enough to sustain such a
notion. This problem, the problem of the relation between
naturalism and individual agency, is of course a descendant
of the problem of determinism and free will.... Thus my
suggestion is that the reluctance of many contemporary
political philosophers to rely on a preinstitutional notion
of desert results in part from a widespread though often
implicit skepticism about individual agency, a form of
skepticism that is the contemporary descendant of skepticism
about freedom of the will.^^
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Scheffler’s explanation, as I understand it, is this. Contemporary
theorists of justice accept the doctrine of naturalism. Naturalism is
incompatible with the doctrine that human beings have free will. The
denial of the doctrine of free will is incompatible with accepting a
robust notion of desert. Hence, contemporary theorists of justice
reject any such notion.
There is something plausible about Scheffler’s explanation. At
any rate, Scheffler is not the first philosopher to suppose that
skepticism about free will or responsibility is tantamount to skepticism
about desert. Daniel Dennett, for example, makes the same supposition
in his engaging book. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth
Wanting:
It could be... that the concept of personal responsibility
enshrined in traditional (Western) morality is subtly
incoherent, and that we ought to revise or even jettison
that concept and the family of ideas surrounding it: guilt,
desert, moral praise, and punishment, to mention the most
important.
Tom Campbell makes a similar remark:
...the belief in desert - the very idea that anybody
ultimately deserves anything - seems to run counter to the
common contemporary assumption that individual behaviour is,
in the end, almost entirely the outcome of heredity and
environment, with little if any significance being
attributable to people’s individual choices. The "free
will" assumptions behind traditional ideas of desert are
certainly hard to fit into a scientific and deterministic
world view according to which human decisions are simply one
part of a continuous causal chain.
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Thus, if desert and naturalism are incompatible, as some have thought,
and if recent theorists of justice accept naturalism, then Scheffler is
correct: the retreat from desert by those theorists should come as no
surprise.
That said, there is something implausible about Scheffler’
s
diagnosis of the recent retreat from desert. First, there is no direct
textual evidence of a denial of free will in the writings of the
theorists of justice that Scheffler has in mind - Rawls and Nozick, most
notably. In fact, Rawls and Nozick depend heavily on notions of
freedom, autonomy, and liberty. seems unlikely, then, that these
theorists have assumed (even tacitly) a conception of the world
incompatible with human freedom. Second, let us suppose with Scheffler
that those philosophers have accepted a conception of the world
incompatible with human freedom. But then why would they jettison
desert only, and not also the "family of ideas," to borrow Dennett’s
phrase, that seem to surround it: guilt, praise, punishment, and so on?
Rawls and Nozick, at least, do not reject this family of notions.^® If
these notions are, along with desert, out of place in a world without
human freedom, then Scheffler ’s explanation implies that contemporary
theorists of justice have internalized naturalism, but without
appreciating some of its most obvious implications. Third, there are
some contemporary theorists of justice who are, I presume, no less
susceptible to the supposed "power" of naturalism, but who nevertheless
make a place in their theories for desert. Scheffler ’s explanation
implies that these theorists are even more incapable than their anti-
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desert colleagues of appreciating the full significance of naturalism.
Given the implausibility of this and the other implications of
Scheffler’s diagnosis, perhaps it would be best to treat it as merely
part of the full explanation of recent refusals to countenance desert.
Perhaps another piece in the full explanation of desert’s neglect
by philosophers is this. Perhaps some philosophers have confused desert
with some other concept, or mistakenly subsumed it under some other
concept. Unaware of the error, but aware of theories of whatever
concept desert may have been confused with or subsumed under, perhaps
these philosophers concluded that there was nothing more to say about
desert. So, they said nothing about it.
There is evidence that some philosophers have, if not confused
desert with some other concept, then at least subsumed it under some
other concept. Brian Barry, for example, seems at one time to have
thought of desert as a species of goodness:
To ascribe desert to a person is to say that it would be a
good thing if he were to receive something. .. in virtue of
some action or effort of his or some result brought about by
him.
Austin Duncan-Jones
,
to take another example, seems to have confused
desert with the concept of responsibility. This confusion is most
apparent in his description of a "utilitarian” theory of desert:
...when we say that a man is responsible, and has certain
deserts, the whole meaning of our statement can be resolved
into two clauses: (1) he has done a good or bad action; (2)
it is useful to apply certain sanctions to him. . .
.
[These]
two clauses. .. convey the whole of our meaning when we
ascribe responsibility or desert....^®
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As a final example, take S. 1. Benn and R. S. Peters. In their once-
influential textbook. The Principles of Political Thought, these authors
treated desert as a species of entitlement:
Desert is a normative word; its use presupposes a rule
having two components: (i) a condition to be satisfied; (ii)
a mode of treatment consequent upon it. In questions of
income distribution the condition is usually the performance
of some service (and in this respect it differs from
entitlement," which is more general^ since one might be
"entitled" to benefits under rules which prescribed need, or
insurance conditions, or sale of goods, as the qualifying
condition). We cannot estimate desert, therefore, in a
vacuum; we must be able to refer to some standard or rule
from which X deserves R" follows as a conclusion.^®
If the philosophers mentioned thought of desert as at least subsumable
under another concept, then perhaps others have thought so too. If so,
this might partially explain the relative lack of interest in desert as
a concept in its own right.
It is interesting to wonder about possible explanations for the
relative lack of philosophical interest in desert. But it may be more
interesting, and more pertinent, to wonder whether this lack of interest
is justified. This is where Scheffler’s diagnosis may take on a deeper
significance. Is it true, as Scheffler and others imply, that a broadly
'naturalistic" view of the world is incompatible with an acceptance of
desert? If it is, and if the naturalistic view of the world is correct,
then a philosophical study of desert (such as the one before you) is
interesting as an academic exercise only. It will be a study of a
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concept that, like the concept of phlogiston,
actual world.
has no application to the
I will not try to fully address this vague worry here. I will,
however, suggest that even if "naturalism" is true and inconsistent with
the doctrine of human freedom, there is still a place for desert in the
world. To see this, suppose we are not free. Suppose further that we
are occasionally victims of crime, natural disasters, workplace
injuries, disease, and so on. Even if we are not free agents, it is not
obvious that we could not deserve compensation, medical care, sympathy,
and perhaps other forms of treatment in virtue of suffering such things.
Indeed, as John Kleinig pointed out twenty-five years ago:
The possibility of deserving compensation.
.. indicates thatthere IS no simple relationship between "being deserving of
and being responsible for." The man who deserves
compensation is precisely not responsible for those things
on the basis of which he deserves it.^^
Thus, even if widespread acceptance of naturalism partly explains the
retreat from desert, it does not obviously justify it. For it to do so
the supposed connection between desert and responsibility would, at the
very least, have to be made much clearer. In Chapters 2 and 7, I take
up inter alia the supposed connection(s) between desert and
responsibility. With Kleinig, I conclude that if there is any such
connection, it is not so simple that a denial of freedom would force us
to deny desert.
I will also record my view that desert is distinct from the
concepts of goodness, responsibility, and entitlement. I have already
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noted that desert and responsibility may not be as closely connected as
some philosophers have supposed. As for desert’s distinctness from
goodness, this can be seen by considering a simple example. Suppose
that I experience some pleasure. This is good in itself. However, I
may not deserve that pleasure. Hence, desert is distinct from goodness.
Besides, even if the getting of what’s deserved is always good in
itself, and in this way a "species" of goodness, this would not provide
any reason for a philosopher to ignore desert - any more than it would
provide a reason for a philosopher to ignore pleasure, virtue,
friendship, or any other species of goodness. As for desert’s
distinctness from entitlement, I refer the reader to Chapter 3, where I
make the case for this distinction in some detail. Thus, if my
suggestions here and in the chapters that follow are correct, the
neglect of desert by some contemporary philosophers cannot be justified
by their supposing that desert is (or is a species of) goodness,
responsibility, entitlement, or some other concept.
Whatever the full explanation or the supposed justification, the
fact remains: desert has been largely ignored by philosophers. There
are only a few worked-out philosophical theories of desert available in
the literature. In this dissertation, I contribute a new theory.
Obviously, I would not do this if I thought that one of the currently
available theories were correct. Accordingly, I do not believe that any
of the currently available theories of desert are correct. I do believe
that all of those theories contain valuable insights. I try to
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incorporate some of those insights into my own theory, which I present
and explain in Chapter 7.
The chapters preceding Chapter 7 can be summarized as follows.
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are devoted to discussions of some prominent
theories of desert. Thus, in Chapter 2, I attempt to clear away some
misguided views of desert that are prominent in the literature, and that
have conveniently coalesced in a theory of desert recently espoused by
Wojceich Sadurski.^^ Chapter 3 is dedicated to an examination of a
family of theories that have the following feature in common: each
attempts to explain desert in terms of rules or purposes^ and most
characteristically in terms of the rules or purposes of social
institutions. (It is this sort of theory that is suggested by some
remarks in Rawls’s A Theory of Justice.) In Chapter 4, I discuss a
theory that attempts to explain desert in terms of a certain class of
emotions. I also explore there some other purported desert-emotion
connections.
As I see it, a pressing question for any theorist of desert is
whether our considered views about what is and what is not a "basis" for
desert can be justified. So, for example, how (if at all) can we
justify the considered views that hard workers deserve to succeed, that
the virtuous deserve to be happy, or that innocent sufferers deserve
sympathy? In the only full-length study of desert currently available
in print, George Sher attempts to justify these and a host of other
desert-claims.^'* My view, explained and defended in Chapter 5, is that
Sher’s justificatory project fails. I take the failure of Sher’s heroic
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attempts to justify the major desert-claims as evidence for the futility
of any such project.
Chapter 6 takes a somewhat practical turn. In it, I try to answer
the question of why, if at all, workers deserve wages. I also trace out
some implications that my answer has for the "comparable worth" debate.
An ostensible aim of this chapter is to discuss some prominent theories
of desert of wages, and to expose their defects. But a deeper aim is to
reveal what I take to be a fundamental flaw with a standard theory of
desert, a theory espoused and defended by Joel Feinberg in his landmark
essay, "Justice and Personal Desert. My hope is that Chapter 6
provides the last piece in a cumulative case for my conviction that a
new theory of desert is needed. As noted before, I present such a
theory in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2
DESERT: CLEARING AWAY SOME MISCONCEPTIONS
Introduction
George Sher opens his full-length study of the concept of desert
with the remark: "Desert is uncharted philosophical territory. Sher
might have said with equal justice that desert is mischarted. The
literature on desert, meager though it is, contains some grave
misunderstandings of a concept that pervades our ethical thought. It
would be advisable, therefore, in a study such as this, to identify and
correct those misunderstandings at the outset. That is the central aim
of this chapter. In it, I play the role of Lockean underlaborer: I
attempt to clear away "...the Rubbish, that lies in the way to
Knowledge.
That said, the goal of this chapter is not entirely destructive.
One constructive aim is to provide (perhaps via negatival ) a rough
sketch of the concept of desert as I understand it. Another is to set
the agenda. Many of the points merely raised in this chapter require
more careful treatment. This they receive in several of the following
chapters.
To make the task of this chapter manageable, I focus on Wojciech
Sadurski’s recent theory of desert.^ I choose Sadurski’s theory for two
reasons. First, Sadurski’s book. Giving Desert its Due, contains one of
the few detailed treatments of desert in the literature. Second,
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Sadurski’s theory is the perfect target: it contains almost all the
received philosophical views about desert that I reject.**
Sadurski’s theory
Desert claims seem to have (implicitly, at least) this form: 'P
deserves x at t in virtue of E’. P is the deserving subject; x is the
thing deserved; t is the time at which P deserves x; and E is the basis
of P’s deserving x. A theory of desert may therefore take the form of a
statement of conditions that are necessary and sufficient for P to
deserve x at t in virtue of E. At any rate, this is how I will construe
Sadurski’s theory.
As I understand it, Sadurski’s theory of desert (or STD) contains
seven parts:
STD P deserves x at t in virtue of E iff (i) P is
responsible for E; (ii) P is a person; (iii) E
is effort exerted by P; (iv) E is valuable to
P’s society; (v) E occurs prior to t; (vi) E is
a burden to P; and (vii) x can be distributed to
P.
In this section, I will further present and explain STD. In the next
section, I will evaluate it.
(i) P is responsible for E, A view widespread in the literature
is that there is an important connection between desert and
responsibility. Typical assertions of such a connection include:
A person’s having been able to have done otherwise is a
necessary condition of ascribing desert.^
16
People ought to be done by according to how they deserve,
and how they deserve depends on how they have done, which in
turn presupposes responsibility and freedom.®
The concept of desert serves to signify the ways of treating
people that are appropriate responses to them, given that
they are responsible for those actions or states of affairs.
That is the role played by desert in our moral vocabulary.’*
The assertion that a man deserves the superior character
that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his
abilities is.
.. problematic; for this character depends in
large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances
for which he can claim no credit.®
These passages differ in important ways, but a doctrine running
through them seems to be this:
If S is not responsible for some quality or action, then S
does not deserve anything in virtue of it.
Sadurski accepts this doctrine:
When we are pronouncing judgments of desert, we are
inevitably making judgments about persons who are
responsible for their actions. It makes no sense to
attribute desert, positive or negative, to persons for
actions or facts over which they have no control. (Page
117
. )
This doctrine, which (i) is intended to express, is supported by
many examples. Suppose a cashier is forced at gunpoint to hand over the
money. The store suffers a loss, but the cashier does not deserve
blame. This is because the cashier was not responsible for handing over
the money: he was coerced. Suppose a student submits an excellent term
paper. If she is not responsible for it (if, for example, her roommate
wrote it), she does not deserve praise or a good grade. Suppose a
17
sprinter swallows a handful of amphetamines prior to a race, and wins.
He does not deserve to win, and this is (at least partly) because he is
not truly responsible for his performance: the drugs are. These
examples lend credence to the doctrine about desert and responsibility,
and hence to ( i )
.
(ii) P is a person. Sadurski writes: "...desert considerations
are always person-oriented" (117), That is, the subject of desert is
always a person. Like (i), many examples could be adduced in support of
this claim. Furthermore, (ii) is at least suggested by (i), which
asserts the connection between desert and responsibility. For it is
plausible that only people can be (morally) responsible for anything.
(ii) might also be suggested by (iv), which states the basis of P’s
desert is valuable to P’s "society." At any rate, the view that the
subject of desert must be a person is venerable. It was, for instance,
endorsed by the eighteenth-century moralist Richard Price:
The epithets right and wrong, are, with strict propriety,
applied only to actions; but good and ill desert belong
rather to the agent. It is the agent alone, that is capable
of happiness or misery; and, therefore, it is he alone that
can properly be said to deserve these.
^
(iii) E is effort exerted by P. According to Sadurski, "...effort
is the only legitimate basis and measure of desert" (116).^° The notion
that effort is the only basis for desert is familiar from discussions of
desert of wages. Thus, in supposing that effort is the only desert
base simpliciter, Sadurski is generalizing that idea. He is also
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accepting what he takes to be a consequence of (i), the thesis about
desert and responsibility:
I consider effort to be the principle criterion of desert,
mainly because 'contribution’ or 'success’ reflect, among
other things, factors which are beyond our control and thus
for which we cannot claim any credit. (Page 134.)
Here, and in the debate over desert of wages, the argument that
effort is the basis for desert goes like this. The basis for desert is
either effort or success. effort one exerts is within one’s
control, the success of those efforts is not. Desert can arise only in
virtue of what is within one’s control, or for what one is responsible.
(As Sadurski says, ...factors which are totally beyond a person’s
control.
. .are irrelevant to desert" [3]). Thus, it is not success but
effort that must be the basis for desert.
(iv) E is valuable to P’s society. The idea here is that the
basis for desert must be valuable to the deserving person’s society.
There are two ways to construe this. One is Sadurski ’s: "What counts is
a conscientious effort which has socially beneficial effects" (116).^^
On this construal, one’s effort is valuable to society, and a basis for
desert, only if it benefits others.
Another way to understand the idea that the basis for desert must
be valuable to P’s society is this: The basis of P’s desert must be
generally "valued" by P’s society (regardless of whether it actually
benefits anyone). This second idea is suggested by Joel Feinberg’s
claim that "If we were all perfect stoics. .. then there would be no use
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for the concept of desert. It is explicitly endorsed by David
Miller:
...desert is a matter of fitting forms of treatment to the
specific qualities and actions of individuals, and in
particular good desert... is a matter of fitting desired
forms of treatment to qualities and actions which are
generally held in high regard.
Like the other portions of STD considered thus far, (iv) has an
air of plausibility. People who contribute to society, or who perform
actions that are generally admired, are said to be deserving.
Philanthropists are said to deserve admiration or public recognition;
virtuous behavior is said to deserve praise and emulation. Thus it may
appear, as (iv) asserts, that desert bases must be "valuable" to society
in some way or another.
(v) E occurs prior to t. Like other parts of STD, this is a
standard thesis about desert. It (or a similar thesis) is endorsed
throughout the literature. Typical statements of the thesis include:
...the basis of all desert is a person’s own past actions.
If a person is deserving of some sort of treatment he must,
necessarily, be so in virtue of some characteristic or prior
activity.
Desert can be ascribed to something or someone only on the
basis of characteristics possessed or things done by that
thing or person. That is, desert is never simply forward-
looking.
The idea in each passage is that desert bases are always located
in the past. This idea can be more precisely expressed:
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If S deserves x at t in virtue of E, then S acquired or
performed E prior to t.
This idea is accepted by Sadurski: "...desert considerations are always
past-oriented. When talking about desert, we are evaluating certain
actions which have already happened" (118). Part (v) of STD corresponds
to this view about the supposed connection between desert and time.
The view that desert bases are always located in the past is
supported by any number of examples. If you deserve an apology, this is
because you have been insulted, not because you are going to be
insulted. If you deserve punishment, this is because you have committed
some wrong, not because you will commit some wrong. If you deserve a
reward, this is because you have done something good, not because you
are going to do something good; and so on. In general, then, it appears
that the basis for desert must be located in the past.
(vi) E is a burden to P. Desert is often attributed to those who
have borne some burden, such as "..effort, sacrifice, work, risk,
responsibility, inconvenience, and so forth" (Sadurski, 116). Consider
the relentless medical researcher who sacrifices her own health for
others’; the firefighter who risks his life to save a child; the
executive of a major corporation who bears ultimate responsibility for
thousands of employees; the person who willingly accepts a major
inconvenience to help a friend through a difficult time: all these
people are deserving in virtue of the "burden" they bear. Furthermore,
those whose actions require no sacrifice, risk, responsibility,
inconvenience, and so on, are often held to deserve nothing for
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performing them. The idea is that there is desert only if there is some
"cost" to the agent.
An argument in support of this intuition is due to Miller.
Miller, as noted above, believes that "...a desert basis consists of
personal attributes which are generally held in high regard. People
who tend to perform actions involving work, risk, sacrifice,
responsibility, inconvenience, etc., are for that reason generally held
in high regard. But people who tend not to perform actions that involve
no such burdens are, for that reason, not highly regarded. They are
regarded with indifference, sometimes contempt. If Miller is right, it
follows that those in the former category are deserving; those in the
latter category are not. Sadurski would put this by saying that the
basis for desert is burdensome.
(vii) X can be distributed to P. Sadurski writes:
To say that X deserves P makes sense only when it is
imaginable that P can be distributed or attributed. To say
"I was working very hard all year therefore I deserve good
weather during my vacations" is erroneous except as a
metaphor. (Page 118.)
Good weather is not something that can be distributed; anyway, it cannot
be distributed by people. Therefore, Sadurski reasons, it cannot be
deserved. In a slogan: The deservable is distributable (by people).
Perhaps the idea behind this slogan is that just as 'ought’ implies
'can’, so 'deserved’ implies 'distributable’.
Let that serve as a presentation and explanation of STD. STD
contains much of what is accepted by philosophers who have written about
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desert. But my view is that every part of STD is false. I now turn to
a defence of that view.
The refutation of Sadurski*s theory
(i) P is responsible for E. I do not accept that if P deserves x
in virtue of some property or action, then P is responsible for that
property or action. Many clear cases of desert involve a person who
suffers some evil, is not responsible for suffering it, yet deserves
something for suffering it. All kinds of sufferings could be adduced as
examples: disease, disaster, crime, insult. A person may not be
responsible for suffering one or another of these things, but each can
be a basis for deserving sympathy, relief, treatment, reparation, or
apology. Therefore, it is false that the deserving subject must be
responsible for the desert base. There are properties for which one may
not be responsible for possessing, but that can be bases for desert.^®
(ii) P is a person, I reject the suggestion that the subject of
desert must be a person. I believe that manuscripts and mathematical
puzzles, for example, can deserve consideration or attention; that trees
and earthquakes can deserve admiration or awe; that baseball teams can
deserve championships; that corporations can deserve to be sued; that
cities can deserve publicity; and so on.^^ I take these desert claims
about non-persons literally. And while I believe that perhaps some such
claims can be adequately translated into claims about what people
deserve, I do not believe that every such claim can be thus translated.
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Consider, for example, the following desert claim: "Cleveland is
an interesting city; it deserves better publicity." Perhaps this claim
IS shorthand for a set of claims about the deserts of various people
(the mayor, members of the city council, downtown merchants) who have
worked hard to improve Cleveland. But what of the claim that the
Lowenheim-Skolem theorem deserves attention? This seems quite different
from, say, the claim that Lowenheim and Skolem deserve admiration for
discovering the theorem. Or what of the claim that Union Carbide
deserves to be sued billions of dollars for the Bhopal disaster? This
claim can be true even if there is no particular Union Carbide employee
(or group of employees) who deserves to be sued billions of dollars for
the Bhopal disaster. These claims suggest that non-persons can be
subjects of desert.
(iii) E is effort exerted by P. The difficulty with this view
requires a distinction between two contrary positions about desert
bases, monism and pluralism. Monism is the view that there is only one
basis for desert; pluralism is the view that there is more than one.
(iii) is a form of monism. According to it, effort is the only basis
for desert. There are other versions of monism. One is that moral
worth is the only basis for desert. G. W. Leibniz and W. D. Ross seemed
to accept this latter version of monism.
(iii) is false. For suppose it were true that the effort you
exert is the only basis for your desert of anything. Suppose further
that one day you are brutally assaulted by a group of thugs. Since you
made no effort to get assaulted, (iii) entails that you deserve nothing.
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This is clearly wrong. You now deserve sympathy, compensation, apology,
and perhaps other things.
As I see it, all monisms about desert are false. There is more
than one basis for desert. I believe these include (but are probably
not exhausted by) innocent suffering, need, being a person, past
receipt, entitlement, moral worth, and effort. A profound and pressing
question is whether there is any way to Justify these claims about what
IS (and what is not) a desert base. Sher devotes an entire book to
attempting to answer this question. Sher’s project is the subject of
Chapter 5. The subject comes up again in Chapter 7.
(iv) E is valuable to P’s society. I offered two interpretations
of this view about desert. On the first interpretation, for E to be
"valuable" to P’s society is for E (that is, its presence or
performance) to contribute to that society’s good. This is false, for
the simple reason that one can deserve punishment or some other evil for
harming one’s society. So perhaps what Sadurski meant is this: If E is
a basis for P s desert of x, then E is either valuable or damaging to
P’s society. I believe this is false. As I see it, one can be
deserving without being part of any society. I postpone a defense of
this controversial claim until the next chapter. There I explain (and
ultimately reject) various versions of the prominent view that desert is
somehow "institutional."
On the second interpretation, for E to be "valuable" to P’s
society is for E (that is, its presence or performance) to be generally
admired or held in high regard by that society. I reject this second
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version of (iv). My view is that at least some properties and actions
are bases for desert even if no one ever admires or detests them.
(Virtue, for example, seems a basis for deserving admiration or
happiness, regardless of the general attitude toward virtue.) However,
this claim is also controversial. I postpone its defense until Chapter
4 .
(v) E occurs prior to t. I reject the widespread assumption that
desert bases are always located in the past. Christopher New recently
argued that it is possible to deserve punishment prior to committing an
offence. 23 Even more recently, Fred Feldman has called attention to
several examples that seem to show conclusively that bases for desert
need not be anchored in the past.^^ One of Feldman’s examples concerns
the Make-a-Wish Foundation. The Foundation attempts to offer
extraordinary benefits to terminally ill children - trips to Disneyland,
for example. Many people feel that such children deserve these
benefits. The reason is not (or not necessarily) that these children
have already suffered, but rather that they will suffer. Thus, their
desert bases are in the future, not the past. Another of Feldman’s
examples concerns a soldier who volunteers for a dangerous mission. The
soldier might be honored prior to his mission. This honor is deserved
not because of what he has done; it is deserved because of what he is
about to do. Thus, the soldier’s desert base is located in the future.
These examples show that desert is not always "backward-looking."
(vi) E is a burden to P. Burdens, on Sadurski’s view, include
effort, sacrifice, work, risk, responsibility, and inconvenience. Thus
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understood, however, bases for desert need not be a burden to those who
are deserving in virtue of them. For example, you can deserve an
apology in virtue of being insulted, even though your being insulted
required no sacrifice, work, risk, responsibility, or inconvenience.
Even if the insult was not an "emotional" burden for you, this would not
make the ensuing apology undeserved. Besides, there are other bases for
desert that clearly are not burdens. Suppose, for example, that there
is a wonderfully talented violinist. She loves nothing more than
playing the violin, and she plays beautifully. She may deserve
admiration or respect in virtue of her beautiful playing, even though
playing the violin is not at all burdensome to her.
(vii) X can be distributed to P, I do not accept that the
deservable is necessarily distributable. Some deserved things cannot be
distributed. These include things that people are incapable of
distributing, such as good fortune good weather. But they also include
what we happen to be unable to distribute at the moment they are
deserved. A trivial example is compensation. It is possible that X
deserves financial compensation from Y, even if Y is unable to pay.
Another example concerns apologies. Suppose that X deserves an apology
from Y, but Y is now dead. The apology cannot be given, but it is
nonetheless deserved.
What desert is not
The results of this chapter can be summarized in seven points.
First, there is no obvious connection between desert and responsibility;
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at any rate, it is possible for a subject to be deserving in virtue of a
property for which he or she is not responsible. Second, persons and
non-persons can be subjects of desert. Third, there are many desert
bases, not merely one. Fourth, there is no interesting sense in which a
desert base must be "valuable" to society. Fifth, bases for desert need
not be located in the past, but may sometimes be located in the future.
Sixth, desert bases need not constitute a "burden" to the deserving
subject. Seventh, whether one deserves something does not hinge on
whether or not it can be distributed.
Some of these points have, I hope, been established in this
chapter. Others clearly have not. I will consider them in some of the
chapters that follow. Those considerations culminate in Chapter 7, in
which I present my own theory of desert.
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CHAPTER 3
INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES OF DESERT
Introduction
In the spring of 1994, in a Singapore jail, an American citizen
named Michael Fay received three violent strokes with a rattan cane.
The blows ripped through his skin and left permanent scars across the
width of his back. This was Fay’s legally prescribed punishment for
spraying graffiti on a row of cars parked along a Singapore street.
Although caning is a standard form of punishment in Singapore,
many in the United States reacted with horror to Fay’s treatment. But
some did not; some thought Fay deserved the caning. However, it was
rare to find someone of this view who also believed that caning would be
an appropriate punishment for vandals in the United States.^
At first blush, this position (that Fay deserved a caning for his
vandalism in Singapore, but would not deserve this for a similar act of
vandalism in the U.S.) seems inconsistent. But on one view of desert,
the inconsistency is merely apparent. On this view, no one deserves
anything "in the abstract," but only according to the rules or purposes
of the social institutions in which he finds himself.^ On this view.
Fay’s caning was deserved because his vandalism occurred in Singapore,
where one of the legal rules is that vandals shall be caned. Since
there is no such rule in the US, vandals here do not deserve to be
31
caned. The alleged inconsistency vanishes on this "institutional"
theory of desert.
In this chapter, I examine some recent attempts to explain desert
in terms of social institutions. I refer to them as institutional
theories of desert, (I make no attempt to elucidate the notion of
"social institution.") I believe that institutional theories of desert
are defective, but that calling attention to their defects sheds light
on some of desert’s most salient features.
A crude institutional theory of desert
I propose to begin by discussing a crude institutional theory of
desert. I am not aware of any philosopher who holds this theory -
though, as will be pointed out later, it is suggested by the writings of
some philosophers. I do believe that this crude theory is presupposed
in some everyday discussions of desert - for example, in discussions of
Michael Fay’s punishment. The theory is this:
T1 S deserves x in virtue of F iff there is some
social institution, I; a rule of I is that those
who participate in I and have F shall receive x;
the rules of I apply to S; S has F.
T1 is rather plausible. Consider the social institution of
professional boxing. Suppose George Foreman knocks out Mike Tyson in
the heavyweight bout. People might say that for this. Foreman deserves
the heavyweight title. This is not because a boxer "preinstitutionally"
deserves the title if he punches out his opponent. It is not as though
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the institution of boxing was invented so that boxers could get the
titles they deserve! Without the institution of boxing, there would be
no boxers, matches, or heavyweight titles. Therefore, the existence of
those rules is a necessary condition of Foreman’s desert of the
heavyweight title. Indeed, it may seem sufficient for Foreman’s desert
of the title that he satisfied the rule that a boxer who knocks out his
opponent in the heavyweight championship fight shall receive the
heavyweight title. At least, that is the idea behind Tl.
Despite Tl’s plausibility, I believe it suffers from several
defects. Perhaps the most obvious one is this. Tl entails that in the
complete absence of social institutions, no one can deserve anything. I
think that reflection on a somewhat fanciful case will suggest that even
in the complete absence of social institutions, it is still possible to
be deserving. The case is this. Imagine a world with no social
institutions: no laws, rulers, governments, religions, and so on. The
only people in this world are Abel and Cain. Abel is industrious. He
built his own shelter, made his own clothes, and hunts his own food.
Cain is slovenly. He lives in a cave, runs around naked, and gets by on
the few berries and roots he can be troubled to gather. Neither Abel
nor Cain knew the other existed until Abel, out hunting, stumbled across
Cain sleeping in the bushes. Without provocation, Cain leapt up and
strangled Abel to death. Cain then stole Abel’s clothes, spear, and the
bag in which Abel had carried a freshly killed rabbit. When Cain came
upon Abel’s shelter, he took up residence until it became uninhabitable
due to neglect. Then Cain resumed his slothful life in the forest.
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Now consider the following desert claims: Abel deserves his
possessions; Abel deserves not to be killed; Cain deserves not to have
Abel’s belongings; Cain deserves punishment (or some other ill) for
killing Abel. These claims seem true. If T1 were true, they could not
be. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine that a society might form
Itself with the intention of distributing goods and evils in accordance
with what people deserve. But if T1 were true, this would be
impossible. Prior to society’s formation, no one could deserve
anything.
The tale of Cain and Abel may be too fanciful to convince the
staunch institutionalist. No matter. T1 has other defects, one of
which can be brought out by considering the following case. Suppose an
ice-fisherman has been warned by a reliable authority that the ice on
the lake is perilously thin. Cavalierly disregarding this warning, he
drives his truck out on the thin ice anyway. He parks it there and
walks several yards away to do some fishing. As expected, his truck
falls through the ice, leaving him stranded. A natural feeling is that
other things being equal, this is just what the man deserves for his
recklessness. But observe that, at least in this world, there is no
social institution with the rule that those who recklessly drive trucks
out on thin ice shall lose their trucks. Indeed, the very idea of such
an institution seems ludicrous. T1 seems unable to handle this sort of
case.
The case of the ice-fisherman is meant to reveal a basic defect of
Tl. The defect is this. T1 requires the existence of some social
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institution for every true desert-claim, even though there are true
desert-claims to which no social institutions can be plausibly held to
correspond. The claim that the ice-fisherman deserves to lose his truck
through the ice is only one example. Another example is the claim that
Jones, in virtue of suffering a series of misfortunes, now deserves a
bit of good luck. This claim could be true, even though there is no
social institution with a rule that those who suffer misfortune shall
experience a bit of good luck. Another example is the claim that, other
things being equal, every person deserves a fair share of life. This
claim (I believe) is true, but there is no social institution with a
rule that people shall receive a fair share of life. Notice that the
point is not merely that there are no such institutions. It is that the
proponent of T1 is forced to either reject these apparently genuine
desert-claims, or posit some rather peculiar social institutions.
A third problem for T1 is this. T1 is not plausibly construed as
a theory of desert at all. Rather, it is more plausibly understood as a
theory of entitlement, which is different from desert. These points can
be brought out by considering a few cases of entitlement. Suppose a
person is named in a legally binding will as the beneficiary of the
testator’s estate. That person is entitled by a rule of law to that
estate. Consider next the runner who first crosses the finish line in
the Olympic 100 meter sprint. This runner is entitled by an Olympic
rule to the gold medal. Consider, finally, the host of a dinner party.
He is entitled by a rule of etiquette to an expression of thanks from
his guests.
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These cases suggest the following theory of entitlement:
E S is entitled to x in virtue of F iff there is
some social institution, I; a rule of I is that
those who participate in I and have F shall
receive x; S participates in I
; S has F.
With one minor difference, E is Tl! The difference is that 'deserves’,
as it appears in Tl, has been substituted with 'is entitled to’ in E.
Thus, Tl better understood as a theory of entitlement, not as a theory
of desert.
This would not matter if entitlement and desert are the same.
They are not. Entitlement is different from desert. This point has
been recognized in the literature^, and can be seen by recalling the
cases above. In each case, it is possible that the person entitled to
the estate, the gold medal, or the expression of thanks does not deserve
it. So, for example, if the beneficiary is a wicked person, he may not
deserve the estate. If the sprinter won only because the most skilled
runner tripped near the finish line, then she may not deserve the gold.
If the host was boorish and the food awful, then he may not deserve any
gratitude. In these cases, people are entitled to things they do not
deserve. Entitlement is therefore different from desert; Tl ignores
this difference.
It is worth noting that at least one philosopher has crafted an
institutional theory of desert that does not conflate entitlement and
desert. This is David Cummiskey, who explains desert not in terms of
institutional rules, but rather in terms of institutional purposes. He
explains this idea with the help of an example:
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A race is a social institution which is usually constructed
tor some specific purpose. We cannot conclude that someonedeserves to win the race without.
.. appealing to the purpose
ot the race. When we say that the most skilled deserves to
win then we are assuming that the point of the race is to
reward skill. Since rewarding skill is the point of the
institution it also is the appropriate basis of desert.^
Julian Lamont seems to commit himself to a similar idea in this passage
This practice [of grading students] normally has behind it
some purpose, or at least some defining value, which plays
an essential role in the setting of the desert-basis. For
instance, sometimes it is to indicate a person’s
demonstrated potential in a particular occupation or in
higher education. In such cases, students who are clearly
above or below the threshold for a B grading do not deserve
that grade, no matter how hard they have tried. Sometimes
the purpose is simply to indicate to the students. .. their
objective mastery of the subject (and this type of grading
can be very different from the previous one). Sometimes the
grade... is to indicate to the students their level of effort
in the subject. Sometimes the desert-basis is decided by
other persons or institutions, sometimes by the teachers
themselves. What is important to notice is that the desert-
basis is determined by other values or purposes, rather than
by something internal to the notion of desert itself.^
The gist of these passages is relatively clear. It can be
expressed as follows:
T2 S deserves x in virtue of F iff there is some
institution, I; a purpose of I is that those who
have F shall receive x; S participates in I
;
S
has F.
So, for example, if a purpose of the institution of racing is to honor
the most skilled runner, then the most skilled runner deserves to be
honored. If a purpose of the institution of grading is to indicate to
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the students their level of effort, then the students who exert the most
effort deserve the best grades.
The important thing to notice is that unlike Tl, T2 does not
conflate desert and entitlement. This is because institutional purposes
are different from institutional rules, and entitlement is explained (in
E) in terms of institutional rules. Thus, it will be possible under T2
to be entitled to something without thereby deserving it, and vice
versa.
To see this, recall Cummiskey’s example of the social institution
of racing. Suppose the purpose of this institution is to honor the most
skilled runner. Suppose further that the rule in a particular race is
that the runner who first crosses the finish line shall receive the
prize. Suppose, finally, that the runner who crosses the finish line
first is not the most skilled. Then this runner is entitled to the
prize, but does not deserve it. The most skilled runner deserves it,
according to T2, since the purpose of the institution is to reward the
most skilled runner. Therefore, T2 does not conflate desert and
entitlement.
However, T2 and Tl are vulnerable to a fourth objection, which I
believe to be the gravest thus far considered. The problem is that Tl
and T2 generate morally repugnant results. Suppose, for example, that
there is a legal system with rules (or purposes) according to which
traffic violators shall receive life imprisonment. If Tl or T2 were
true, traffic violators who fell under these rules would actually
deserve life imprisonment. Suppose next that there is an academic
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grading system with a rule (or purpose) that those with blond hair and
blue eyes shall receive the highest possible marks. T1 and T2 entail
that those who fall under those rules really deserve the highest marks.
Suppose next that there is a system of etiquette with the following
rule: Those who fail to cover their mouths during a sneeze shall have
their hands dipped in boiling chicken fat. If these institutional
theories were true, then rudeness could be grounds for torture.
These are absurd results. No matter what rules or purposes there
are, no one can deserve life imprisonment for double parking. No one
can deserve high marks on a physics exam for being blonde and blue-eyed.
No one deserves to have a hand immersed in boiling chicken fat, merely
for failing to cover a sneeze. Clearly, something has gone wrong with
the institutional theories of desert considered thus far.
The problem is not hard to see. Neither T1 nor T2 places any
moral constraint on the supposedly desert-conferring rules or purposes
of institutions. Without such a constraint, as we have seen, the door
is left open for all sorts of repugnant results. This suggests that an
institutional theory with such a constraint will fare much better than
T1 and T2. Let us examine such a theory.
A rawlsian approach
In a few passages from his remarkably influential A Theory of
Justice, John Rawls appeared to advance an institutional theory of
desert. Like the theories thus far considered, the rawlsian theory
explains desert in terms of the rules (or purposes, in Cummiskey’s
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theory) of institutions. The important difference is that on the
rawlsian theory, there is a moral constraint on those rules. The
constraint is that desert-conferring institutions must be just. As will
be shown, this constraint protects the rawlsian theory of desert from
some of the objections that plagued T1 and T2.
According to a standard view, justice obtains to the extent that
people get what they deserve. A proponent of this standard view
explains justice in terms of desert. Rawls rejects the standard view.
He believes that justice has nothing to do with desert.® Thus, Rawls
does not explain justice in terms of desert. Indeed, in passages
suggesting his commitment to an institutional theory of desert, Rawls
appears to do the opposite: namely, explain desert in terms of justice!
Rawls
:
...it is necessary to be clear about the notion of desert.
It is perfectly true that given a just system of cooperation
as a scheme of public rules and the expectations set up by
it, those who, with the prospect of improving their
condition, have done what the system announces that it will
reward are entitled to their advantages. ... But this sense of
desert presupposes the existence of the cooperative
scheme. . . .
^
The case [of the relation of justice to desert] is analogous
to the relation between the substantive rules of property
and the law of robbery and theft. These offenses and the
demerits they entail presuppose the institution of property
which is established for prior and independent social ends.
For a society to organize itself with the aim of rewarding
moral desert as a first principle would be like having the
institution of property in order to punish thieves.®
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Not only the content of these remarks, but also their context (in
each case they serve as a response to the objection that Rawls’s theory
of justice ignores desert) have suggested to several commentators that
Rawls endorsed an institutional theory of desert. Samuel Scheffler, for
example, writes:
On [Rawls’s] way of understanding desert, the idea that
social institutions should be designed in such a way as to
ensure that people get what they deserve makes about as much
sense as the idea that universities were created so that
professors would have somewhere to turn in their grades, or
that baseball was invented in order to ensure that batters
with three strikes would always be out.®
Another commentator, George Sher, reads Rawls similarly:
In his major work, A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that
desert of reward and recompense are. .. artifacts of social
institutions which in turn are justified in quite different
ways. Instead of imposing constraints upon our choice of
social institutions, personal desert is only established
within and by such institutions.^®
The rawlsian theory of desert is relatively clear: to deserve
something is to be entitled to it under institutional rules that are
just. Let us try to make this theory more precise.
One possible statement of the rawlsian institutional theory of
desert is this:
T3 S deserves x in virtue of F iff there is some
social institution, I; a rule, R, of I is that
those who participate in I and have F shall
receive x; R is just; S participates in I ; S has
F.
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This is a plausible interpretation of Rawls’s own remarks. Moreover, it
does not generate the morally repugnant results that T1 and T2
generated. To see this, reconsider the traffic rule that penalizes
double-parkers with life imprisonment. This rule is plainly unjust.
Likewise for a rule that awards the best grades in a physics class to
people with blond hair and blue eyes, and a rule of etiquette that
punishes rudeness with torture. Rules like this fail to satisfy T3’s
requirement that desert-conferring institutional rules are just.
But if T1 and T2 are implausible, so is T3. Like T2 and T3, T3
entails that in the absence of social institutions, no one deserves
anything. Like T1 and T2, T3 requires its proponent to either reject
apparently genuine desert-claims, or posit some peculiar social
institutions. Finally, like Tl, T3 conflates desert and entitlement. In
these respects, T3 is no improvement over Tl and T2.
However, T3 may not capture the spirit of the rawlsian view. As I
see it, the spirit of that view might be expressed counterfactually
:
People actually deserve things in virtue of the fact that if there were
just social institutions, those institutions would entitle those people
to those things. For personal reasons, I prefer to express this in
terms of possible worlds:
T4 S deserves x in virtue of F iff there is some
world, w, and some social institution, I, in w;
a rule, R, of I is that those who have F shall
receive x; R is just; S has F.^^
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T4 is more plausible than T3. Like T3, it avoids the morally
repugnant results that T1 and T2 generated. Unlike T3, T4 is not
vulnerable to the objection that if it were true, then no one would
deserve anything in the absence of (actual) social institutions. This
is because T4 ranges over all possible worlds, and a proponent of T4 can
appeal to some of those worlds to account for the truth of desert-claims
in worlds without social institutions. Recall, for example, the claim
that Cain deserves punishment (or some other ill) for murdering Abel.
This claim seems true, even though there are no social institutions in
that world. This is no problem for the advocate of T4, who can note
that there is a social institution in some world with the just rule that
murderers shall be punished. It is that otherworldly institution, the
advocate of T4 can claim, that accounts for Cain’s desert of punishment.
In this way, the advocate of T4 may be able to handle many desert-claims
that seem true at institutionless worlds.
Many, but not all. Recall the claim that Abel deserves not to be
killed by Cain. This claim seems true. As I see it, this is because
other things being equal, people deserve a fair share of life.
Consequently, they deserve not to have their lives unnaturally shortened
by murder. But if it is true that each person deserves a fair share of
life, then T4 requires the existence of some social institution with a
rule that persons shall receive a fair share of life - either that, or
the rejection of perfectly plausible desert-claims.
I now turn to consider a final objection to the rawlsian
institutional theory of desert. The objection is that even if T4 avoids
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the morally repugnant conclusions generated by T1 and T2, it generates
some of its own. This objection requires some explanation.
As has been emphasized, the rawlsian theory of desert places a
moral constraint on the rules of desert-conferring institutions. The
constraint is that those rules must be just. Thus, a proper evaluation
of T4 depends on an understanding of the concept of justice that it
depends on. What concept of justice is it?
One thing is clear: it cannot be a concept of justice that appeals
to desert. So, for example, it cannot be the venerable view that
justice is the getting of what’s deserved. Otherwise T4 would be
viciously circular. It would explain desert in terms of justice, and
justice in terms of desert. This would be unacceptable.
A natural alternative conception of justice is, obviously, Rawls’s
conception. This is not the place for a full exposition of Rawls’s
theory of justice. Fortunately, the substance of Rawls’s theory of
justice is contained in two relatively straightforward principles'^:
The Liberty Principle: Each person is to have an equal right
to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a
similar liberty for all.
The Difference Principle: Social and economic inequalities
are to be arranged so that they are (a) to the greatest
benefit to the least advantaged; and (b) attached to offices
and positions that are open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity.
It will not be necessary to rehearse Rawls’s proustian efforts to
explain and defend these principles. The objection that I wish to level
against the rawlsian theory of desert depends only on an understanding
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of the Difference Principle and what it requires. I shall ignore the
Liberty Principle in what follows.
The intuition behind the Difference Principle is plausible enough.
It is that social and economic inequalities should, in justice, benefit
the worst off group. But by how much? The answer to this question is
determined by the fact that the Difference Principle is a maximizing
principle. It requires that a perfectly just institutional framework
maximize the welfare of the socially and economically worst off. Thus,
a slightly less-than-perfect institutional framework will improve but
not maximize the welfare of the worst off group. As Rawls explains:
"while the difference principle is, strictly speaking, a maximizing
principle, there is a significant distinction between the cases that
fall short of the best arrangement
.
So the answer to the question
"By how much?" is: "As much as possible."
Now we are in a position to pose the final objection to the
rawlsian theory of desert. The objection is based on a remark made by
Tom Campbell in the midst of his penetrating discussion of the
Difference Principle:
There is... the problem of what to do about disadvantages
which cannot be specifically rectified, but only compensated
for, such as liability to serious and painfully incurable
illness. Clearly, even an equal share of resources will be
insufficient to redress such imbalance of satisfactions and
medical care in itself will not greatly alter the situation.
Does this mean that the difference principle would involve
putting more and more resources towards marginal
improvements in the lot of persons with such a low quality
of life? Society would then become one large hospital or
welfare institution, to which end all social co-operation
would be ultimately geared.
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Campbell is imagining a society in which the worst off group is
composed of people who suffer from painful and incurable diseases or
handicaps. To avoid the most excruciating pain, and to enjoy even a
minimal level of satisfaction, these unfortunate people require
tremendous amounts of medical care and other benefits. Campbell’s point
is that the Difference Principle seems to require "putting more and more
resources towards marginal improvements" in the lives of these people.
Indeed, if even a marginal improvement can be obtained by imposing huge
taxes on the advantaged groups, then the Difference Principle (which is
a maximizing principle) would seem to require it.
The force of this objection is easier to grasp by comparing two
possible societies. In each society, there are several socio-economic
classes. The worst off class is the class, described above, of those
who suffer from painful and incurable diseases or handicaps. Let us
numerically indicate the net distribution of benefits and burdens to
each class, thus:
SI
Upper Class: + 500
+ 300
+ 100
+ 50
-50
-500
Upper Middle Class:
Middle Class:
Lower Middle Class:
Lower Class:
Worst Off Class:
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S2
Upper Class:
-5
Upper Middle Class: -6
Middle Class: -7
Lower Middle Class: -8
Lower Class:
-9
Worst Off Class:
-499
Campbell’s objection is, in effect, that the Difference Principle
forces us to say that S2 is more just than SI. This is because the
worst off class in S2 is better off than the worst off class in SI.
Apparently, Campbell’s intuition is that this is wrong. SI is not
necessarily less just than S2. Indeed, if the distribution in S2 arises
within an institutional framework that imposes severe taxes on the other
classes, S2 may be less just than SI.
Campbell’s point can now be turned into an objection to the
rawlsian theory of desert. The objection is this. Presumably, an
institutional rule operating in S2 is that those not in the worst off
group must contribute huge sums of their own money in order to achieve a
marginal improvement in the lot of the worst off class. Since this rule
seems required by the Difference Principle, it must be a just rule by
Rawls’s lights. These points, coupled with T4, entail that those who
are not in the worst off group deserve to be aggressively and
oppressively taxed!
As I see it, this is a morally repugnant result. Other things
being equal, no one deserves to suffer such a system of taxation. Of
course it is unfortunate that there are people whose lives will be
somewhat more miserable without such a system. It might even be morally
47
right for people to voluntarily sacrifice large portions of their income
for the sake of minimal improvements in the lives of the worst off. But
no one deserves to have his or her own standard of living drastically
worsened for the sake of such minimal improvements in the lives of
others. Therefore, T4 is defective. In light of this defect and the
others already discussed, I conclude that the rawlsian theory of desert
should be rejected.^®
A rule-utilitarian approach
This is not the end of institutional theories of desert. There
are many possible moral constraints that an institutional theorist might
place on the rules of supposedly desert-conferring institutions;
therefore, there are many possible versions of the institutional theory
of desert. Justice is only one such constraint. Indeed, since there
are different and competing conceptions of justice, there is (at least
in logical space) a collection of "justicized" institutional theories of
desert. A thorough refutation of the institutional approach, then,
would seem to require the refutation of each theory. Needless to say, I
will not attempt that herculean task here.
What I propose to do instead is this. One moral constraint that
an institutional theorist of desert might place on the rules of desert-
conferring institutions is that those rules maximize utility. Something
like this "rule-utilitarian" theory of desert is suggested by Richard
Brandt.
I
propose to examine Brandt’s theory in some detail.
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In contemporary philosophical usage, the term 'utilitarianism’ is
used to name any one of several distinct theories. It is customary to
divide these theories into two sorts: act-utilitarianism and rule-
utilitarianism. If anything unites act-utilitarianisms, it is roughly
the thesis that the moral status of an action - its rightness or its
wrongness - is determined by the consequences that would obtain if that
action were performed. If anything unites rule-utilitarianisms, it is
roughly the thesis that the moral status of an action is determined by
the consequences that would obtain if there were a rule permitting that
action. Although act-utilitarian theories of desert have been
suggested^®, our interest is in a rule-utilitarian theory of desert.
This is because an institutional theory of desert purports to explain
desert in terms of the rules of institutions, not in terms of individual
actions or their consequences.
Perhaps the most influential and well-developed contemporary
version of rule-utilitarianism is Richard Brandt’s "Ideal Moral Code"
theory. Brandt states this theory as follows:
IMC An act is right if and only if it would not be
prohibited by the moral code ideal for the
society; and an agent is morally blameworthy
(praiseworthy) for an act if, and to the degree
that, the moral code ideal in that society would
condemn (praise) him for it.^^
It is somewhat unusual to construe utilitarianism as Brandt has
done: namely, as a theory of not only the moral status of actions, but
also the moral blameworthiness or praiseworthiness of agents. This,
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however, is why Brandt’s rule-utilitarianism is of interest here. For
what else is it to be blameworthy or praise worthy, except to be
deserving of blame or praise? So, IMC seems to include a theory of
desert (of praise and blame at least).
IMC contains or presupposes several technical concepts. One is
the concept of a moral code. A moral code is a set of moral rules.
Examples of moral rules include: "Keep your promises," "Honor your
father and mother," "Help others," "Avoid injuring others," "Improve
yourself," "Bring about just distributions," and so on.^2 Presumably,
this set should be consistent: it should not contain rules that
contradict each other, or rules that direct agents to perform
incompatible actions. It should also be complete: the rules taken
together should cover every situation that is likely to arise in the
relevant society.
A second technical notion is that of a moral code’s being ideal
for a society. Brandt explains that a moral code is ideal for a society
"...if and only if its currency would produce at least as much good per
person as the currency of any other moral code."^^ That is, a moral
code is ideal for a society if and only if no other moral code would, if
current in that society, produce a greater net good per person.
A moral code is current in a society, on Brandt’s view, just in
case two conditions are satisfied:
First, a high proportion of the adults in the society must
subscribe to the moral principles, or have the moral
opinions, constitutive of the code. . .
.
[P] robably it would
not be wrong to require at least 90 percent
agreement. ... Second, we want to say that certain principles
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A, B, etc. belong to the moral code of a society only if
they are recognized as such. That is, it must be that a
large proportion of the adults of the society would respond
correctly if asked, with respect to A and B, whether most
members of the society subscribed to them. 2“*
That is, a moral code is current in a society just in case (i) at least
90 percent of the adults in that society subscribe to it; and (ii) most
adult members of that society believe that most members of that society
subscribe to that code.
An agent subscribGs to a moral code if the following conditions
are met.^^ First, the agent is generally motivated to perform actions
that are permitted by the code, and to avoid performing actions
forbidden by it. Second, the agent will tend to feel guilty or
remorseful if she thinks that she has performed some action forbidden by
the code - unless she has some excuse for performing it. Third, the
agent will tend to think less of those who perform actions forbidden by
the code. Finally, the agent will think that these dispositions,
feelings, actions, and attitudes of hers are justified.
It is important to understand that IMC does not entail that if a
moral code ideal for some society is not actually current in that
society, then actions performed in that society fail to have any moral
status. This is because on Brandt’s view, the moral rightness of an
action performed in a given society is determined by whether or not that
action would be permitted by the moral code ideal for that society if it
were current in that society. Since IMC is also a theory of desert, it
therefore allows that there can be desert (at least of praise and blame)
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in the absence of social institutions and their rules.
Is IMC a plausible theory of desert of blame and praise?
Answering this question may be easier if that theory is considered
separately from Brandt’s theory of moral rightness. Recall that the
theory of desert of blame and praise, as stated by Brandt, is this:
An agent is morally blameworthy (praiseworthy) for an act
if, and to the degree that, the moral code ideal in that
society would condemn (praise) him for it.
This theory is incomplete. It states only a sufficient condition on the
moral blameworthiness or praiseworthiness of agents. A more complete
theory would state sufficient and necessary conditions, thus:
IMC* An agent is morally blameworthy (praiseworthy)
for an act if and only if, and to the degree
that, the moral code ideal in that society would
condemn (praise) him for it.
I presume that Brandt would accept IMC*. At any rate, there is no
indication that he would not.
Crucial to IMC* is the notion of a moral code condemning (or
praising) an agent. Brandt does not explain this notion, but it is
natural to construe it as follows:
C A moral code condemns an agent for performing a
type of action just in case a rule of that code
forbids the performance of actions of that type.
So, for example, if one of the rules of the moral code ideal for a given
society is that lying is not permitted, then agents in that society who
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lie thereby come to be blameworthy - that is, deserving of blame.
One problem with this suggestion is that the analogous suggestion
for a moral code’s praising an agent is implausible. To see this,
suppose a moral code praises an agent for performing a type of action
just in case a rule of that code permits the performance of actions of
that type. Now suppose, as seems plausible, that one of the rules of a
moral code ideal for a given society is that it is permissible to tie
one’s right shoe before tying one’s left shoe. If the current
suggestion were correct, then agents in that society who tie their right
shoe before tying their left shoe would thereby come to be praiseworthy
that is, deserving of praise. This seems wrong. Ordinarily, a normal
adult person does not deserve praise for tying his right shoe before his
left shoe. Furthermore, it may be that another rule in the moral code
ideal for that society is that it is permissible to tie one’s left shoe
before tying one s right shoe. (That is, the moral code ideal for that
society permits one to tie either shoe first.) If so, then the current
proposal generates the result that people in that society would deserve
praise every time they lace up their shoes! Similar arguments would
show that praise is deserved for performing any sort of trivial act.
This seems wrong.
Another notion crucial to IMC* is degree of desert of blame and
praise. There can be no doubt that desert of these things comes in
degrees. I can deserve more blame than you deserve, or less praise than
you deserve. Brandt tries to account for these degrees of desert by
building into IMC* "degrees" of condemnation (or praise) by the moral
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code ideal for a society. Brandt does not explain what it could mean to
speak of such "degrees," but one possibility is this. Let us begin by
focusing on desert of blame. Suppose that punishments are attached to
some of the rules of the moral code ideal for a given society, so that
those who violate those rules are punished. This allows us to say that
degrees of desert of blame are just the degrees of severity of the
punishments attached to these rules. So, to say that a rule severely
blames an agent for performing a type of act is to say that there is a
severe punishment for actions of that type; to say that a rule mildly
blames an agent for performing a type of act is to say that there is a
mild punishment for committing actions of this type. In this way, IMC*
may seem to accommodate degrees of desert of blame: degrees of desert
of blame are degrees of severity of punishment.
The analogous proposal for degrees of desert of praise is this.
Let us suppose that rewards are attached to some of the rules of the
moral code ideal for a given society, so that those who obey them are
rewarded. This allows us to identify degrees of desert of praise with
the values of those rewards. (I leave aside the question of what sort
of value this might be.
)
So, on this suggestion, to say that a rule
highly praises an agent for performing a type of act is to say that
there is a highly valuable reward for performing actions of that type;
to say that a rule lowly praises an agent for performing a type of act
is to say that there is a minimally valuable reward for performing
actions of that type. In this way, IMC* may seem to accommodate degrees
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praise are degrees of value of
of desert of praise: degrees of desert of
reward.
These attempts to account for degrees of desert of blame and
praise reveal the need for a more general theory of desert. To see
this, suppose that the moral code ideal for a society contains a rule
that prohibits lying. Suppose further that there is a punishment
attached to this rule, so that liars are punished. Now suppose someone
in that society tells a lie. Would any punishment be appropriate? The
answer is clearly "No." As I see it, the appropriate punishment is the
deserved punishment. So, for example, if the agent’s lie was trivial,
then the agent deserves mild punishment. If the agent’s lie was
seriously damaging, then the agent deserves severe punishment.
What is it for an agent to deserve punishment? IMC* does not
provide an answer to this question. This is because IMC* is not a
theory of desert of punishment (or reward). It is a theory of desert of
blame and praise. Thus, the plausibility of IMC^ appears to hinge on
the plausibility of some theory of desert of punishment and reward.
Indeed, I suspect that the plausibility of that theory would itself
depend on the plausibility of a general theory of desert. What might a
general theory of desert look like, on Brandt’s view?
Brandt does not propose a general theory of desert. However, I
think that if he were to propose one, it might look something like this:
BTD S deserves x in virtue of F if and only if S has
F, and a rule in a moral code ideal for S’s
society is that those who have F shall receive
X.
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BTD treats desert as entitlement according to rules that are part
of a moral code ideal for the relevant society. For example, S deserves
punishment to some degree of severity in virtue of lying if and only if
S lies and is thereby "entitled" to a punishment of that degree of
severity by a rule in a moral code ideal for S’s society
. To take a
different example, S deserves a reward for capturing a wanted felon if
and only if S captures a wanted felon and is thereby entitled to a
reward by a rule in a moral code ideal for S’s society.
I believe that BTD is false. It is possible to be entitled to
something by a rule within a moral code ideal for one’s society, yet
fail to deserve it. To see this, consider the moral rule that elderly
people shall receive care and assistance from their children. It seems
likely that this rule will be part of a moral code ideal for many
societies, including our own. BTD, together with this rule, entail that
elderly people in that society deserve care and assistance from their
children. Now suppose that I am an elderly person living in that
society. Suppose further that I have been an abusive, unloving, and
irresponsible father to my children. Suppose, finally, that I am now
aged, feeble, and in need of medical care and financial assistance. In
these circumstances, it would be implausible to suppose that I now
deserve care and assistance from my children. If I deserve care and
assistance at all, I may deserve it from the state, or from my former
employer, but certainly not from the children to whom I gave nothing but
grief. This example shows that BTD is defective, provided that the
56
aforementioned rule is indeed part of a moral code ideal for this
society.
Consider next the moral rule that those to whom promises have been
made shall receive what was promised. It seems likely that this rule
will be part of a moral code ideal for many societies, including our
own. Now suppose that you have promised to loan me your car. Suppose
further that if I receive it, I will use it to run down my enemies.
BTD, together with this rule, entail that I deserve the loan of your
car. This is absurd. Whatever prima facie claim I had to the car in
virtue of your promise is completely mitigated by the fact that I will
use it to run people over. Thus, if the rule regarding promises is
indeed among the rules in a moral code ideal for that society, then
there is reason to reject BTD.
An advocate of BTD might reply to these arguments by claiming that
the aforementioned rules would never be among the rules of a moral code
ideal for a society. However, such a claim would be implausible. If
those rules are moral rules at all, then surely there is a moral code
ideal for some society that contains one or another of them.
This suggests that a supporter of BTD might argue that these rules
are not moral rules at all, and hence not part of any moral code. But
this, too, is implausible. If "Keep your promises" is a moral rule,
then why not "Those to whom promises have been made shall receive what
they have been promised?" If "Honor your elders" is a moral rule, they
why not "The elderly shall receive care and assistance from their
children?" After all, it seems as though one would be as effective as
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the other if given as moral advice. I conclude that there is no basis
for denying these rules the status of moral rules.
I further conclude that Brandt’s rule-utilitarian theory of desert
of praise and blame, and the general theory of desert suggested by it,
are not acceptable theories of desert. If there is an acceptable rule-
utilitarian analysis of desert, Brandt has not found it.
Conclusion
In spite of the apparent failure of institutional theories of
desert, there is something plausible about them. As I see it, their
plausibility derives from the following fact: Many objects of desert,
and many bases for deserving them, are institutional artifacts.
Consider first some typical objects of desert, or things deserved:
grades, championships, financial compensation, promotions, wages, and so
on. Each of these is an artifact of a more or less identifiable
institution. Perhaps it is reflection on these objects of desert that
has led some philosophers to suppose that desert itself is an artifact
of social institutions. Next, consider some bases for desert: excelling
on a physics exam, winning the Boston Marathon, closing the big deal
with Microsoft. None of these could exist without the existence of a
social institution and its rules. Perhaps it is reflection on these
bases for desert that has led some philosophers to conclude that desert
itself is an artifact of social institutions.
However, reflection on other objects and bases of desert suggests
that desert itself is not an artifact of social institutions. For
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example, consider the claim that Jack deserves punishment in virtue of
killing an innocent person, or the claim that Jill deserves respect in
virtue of being a human being, or the claim that Joe deserves gratitude
from his parents in virtue of his efforts to take care of them in their
old age. These and many other cases of desert seem not to depend on the
existence of institutions. Indeed, some of these cases suggest that a
desire that people get what they deserve might prompt people to create
institutions - the institution of punishment, for example. It may have
been reflection on these sorts of cases that led Feinberg, for one, to
declare that desert ...is not logically tied to institutions,
practices, and rules.
How can a theorist of desr *' account for the dependence of some
desert objects and desert bases on social institutions, on the one hand,
and the independence of some desert objects and desert bases from social
institutions, on the other? Is a compromise between institutional and
preinstitutional theories of desert possible?
One possible compromise is due to N. Scott Arnold. In the course
of a discussion of desert of profits, Arnold made the following
distinction:
...there are two kinds of desert claims - institutional and
noninst itutional . The latter directly reflect general moral
assessments of a person’s character. Thus it is in this
sense that good people deserve to be happy... and wicked
people deserve to be miserable. On the other hand,
institutional deserts are logically connected to particular
social institutions. The basal reasons. .. that ground
[institutional] desert claims are determined by the nature
of the institution and need not have any independent
significance. This distinction between institutional and
noninstitutional deserts comes out quite clearly in the case
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of contests such as sporting events. The naturally talented
athlete who demonstrates the greatest proficiency deserves
to win, even if he is an unsavory character and even if his
untalented opponent trains harder.^®
As I understand it, the compromise suggested by these remarks is
that there are two concepts, each meriting the name 'desert’. One is
the concept of institutional desert; the other is the concept of
noninstitutional desert. If this suggestion is correct, the conflict
between institutional theorists of desert, on the one hand, and
preinstitutional theorists of desert, on the other, is merely apparent.
Rather than contradicting one another, advocates of these theories are
merely talking past each other.
For two reasons, I do not favor this compromise. One is that, as
I hope has been shown, institutional theories of desert are defective.
If they are theories of anything, they are not theories of desert. It
is misleading, then, to label them theories of desert - even
institutional theories of desert. Another is that there seems to me
to be a better compromise, one that does not fracture the concept of
desert.
The compromise is this. Common to the institutional theories of
desert considered thus far is the idea that desert is somehow determined
by rules. More specifically, the idea is that to deserve something is
to be entitled to it according to some sort of rule. My suggestion is
that this idea - rather, what is plausible in this idea - can be
captured by accepting the following proposal: Entitlement is a basis
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for desert, but not the whole of desert. Although I explain this
proposal in detail in Chapter 7, a few remarks here may be helpful.
My view is that there are many bases for desert. I believe these
bases include effort, achievement, moral worth, being a person, need,
and others. Many of these bases - need and effort, for example - are
not institutional artifacts. But on my view, another desert base is
entitlement. As noted, I defend this claim in Chapter 7. Entitlements
are generated by institutional rules. Hence, entitlement is an
institutional artifact. If this is right, then a basis for desert, but
not desert itself, is purely institutional.
This is a compromise position. It attempts to capture not only
what is plausible in institutional accounts of desert (namely, that
entitlement has a deep relationship to desert), but also what is
plausible in preinstitutional theories of desert (namely, that desert
can arise in the absence of social institutions and their rules). Of
course, the tenability of this compromise can be assessed only in the
light of a complete theory of desert that includes it. I present such a
theory in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 4
DESERT AND THE EMOTIONS
Introduction
"Emotions occupy a fundamental place in our moral lives." Or so
claims Justin Oakley in his recently published book, Morality and the
Emotions.^ My view is that desert also occupies a fundamental place in
our moral lives. If Oakley and I are right, it would not be surprising
if the emotions and desert turned out to be deeply connected.
In fact, there is a tendency among writers on desert to posit a
deep connection between desert and the emotions. Joel Feinberg’s
seminal paper, "Justice and Personal Desert," is an excellent example of
this tendency. Therein Feinberg claimed: "If we were all perfect
stoics ... there would be no use for the concept of desert."^ I suspect
that behind this assertion is the belief that the basic objects of
desert, the things we ultimately deserve, are expressions of emotion.
Not just any emotion, but rather a special class of emotions. On
Feinberg’s view, these include gratitude, appreciation, resentment,
remorse, sympathy, and concern. Feinberg calls these emotions the
"responsive attitudes":
...responsive attitudes are the basic things persons deserve
and... 'modes of treatment’ are deserved only in a derivative
way, insofar perhaps as they are the natural or conventional
means of expressing the morally fitting attitudes. Thus
punishment, for example, might be deserved by the criminal
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only because it is the customary way of expressing the
resentment or reprobation he "has coming."^
Feinberg’s idea seems to be that if the "basic things" people
deserve are expressions of emotion, then a world of emotionless or
stoic people would have "no use" for the concept of desert. At any
rate, people in that world will never get what they deserve. Toward the
end of this chapter, I will return to Feinberg’s view of the connection
between desert and the so-called "responsive attitudes."
Meanwhile, consider another philosopher who envisages a
relationship between desert and the emotions. This is Samuel Scheffler,
who has recently argued that our "...reactive attitudes presuppose a
preinstitutional notion of desert that is incompatible with liberal
principles of justice."^ That is, the character of such emotions as
indignation, gratitude, and respect suggests (to Scheffler, at any rate)
that ordinary folk implicitly believe what some influential contemporary
theorists of justice reject: namely, that the notion of desert is
conceptually prior to the idea of justice, and that it can be used to
judge the justice of institutions and their rules. The details of
Scheffler’ s argument for this claim are not relevant here. The point is
simply that Scheffler connects (though in a way different from Feinberg)
desert to emotions .
Yet another philosopher who posits a connection between desert and
the emotions is David Miller.^ Miller’s view of this connection is the
main topic of this chapter. I choose to examine Miller’s theory for two
reasons. One is that his proposal is the most detailed of those that
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posit a desert-emotion connection. Another is that Miller’s theory
promises to supply an interesting criterion of desert basehood. This
criterion, if correct, could be used (and Miller attempts to use it) to
settle long-standing debates over whether desert bases include need,
suffering, moral worth, and others. Such a principle is clearly
desirable. Thus, Miller’s view demands serious attention.
Desert bases and the appraising attitudes
s conception of the link between desert and certain
emotions can be introduced in the following way. Desert requires a
base. That is, if a person deserves something, then he or she deserves
it /or possessing some property (e.g., having innocently suffered) or
performing some action (e.g., committing a crime). As Feinberg
insisted, "Desert without a basis is simply not desert."^
A related point has been thought to hold for a certain class of
emotions: gratitude, resentment, admiration, remorse, sympathy, and
others. These emotions (the "reactive attitudes," in Peter Strawson’s
famous terminology®) seem to require a basis. Like desert bases, the
bases for these emotions are either properties possessed or actions
performed by individuals. So, for example, if I admire you, I admire
you for something - say, your fine musical talent. If you resent me,
you resent me for something - say, for some misdeed of mine. Likewise
for gratitude, remorse, sympathy, and many other emotions. These
emotions are different from emotions such as malaise, joy, fear, and
anxiety, which seem not to require a basis. It is possible to be
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anxious, for example, without being anxious about anything in
particular. But it is not possible to be resentful, for example, and
not resent someone for something in particular.
Now we are in a position to understand Miller’s view of the
connection between desert and emotion. It is that the bases for
reactive attitudes ("appraising attitudes," in Miller’s terminology) are
also the bases for desert. Miller writes:
To understand the relationship between a desert basis and a
judgement of desert, it is helpful to... look at certain
attitudes which one person may hold towards another:
attitudes such as admiration, approval, and gratitude, for
which I shall use the generic term 'appraising attitudes’.
It is plain that, like judgements of desert, these
appraising attitudes demand a basis, which consists of
features of the person (or his conduct) towards whom the
attitude is held. If I admire someone, I must admire him
for something (for his intelligence, or for his skill at
playing the violin) The range of possible desert bases
coincides with range of possible bases for appraising
attitudes. (Page 89.)
As I understand him. Miller is proposing that whatever is a basis
for an appraising attitude is also a basis for desert, and that whatever
is a basis for desert is a basis for an appraising attitude. In other
words:
MT F is a desert base if and only if F is the basis
of an appraising attitude.
MT is plausible. Consider the appraising attitudes of admiration
and approval. These attitudes are directed toward people who possess
qualities that are desert bases. Examples of these desert bases include
68
athletic skill, industriousness, and moral excellence. Or consider the
appraising attitudes of abhorrence and contempt. These attitudes are
often aimed at those who exhibit qualities that are desert bases.
Examples of these desert bases include ineptitude, slovenliness, and
wickedness. The coincidence of desert bases and appraising attitudes in
these and other cases lends some credence to MT.
MT is plausible for other reasons. First, it is inconsistent with
the implausible view that there is only one basis for desert. (I called
this view monism in Chapter 2.) There is surely more than one basis
for emotions such as gratitude, resentment, admiration, contempt, and so
on; thus, MT implies that there is more than one basis for desert.
Second, MT implies that people need not be responsible for bases of
desert. This is because at least some appraising attitudes - sympathy,
for example - may be appropriately directed at people in virtue of
properties for which they are not responsible - for example, innocent
suffering. Third, MT implies that desert bases need not be located in
the past.^ For example, it is possible to be grateful to someone not
only for what she has done, but also for what she will do; or to detest
someone not only because of what he has done, but also for what he will
do.® Since the bases for these appraising attitudes are located in the
future, MT implies that desert bases can be located in the future.
Fourth, MT implies that non-persons can be subjects of desert. A
seeing-eye dog, for example, can be the object of admiration or
gratitude; therefore, it can be a subject of desert. These implications
were endorsed in Chapter 2. If they are correct, MT gains plausibility.
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MT captures the essence of Miller’s version of the desert-emotion
connection. However, as will become apparent in the next section, MT is
too crude to serve Miller’s purposes. To meet those purposes, MT must
be refined. This can be done in the following way. Let us divide
appraising attitudes into two sorts: positive and negative. Positive
appraising attitudes are pro attitudes. They include admiration,
respect, gratitude, and so on. Negative appraising attitudes are "con"
attitudes. They include contempt, disrespect, resentment, and so on.
Presumably, bases for "good desert" or desert of benefit will be bases
for positive appraising attitudes; bases for "bad desert" or desert of
harm will be bases for negative appraising attitudes. These points
allow us to state a clarified version of Miller’s version of the desert-
emotion connection:
MT* F is a desert base for x if and only if (i) x is
a benefit and F is the basis of a positive
appraising attitude; or (ii) x is a harm and F
is the basis of a negative appraising attitude.®
Using the theory
As I noted earlier, one of the striking aspects of Miller’s view
of the desert-emotion connection is that it provides an interesting
criterion for desert basehood. At any rate, this is what Miller
believes. He argues against regarding various things as desert bases,
and these arguments depend on the truth of (what I have called) MT*.^°
Let us examine these arguments.
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Writers on desert disagree about what is and what is not a basis
for desert. One disputed desert base is need. Some philosophers say
that need is a desert base. Feinberg is an example. He writes:
A man with a chronically sick wife or child deserves
compensation since through no fault of his own he has
greater need than others; and the same is true of the man
with a large number of dependents.
Miller disagrees. His view is that need is not a basis for
desert. He argues as follows:
What disqualifies needs from being taken as grounds for
desert is. . .that no one wishes to have them, or admires
others for having them. (Page 86.)
In this passage, Miller is not being as careful as he should be.
He claims to show that need is not "grounds for desert" by showing that
need is not a basis for admiration (or, presumably, any other positive
appraising attitude). But the most Miller has shown is that need is not
grounds for deserving anything good. Need, for all that Miller has
said, may be a basis for some negative appraising attitude. If so, it
could be grounds for desert; that is, it could be a basis for deserving
something bad.
Indeed, some needs seem to be bases for negative appraisal. To
see this, suppose a profoundly insecure man needs to belittle other
people in order to feel happy. This need may be a basis for regarding
the man with contempt. Or suppose a fantastically gluttonous man needs
to eat five pounds of meat daily in order to maintain his weight. This
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need may be a basis for regarding the man with disgust. Or suppose a
masochist needs to feel pain in order to retain her sense of self-worth.
This need may be a basis for pitying her. These examples suggest that
need may be a basis for various negative appraising attitudes. If it
is, MT* entails that need is a basis for bad desert.
Consider next Miller’s argument against several other purported
desert bases:
Needs are not unique in being generally inappropriate as a
basis of desert. The same is true of beliefs, or
preferences, or interests; we cannot claim that people
deserve benefits because of what they believe, and again the
reason is that there is nothing in the actual holding of a
belief (as opposed to the process of arriving at it) that we
can appropriately admire. (Page 86.)
Beliefs, preferences, interests: none, argues Miller, is a base for an
appraising attitude. Therefore, none is a basis for desert.
Once again. Miller is not being very careful. What he means to
argue is that beliefs, preferences, and interests are not something we
"admire;" hence, they are not bases for deserving anything good. Miller
has not shown that these things are not bases for negative appraising
attitudes; nor, if MT* is assumed, has he proven that they are not bases
for desert of something bad.
Indeed, it seems that beliefs, preferences, and interests can be
bases for negative appraising attitudes. Suppose, for example, that
Jones believes one race of human beings is intrinsically inferior to
another race. It would be quite natural to regard Jones with contempt
in virtue of his believing such a thing. Or suppose Smith prefers to
72
converse with his mouth full of masticated food. Most of us would
regard Smith with disgust for this. Or suppose Roberts has an
irrational interest in some hopeless, doomed project. For this, we
might regard him with pity. If contempt, disgust, and pity are negative
appraising attitudes, and if MT* is true, then beliefs, preferences, and
interests can be bases for bad desert.
But once it is admitted that beliefs (etc.) can be bases for bad
desert, it is implausible to deny that they can also be bases for good
desert. Indeed, it seems that beliefs can be bases of good desert.
Consider this dialogue by William Galston:
A: John deserves to be the leader of our spiritual community.
B: Why?
A: Because of the unusual purity and sincerity of his
Christian belief.
I believe that similar examples could be adduced to show that
preferences and interests can be bases for good desert.
It is important to see that these criticisms do not impugn MT*.
This is because MT*, by itself, entails nothing about whether a
particular property is a basis for desert, or a basis for some
appraising attitude. To yield such results, MT* must be conjoined with
a substantive view about what is and what is not a basis for appraising
attitudes, or a substantive view about what is and is not a basis for
desert. The upshot is that an advocate of MT* need not accept Miller’s
arguments that need, beliefs, preferences, desires, and pain are not
bases for (good) desert. Those arguments presuppose what an advocate of
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MT* can reject: namely, Miller’s substantive view that these things are
not bases for positive appraising attitudes.
Why Miller’s theory is false
Nevertheless, there are two reasons for thinking that MT* is
false. One can be brought out by considering Miller’s argument against
a popular view about why wages are deserved. According to this view,
wages are deserved as compensation for the suffering one’s work
involves. Miller rejects this theory:
Generally, when we think of work as involving human
costs... we are thinking of what the person is suffering, not
of the good qualities he is displaying. I do not think that
these features can serve as a basis for desert. ... [for] a
desert basis consists of personal attributes which are
generally held in high regard. Pain cannot therefore be a
ground for desert [of wages]
,
though the courage shown in
withstanding pain might be. In so far as we consider the
costs themselves which are involved in work... our judgements
of deserved compensation must be interpreted. .. not as desert
judgements in the true sense, but as judgements about the
making good of unwarranted deprivation. (Page 112.)
I understand the argument of this passage as follows. Wages are a
benefit. Thus, MT* requires that the basis for deserving them must be
the basis of some positive appraising attitude. But suffering is not a
basis for any appraising attitude. Therefore, if wages are deserved at
all, they are never deserved as compensation for work-related pain or
harm.
This argument reveals a defect with MT*. The defect can be
brought out by way of a dilemma. Suffering is a basis for some
appraising attitude, or not. Suppose that it is not. Then if MT* is
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true, suffering is not a basis for desert of any kind. But surely
suffering is a basis for desert. To see this, suppose an innocent
person is mugged. In the course of her attack, she suffers serious
injuries. For this she may deserve sympathy, compensation, and medical
care. She may also deserve that the mugger be prosecuted to the fullest
extent of the law. She deserves all this in virtue of suffering the
attack and the injuries. So, suffering is a basis for desert. Assuming
that MT* is correct, it follows that suffering is the basis for some
appraising attitude, positive or negative. Suffering is unlikely to
be the basis of a negative appraising attitude. If it were, MT* would
entail that suffering is a basis for bad desert. That would be
implausible. It is more plausible that suffering is a basis for desert
of good things (financial compensation, for example). So, suffering
must be the basis for some positive appraising attitude. What attitude
could this be? Pity and sympathy seem to be the only candidates. Yet
these are not really modes of positive appraisal. They are not "pro"
attitudes. Indeed, it seems highly counterintuitive that suffering
should be the basis of a "pro" attitude of any kind. Thus, if suffering
is a basis for deserving good, MT* requires that suffering be the basis
of some positive appraising attitude - but there seems to be no positive
appraising attitude appropriate to suffering. This reveals a defect
with MT*. It is that suffering is basis for desert of good, but there
seems to be no basis for positive appraisal that corresponds to it.
The second reason for rejecting MT* can be brought out by
recalling a point made by G. E. Moore. Consider the property of being
75
desirable. How does one discover whether something has this property?
One answer, which seems to have suggested itself to John Stuart Mill, is
that one looks around and sees whether the thing is actually desired.
If it is actually desired, then it is desirable; if not, not. Moore’s
point was that this is not a good test for desirability. For, as Moore
maintained, a thing’s desirability is not dependent on whether or not it
IS desired. This is evidenced by the fact that it is possible that
people will desire that which is really undesirable. There is no
necessary connection, then, between that which in fact desirable, on the
one hand, and that which is in fact desired, on the other.
A similar point can be made about bases for appraising attitudes.
To see this, suppose that you admire me. It does not follow that I
possess any property that makes me worthy of admiration. For it is
possible to admire someone for whom contempt would be appropriate.
There is no necessary connection between that which is in fact
admirable, on the one hand, and that which is in fact admired, on the
other.
This fact allows us to ask a general question: Given an
appraising attitude, what is an appropriate basis for that attitude?
Miller sometimes writes as though the appropriateness of a basis for an
appraising attitude is determined by whether or not that attitude is
actually directed towards those who exemplify that basis.
Now it is not actually necessary for me, the maker of the
judgement [that Smith deserves to win the race], to have
this attitude of admiration myself .... Still
,
I live in a
community in which most people would take up the relevant
appraising attitude toward hard athletic training, and hence
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I can give Smith’s training as a reason for his desert.
(Page 90.
)
...a [good] desert basis consists of personal attributes
which are generally held in high regard. (Page 112.)
These passages suggest the following:
F is a basis for an appraising attitude, A, if
and only if most people adopt A towards those
who have F.
This is an untenable view, for the reason noted above: namely,
that from the fact that most people direct an appraising attitude
towards someone in virtue of possessing some property, it does not
follow that this property really is a basis for that attitude. Besides,
if MT* were construed in accordance with the theory above, then what
counts as a basis for desert would be determined by contingent facts
about what "most people" make the objects of their appraising attitudes.
This would be an implausible account of desert basehood. To see this,
suppose that most people are contemptuous of those who are morally
virtuous. Then moral virtue would be the basis for the appraising
attitude of contempt. Since contempt is a negative appraising attitude,
MT* would entail that moral virtue is a basis for deserving harm. This
is an absurd result.
In other places. Miller appears to accept the difference between
being, as a contingent fact, the basis of someone’s appraising attitude,
and being an appropriate basis for that attitude. For example:
...we cannot claim that people deserve benefits because of
what they believe, and... the reason is that there is nothing
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in the actual holding of a belief .. .which we can
appropriately admire. (Page 86.)
When we make a judgement of desert, we are judging the
appropriateness of this particular individual, with his
qualities and past behavior, receiving a given benefit or
harm - an appropriateness which is make intelligible by
considering the appraising attitudes that we may take up
towards the person. (Pages 92-93.)
The question is, what does Miller mean by 'appropriate’? A
natural answer is this:
A basis for an appraising attitude is an
appropriate basis for that attitude if and only
if those who exemplify that basis deserve to be
the object of that attitude.
To see that this is a natural answer to the question, consider a
few examples. Take those who possess great musical ability. These
people are appropriately admired because, in virtue of their talent,
they deserve to be admired. Similarly, those who are morally wicked are
appropriately detested because they deserve to be detested. Similarly,
those who innocently suffer are appropriately shown sympathy because
this is what they deserve; and so on. In general, then, it seems that a
basis is appropriate to an attitude just in case those who exemplify
that basis deserve to be the object of that attitude.
Miller cannot help himself to this natural understanding of what
it is for a property to be an appropriate basis for an appraising
attitude. If he did, MT* would amount to this:
F is a desert base for x if and only if (i) x is
a benefit and those who exemplify F deserve
positive appraisal; or (ii) x is a harm and
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those who exemplify F deserve negative
appraisal
.
This is an explanation of being a desert base in terms of desert.
One would have thought that if there were an explanation of desert, it
would go in precisely the opposite direction, explaining desert in terms
of its bases. Anyway, the main attraction of MT* - namely, its promise
as a principle for determining what is and is not a basis for desert -
is entirely lost on this current proposal. For if the question is what
counts as a desert base, then it is no help to be told, as the theory
above tells us, that bases for desert are those things that make people
deserving. This is as helpful as saying, for example, that bases for
admiration are those things that make people admirable.
Thus, the second defect with MT* is that it may amount to an
explanation of desert basehood in terms of bases that are appropriate to
various emotions, but this notion of appropriateness seems to be nothing
more than the concept of desert itself. If so, then MT* is vacuous.
Is there a desert-emotion connection?
The failure of Miller’s theory raises the question of whether
there is any interesting link between desert and the emotions. In this
final section, I briefly consider two further views: Feinberg’s and my
own.
As noted at the outset, Feinberg’s view seems to be that desert
and emotions are connected in the following way: Whenever one deserves
something, what one deserves is that some emotion be expressed. The
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forms of treatment that are in fact received - prizes, grades,
punishment, wages, and so on - are, in Feinberg’s words, "deserved only
in a derivative way, insofar perhaps as they are the natural or
conventional means of expressing the morally fitting attitudes." So,
for example, if you deserve a prize, then you deserve that admiration be
expressed. If you deserve a good grade, you deserve that approval be
expressed. If you deserve punishment, then you deserve that resentment
be expressed. If you deserve a wage, then you deserve that gratitude be
expressed; and so on.
Note that unlike MT*, Feinberg’s view is not really a substantive
theory of desert basehood. It merely asserts an interesting connection
between objects of desert and the emotions. The connection is this:
Whenever a form of treatment is deserved, this treatment is really just
the expression of some emotion that deserves to be expressed.
A bit of reflection, however, casts doubt on Feinberg’s view.
Suppose, as seems plausible, that every newborn child deserves to live a
relatively long life. (This is one reason why it is especially tragic
when young people die: they have been robbed of their "fair share" of
life. ) We may hope that each child gets the share of life that it
deserves. We may be happy if it does, or unhappy if it does not. But
it is clear that what the child deserves - namely, a relatively long
life - is not that some emotion be expressed. Or, taking a different
example, suppose a person has suffered a long stretch of misfortune.
Other things being equal, this person now deserves some good luck. My
may hope that this happens, and be sad if it does not. But what the
80
person deserves - namely, a bit of good luck - Is not that some emotion
be expressed. I think these examples show that Feinberg’s view of the
desert-emotion connection is false.
Despite my rejections of Miller’s and Feinberg’s views, I do
accept that there is an interesting desert-emotion connection. My
version of it is simple: Some emotions are desert bases. My reason for
saying this is based on two things: the view that moral virtue is a
basis for desert, and the view that moral virtue has something to do
with the emotions.
Moral virtue has traditionally been regarded as a basis for
desert. The idea is that those who are virtuous deserve happiness.
Those who are wicked deserve to fail to be happy. But as Aristotle
argued in the Nicomachean Ethics, a person is virtuous not merely for
performing the right sorts of actions in the right sorts of
circumstances, but also for feeling the appropriate emotions to the
appropriate degree. If this is correct, as I believe it is, then
emotions are a constituent of a basis for desert.
Feinberg said "If we were all perfect stoics. .. there would be no
use for the concept of desert." The truth, I believe, is rather that if
we were all perfect stoics, then there would be no use for the venerable
notion - a "law of justice," in Leibniz’s opinion - that the virtuous
deserve happiness, and the wicked do not.^® For if Aristotle is right
about emotions and virtue, then emotionless people would lack virtue.
Hence, they would lack an important basis for desert. That, so far as I
can see, is all there is to the elusive desert-emotion connection.
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CHAPTER 5
JUSTIFYING DESERT-CLAIMS
Introduction
Hard workers deserve success. Wrongdoers deserve punishment.
Victims of negligence deserve compensation. The best qualified
applicant deserves the job. The most able athletes deserve victory.
Conscientious students deserve good grades. The virtuous deserve
happiness.
Many people would accept these platitudes without thinking twice.
If pressed to justify them, however, these people might be nonplussed.
They might (after recuperating) protest that these and kindred "desert-
claims" are so obviously true that there is no way, and no need, to
justify them.
For a philosopher, this response might seem unsatisfactory. As
David Lewis eloquently put it:
It is the profession of philosophers to question platitudes
that others accept without thinking twice. A dangerous
profession, since philosophers are more easily discredited
than platitudes, but a useful one. For when a good
philosopher challenges a platitude, it usually turns out
that the platitude was essentially right; but the
philosopher has noticed trouble that one who did not think
twice could not have met. In the end the challenge is
answered and the platitude survives, more often than not.
But the philosopher has done the adherents of the platitude
a service: he has made them think twice.
^
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George Sher has provided us this service with respect to the
platitudes about desert. Indeed, his book Desert is (as far as I know)
the only attempt at a full-scale justification of desert-claims
available in print. ^ if his project succeeds, we will have reasons to
believe our platitudinous desert-claims. We will also gain the
intellectual satisfaction of knowing that our beliefs about desert are
linked to other, more fundamental beliefs, and are not simply "adrift"
in conceptual space. Even better, perhaps, we will have settled debates
about what is and what is not a basis for desert of various things. If,
on the other hand, Sher’s justificatory project fails, no harm is done.
Thus, there are good reasons to undertake it, and no good reason not to.
A summary of Sher’s project
Before proceeding, a brief summary of Sher’s project may be
helpful. Sher writes: ...one of my central aims is to display the
underlying justification of desert-claims" (xi). In one place, Sher
says desert-claims are "...claims that persons deserve things" (x).^ He
offers a list of fifteen examples:
1. Jones deserves his success; he’s worked hard for it.
2. Smith deserved more success than he had; he gave it his
all.
3. Walters deserves the job; he’s the best-qualified
applicant.
4. Wilson deserved to be disqualified; he knew the deadline
for applications was March 1.
5. Jackson deserves more than minimum wage; his job is
important and he does it well.
6. Baker deserves to win; he’s played superbly.
7. Miss Vermont deserves to win; she’s the prettiest
entrant.
85
8. Anderson deserves his twenty-year sentence; he planned
the murder.
9. Brown may have known that he wouldn’t be caught, but he
still deserves to be punished.
10. Winters deserves some compensation; he’s suffered
constant pain since the shooting.
11. Lee deserves a reward; he risked his life.
12. Benson deserves some good luck; he’s a fine person.
13. Gordon deserves some good luck; he’s had only bad.
14. McArthur deserves a hearing; he’s an expert on the
subject.
15. Cleveland deserves better publicity; it’s an
interesting city. (Pages 6-7.)
According to Sher, these and all other desert-claims have (at
least implicitly) the form *M deserves X for A’ M is the object of
desert, X is the thing deserved, and A is the reason for M’s deserving X
or what Sher, following Joel Feinberg, calls a "desert basis" (7).
Actually, Sher is not interested in justifying desert-claims like
1-15, at least not directly. After all, one might "justify" any one of
desert-claims 1-15 by appealing to one or more of the platitudes about
desert. For example:
Hard workers deserve to succeed.
Jones is a hard worker.
Therefore, Jones deserves to succeed.
This argument is a "justification" of the particular desert-claim that
Jones deserves success. But it is not very deep, because the platitude
that hard workers deserve to succeed has been left unjustified. Sher
wants to provide deep justifications of particular desert-claims, such
as 1-15 above, by justifying more general desert-claims, such as the
claim that hard workers deserve to succeed.
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It will be helpful to have a list of the general desert-claims
that Sher attempts to justify^:
to experience the expected consequences
oi their free actions.
C2. People deserve what they have diligently tried to
achieve.
C3. People deserve punishment for their wrongful acts.
C4. People deserve compensation for the wrongful harm they
suffer.
C5. People deserve wages for the work they do.
C6. People deserve prizes/good grades for performing well
according to the relevant rules.
Cl. The best-qualified applicant deserves the job.
C8. People who perform virtuous acts deserve to be rewarded.
C9. Virtuous people deserve happiness.
How does Sher justify these desert-claims? In theory, Sher does
not commit himself to any particular method of justification:
...I accept, and find liberating, a metaethic that holds
that there are no a priori limits to what counts as an
acceptable philosophical account. What will turn out to be
intellectually satisfying often cannot be known in advance.
( Page xii
. )
But in practice, Sher’s justifications are naturally interpreted as
arguments intended to entail a general desert-claim. At any rate, that
is how I will interpret them.
Sher’s justifications, whatever their nature, have something in
common: each involves an operative principle that is moral-normative or
axiological.® It will help to have a list of the principles to which
Sher appeals in his justifications of C1-C8’:
PI. Freedom is valuable.
P2. Persons are valuable.
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P3.
P4.
P5.
P6.
P7.
For every good G, every person M, and every
period of time P, if M has less (more) of G than
he should during P, then M should have
correspondingly more (less) of G or some related
good than he otherwise should during some later
period P’
.
Conventions for evaluating performance ought to
be honored.
Persons should be treated as rational agents.
Gratitude is owed to those who make sacrifices
to benefit others.
The morally virtuous have greater moral worth
than those who are not morally virtuous.
The moral-normative principles make use of the concepts ought or
should] the axiological principles make use of the concepts value or
worth. But whatever their classification®, Sher appears to believe that
PI is crucial to the justification of Cl; P2 to the justification of C2;
and so on down the lists. (Sher appeals to P3 to justify desert-claims
C3, C4
,
and C5.) Thus, Sher’s justificatory project is intended to be
"...an account of the moral underpinnings of desert" (x). One of Sher’s
fundamental theses, then, is that desert has "moral underpinnings" or
"normative roots."
Sher’s justificatory project is pluralistic: "...desert need not
have any single normative basis. Instead, the different classes of
desert-claims may owe their justification to irreducibly different
principles and values" (xii). Indeed, Sher does not propose a grand
ethical principle, or even a set of unified ethical principles, that
would justify all or even most interesting desert-claims. He offers
instead a plurality of ethical principles to justify an assortment of
general desert-claims.
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So much by way of summary. Before turning to the details of
Sher’s justificatory project, I want to briefly discuss another way of
looking at it. I have spoken of Sher’s project as an attempt to justify
certain platitudes" about desert, or as an attempt to justify general
desert-claims." These desert-claims specify certain bases for desert:
effort, wrongdoing, suffering, achievement, virtue, and so on. So, one
could use those general desert-claims to draw up a list or catalogue of
desert bases. Thus, another way to view Sher’s project is as an attempt
to justify a particular catalogue of desert bases.
I offer this as an alternative way of looking at Sher’s project
for the following reason. In Chapter 7, where I present my own theory
of desert, I attempt to draw up a catalogue of desert bases. One of the
claims I make with respect to this catalogue is that it is difficult if
not impossible to Justify it. Although there are, of course, things
that we intuitively feel are bases for desert, and things that we
intuitively feel are not bases for desert, these intuitions are (as I
see it) difficult if not impossible to justify. My view, then, is that
if those intuitions are correct, they must be taken as epistemologically
basic. By saying that these intuitions are "epistemologically basic," I
do not mean that we are not justified in believing them. I do mean that
they are incapable of being justified by some more fundamental principle
or principles.
This claim - that our intuitions about what is and what is not a
basis for desert are, when correct, epistemologically basic - might
strike some as outlandish. It strikes me as somewhat outlandish, too.
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It is not a claim I prefer to make. It is a claim I feel forced to
make, in virtue of failing to find any convincing justification of our
considered views about what is and what is not a basis for desert. This
is one reason why I dedicate a chapter to Sher’s heroic efforts to
justify the platitudes about desert: I believe that his attempt fails,
and that its failure is evidence for my view (which I adopt tentatively
and reluctantly in Chapter 7) that there may be no way to justify those
platitudes about desert, no way to justify the correct catalogue of
desert bases.
Another reason for dedicating a chapter to Sher’s attempt to
justify desert-claims is this. Several of Sher’s justifications depend
on principles that assert connections between desert and other ethical
concepts, such as value and moral obligation. A deep and important
question is whether there are any such connections between desert and
those other ethical concepts. I think that there are such connections,
and that reflection on Sher’s attempts to justify desert-claims reveals
at least some of them.
Desert, freedom, and expected consequences
Sher begins Chapter 3 of Desert with an observation: "It is
widely recognized that free action has some important link to desert"
(37). Sher thereby agrees with those writers who assert that freedom
and desert are importantly linked. Indeed, Sher’s project in this
chapter is to explain this supposed "desert-autonomy link" (38).
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The link, in Sher’s view, is this: free or "autonomous" action is
a desert basis (49). But for what? His answer is that the performance
of a free action is a basis for deserving its consequences (38);
specifically, performing a free action is a basis for deserving its
expected consequences (39-40). Sher dubs this the "expected-consequence
account" of the supposed link between free action and desert.^
Although Sher does not formulate it in this way, I believe the
general desert-claim he intends to justify is this:
(Cl) People deserve to experience the expected consequences
of their free actions.
This general desert—claim is supposed to "capture the essence" of
specific desert-claims that Sher does mention:
1. Wilson, who knowingly submitted his application late,
deserves to be disqualified.
2. Harris, who didn’t bring his raincoat, deserves to get
wet.
3. Simmons, who didn’t study for his exam, deserves to
fail.
4. Jake, who drove his truck out on the thin ice, deserves
to have his truck fall through the ice. (Page 41.)
In each claim, someone is said to deserve "...to suffer the predictable
consequences of one’s earlier carelessness" (41). These are the sorts
of cases where some people will say "Serves him right," or "He got what
was coming to him."
Sher is interested in justifying desert-claims involving not only
an agent’s carelessness, but also an agent’s resourcefulness:
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Just as the man who leaves his umbrella home when it rainsdeserves to get wet, so too does the man who brings his
umbrella deserve to reach his destination dry. More
important, we believe that persons who resourcefully seize
opportunities deserve the resulting benefits, that persons
who carefully make and execute plans deserve success, and
that persons who forego immediate benefits in expectation of
longer-range gains deserve those gains. (Pages 41-42.)^°
In all these cases, agents are said to deserve the expected
consequences of their free choices - regardless of whether the agent’s
choice was careless or resourceful. Hence, what Sher seems to be
assuming is that the real basis for desert in these cases cannot be the
carelessness or resourcefulness of the agent, but rather the common
element in each case: namely, the agent’s free or "autonomous" choice.
Sher’s attempted justification of Cl can be drawn from the
following passage:
Few would deny that person ought to be able to choose and
act freely, and indeed that their doing so is of paramount
importance.
. .
.
[But] any value that attaches to an autonomous
act might carry over to that act’s consequences. Because
(at least some of) those consequences are part of what an
agent chooses, it would be quite arbitrary to say that it is
good that the agent perform the act he has chosen, but not
good that he enjoy or suffer that act’s predictable
consequences. Since choice encompasses both acts and
consequences, any value that attaches to the implementation
of choice must belong equally to both.... In light of this,
one natural reason for saying that free agents ought [i.e.,
deserve] to enjoy or suffer specific consequences is that
those consequences, where predictable, have acquired value
from the fact that they are part of what the agent has
chosen.... In that case, what justifies our desert-claim will
be the value of the retrospective aspect of freedom itself.
(Pages 39-40.
Here is how I understand the argument of this passage:
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1. Freedom is valuable (PI).
2. If 1, then the exercise of freedom (that is, the
performance of free actions) is valuable.
3. If the exercise of freedom is valuable, then
experiencing the expected consequence of one’s free action
is valuable.
4. If experiencing the expected consequence of one’s free
action is valuable, then one deserves to experience the
expected consequence of one’s free action.
5. Therefore, one deserves to experience the expected
consequence of one’s free action (Cl).
Sher summarizes the crux of the argument: "...it is generally
sufficient for an outcome’s having value, and the agent’s consequently
deserving it, that that outcome have been predictable from the agent’s
earlier activities" (67, my emphasis).
Sher does not feel it necessary to argue for PI, the first premise
that freedom is valuable. He merely says this:
Few would deny that persons ought to be able to choose and
act freely, and indeed that their doing so is of paramount
importance. These claims, whatever their exact
interpretation, are central to our shared moral scheme.
( Page 39.
)
The question of whether freedom is good cannot, however, be
treated so lightly. For one thing, the answer to that question depends
on what is meant by *good’. Sher is right that few would deny that the
exercise of freedom can be extrinsically good. But this is irrelevant
to Sher’s argument. Sher wants to show that if freedom is good, then so
is its exercise. From the fact that freedom is extrinsically good, it
does not follow that the exercise of freedom (the performance of a free
act) is extrinsically good. If the performance of a free act causes the
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agent harm, then that particular exercise of freedom is extrinsically
bad.
Sher must mean, then, that the exercise of freedom is
intrinsically good. Is it? We might try to answer this by imagining
two extremely similar worlds. The only difference between them is that
people have freedom in one world but not in the other. If the free
world is intrinsically better than the unfree world, then freedom is
intrinsically good.
I have no fixed intuitions regarding this thought-experiment. In
this, I am not alone. Consider the confessions of this ethicist:
One problem for me is that my intuitions about what has
intrinsic value are not sufficiently firm. Freedom, for
example, is a source of puzzlement. Sometimes I think that
freedom is good only as a means, and then at other times I
become convinced that it is good in itself, even when it
produces nothing else of value.
Hence, it is difficult (for some) to know whether PI, the first premise
in Sher’s justification of Cl, is true. For the sake of argument,
however, let it be granted that freedom is intrinsically good. Let it
even be granted that freedom’s being intrinsically good means that the
exercise of freedom - the performing of free acts - is intrinsically
good.^^ Let it be granted, then, that the first two premises in Sher’s
argument for Cl are true.
A crucial question is whether it is true, as Sher’s third premise
asserts, that if the performance of a free act is intrinsically good,
then the agent’s experiencing the "expected" consequence of that act is
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also intrinsically good. Sher’s argument for this premise, recall,
that "it would be quite arbitrary to say that it is good that the agent
perform the act he has chosen, but not good that he enjoy or suffer that
act’s predictable consequences" (39).
I do not think this would be at all "arbitrary." To see this,
suppose you dive into frigid water to save a drowning child. Just
before diving in, you are skeptical about your chances to save the
child. Although you hope to save the child, what you actually expect is
to suffer intense pain, cramp up, and drown before you reach the child.
But since you feel you have no morally acceptable alternative, you dive
in. Just as you expected, you suffer intense pain, cramp up, and drown
before you reach the child. This, if anything, is intrinsically bad.
If so, then it is false that experiencing the expected consequence of a
free act is intrinsically valuable.
Another crucial question is whether it is true, as Sher’s fourth
premise asserts, that if experiencing the expected consequence of one’s
free action is intrinsically valuable, then one deserves to experience
the expected consequence of one’s free action. I suspect that this
premise depends on a general principle that asserts a certain connection
between the concept of value and the concept of desert. The principle,
it seems, is this:
VD If receiving (experiencing) x is intrinsically
good for S, then S deserves to receive
(experience) x.
The crucial question, then, is whether VD is true.
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I think the answer is "no." As I see it, there is no reason to
suppose that an experience’s being intrinsically good for a person has
anything to do with whether or not the person deserves that experience.
The ancient Romans, for example, might have taken tremendous pleasure in
the spectacle of Christians being devoured by lions in the Colosseum.
Suppose their pleasure, considered in isolation, was intrinsically good
for them. Clearly, this is no reason for supposing that the ancient
Romans deserved those pleasures!
This is not to say that there is no connection between the concept
of value and the concept of desert. Indeed, my own view is that there
are such connections. One such connection can be brought out by
considering a simple case. So, suppose you have worked hard, and I have
not. You deserve a dollar. I deserve nothing. Suppose next that I,
who do not deserve it, happen to get the dollar. You, who deserve it,
do not get the dollar. Other things being equal, it would (I believe)
have been much better for you to have gotten the dollar than for me to
have gotten it. The natural explanation for this is, of course, that
you deserved the dollar and I did not. This simple case suggests that,
other things being equal, receiving what one deserves is intrinsically
better than failing to receive what one deserves. That is:
DV If S deserves x, then S’s receiving x is
intrinsically better than S’s not receiving x
(other things being equal).
An important feature to notice about DV is that, like VD, it
asserts a connection between desert and value. The connection, however.
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IS reversed. Sher assumes that something’s being intrinsically valuable
for a person is a reason to think that the person deserves it. That is,
Sher assumes the truth of something like VD. My assumption is that if a
person deserves something, this is some reason for thinking that the
person’s receiving it will be intrinsically better than the person’s not
receiving it. That is, I assume the truth of DV.
Besides, if I have understood him, Sher went wrong in supposing
that Cl captures the essence of the specific desert-claims that he
wishes to justify. It seems to me far more natural to suppose that, in
the cases Sher mentions, the basis for desert is not freedom, but
carelessness and prudence. According to this natural view, carelessness
or recklessness is a basis for deserving to suffer its harmful
consequences to oneself; thoughtfulness or prudence is a basis for
deserving the consequences that are pleasant to oneself. Thus, one who
accepted this alternative view would replace Cl with a pair of desert-
claims:
Cl(-) People deserve to suffer the harmful, self-
affecting consequences of their careless or
reckless actions.
Cl{+) People deserve to enjoy the pleasant, self-
affecting consequences of their thoughtful or
prudent actions.
My own view is that these are plausible desert-claims. Return to
the case of Jake. He was reckless in driving his truck out on the
melting ice. It was his stupid recklessness that makes us feel that he
deserves that his truck fall through the ice, whether he expected that
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or not. Or consider the case of Wilson, who knowingly submitted his
application late. This was a careless thing to do. If because of his
carelessness he is disqualified, then so be it. That is what we
intuitively feel he deserves, whether he expected it or not. Or
consider the person who prudently carries his umbrella to work, on the
expectation of rain. We feel that this person deserves, other things
being equal, to stay dry.
I suggest, then, that Cl is not among the platitudes about desert.
Sher should not bother trying to justify it. In light of the cases he
describes, the desert-claims that Sher ought to justify, if any, are
better captured by Cl(-) and Cl(+).
This raises the question of how, if presented with Cl(-) and
Cl(+), Sher would attempt to justify them. One thing is clear. He
could not justify them by appealing to VD. For one thing, VD is false.
But even if VD were true, it could not be used to justify Cl(-). The
reason is simple. The antecedent of VD has to do with what is
intrinsically good for a person. Cl(-) is claim about the harms that
people deserve to suffer. Suffering a harm is not, I believe,
intrinsically valuable. So even if VD were true, it could not be
invoked to justify Cl(-).
Desert and diligence
In Chapter 4 of Desert, Sher seeks to justify the following sorts
of desert-claims:
1. Conscientious students deserve to get good grades.
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2. Athletes who practice regularly deserve to do well.
3. Businesspeople who work long hours deserve to make
money.
4. Immigrants who overcome displacement and poverty deserve
their success. (Page 53.)
In these and other cases, the basis for a person’s desert is said
to be his or her "diligence." But exactly what does a person deserve in
virtue of being diligent? Sher argues that what the agent deserves in
virtue of his diligence is "...a function of his particular efforts"
(54). Therefore, the general desert-claim Sher wants to justify seems
to be this:
(C2) People deserve what they diligently strive to achieve.
Unlike Cl, C2 is a common view about desert. It is a worthwhile target
of an attempted justification.
Sher’s argument for C2 is contained in the following passages:
...persons themselves matter.... If persons themselves
matter, then what matters to persons should matter as well.
This line of reasoning makes is plausible to say that
desires confer some value on their objects. ... But if so,
then sustained efforts will indeed confer more value than
desires if the objects of such efforts matter to persons in
a deeper way [than merely desiring those objects].
Moreover ... the objects of diligent striving do matter to
persons more deeply, for diligent striving represents a far
greater commitment than does mere desire. ... [This is] the
correct explanation of why the diligent ought [i.e.,
deserve] to succeed. They ought to succeed because their
sustained efforts are substantial investments of themselves
- the ultimate sources of value - in the outcomes they seek.
( Pages 57-62
. )
Here is how I understand the argument of these passages:
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1. Persons are valuable (P2).
2. If 1, then what persons desire to achieve is valuable.
3. If what persons desire to achieve is valuable, then what
they diligently try to achieve is valuable.
4. If what persons diligently try to achieve is valuable,
then people deserve what they diligently try to achieve.
5. Therefore, persons deserve what they diligently strive
to achieve (C2).
An evaluation of this argument can begin with considering premise
1, or P2. Sher’s explanation of P2, the principle that persons are
valuable, occurs in this passage:
Put most simply, the belief is that persons themselves
matter - that they are, in some sense, "ends in themselves."
(Page 57.
)
Sher does not specify in what sense persons are "ends in
themselves." But the dictum that persons are "ends in themselves" is
usually a premise in an argument for the kantian view that we should
never treat other persons merely as means to our own ends. This kantian
view is controversial, and not entirely clear. Sher, astonishingly,
does not defend or explain it. He says only that it is "plausible" and
"...in the current context, beyond dispute" (57).
So let us take up the second premise, or what Sher calls the
"desire-confers-value thesis." The thesis, in Sher’s words, is (or
provides) that we can "...infer from *M desires X’ to 'M’s having X is
valuable in itself’" (56). Sher claims (55) that the desire-confers-
value thesis "received its classic statement" from Ralph Barton Perry.
Perry said:
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[a]ny object, whatever it be, acquires value when anyinterest, whatever it be, is taken in it.^‘*
Perry s considered view was that something is good(bad) if and
only if someone desires(is averse to) it; and that something is
intrinsically good(bad) if and only if someone desires(is averse to) it
for its own sake.^^ Hence, Perry would accept the desires-confer-value
thesis, which appears to be that if M desires x (for its own sake), then
X is valuable (in itself).
If the desires-confer-value thesis is true, then (Sher argues) so
is the ef fort-confers-value thesis:
Persistent attempts to achieve a result, and sacrifices made
to obtain it, are the strongest possible evidence of a
stable and enduring desire for it. More deeply, desire and
effort may be conceptually related; for on various accounts,
it is impossible to desire something without being disposed
to try to get it. If even the former connection holds, then
all diligently pursued outcomes are desired. Hence, if all
desired outcomes have value, then so too do all outcomes
that are diligently pursued. (Page 58.)
For argument’s sake, let us grant that if desires confer value on
their objects, then so do diligent efforts. That is, let us grant
premise 3. One question that remains is whether desires do "confer
value" on their objects in the way that Sher, following Perry, claims.
I think not. As critics of Perry were quick to point out, his theory of
intrinsic value would make even the most reprehensible thing
intrinsically good, provided that someone desired it as an end in
itself. A similar point would cut against the effort-confers-value
thesis. Hence, there is little reason to accept either thesis.^®
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Let us turn, then, to premise 4. According to it, if what people
diligently try to achieve is valuable, then people deserve what they
diligently try to achieve. This seems to be the argument’s crucial
premise. It asserts a connection between what is valuable
(intrinsically valuable, let us assume) and what is deserved. It
therefore appears to be an instance of VD. But as I have argued, VD is
false. There are no grounds for supposing that something’s being
intrinsically valuable to a person provides any reason for a person’s
deserving it. Indeed, reflection on simple cases suggests that at least
one connection between desert and value is quite the reverse. That
connection is expressed in DV. Thus, Sher’s justification of C2 fails,
ultimately, in just the way that his justification of Cl failed.
However, it may be that Sher does not really depend on the
desires-confer-value thesis. Recall that the desires-confer value
thesis is supposed to secure the ef forts-confer value thesis, which in
turn is supposed to secure that the goals of diligent striving are
valuable. In one passage, Sher seems to advance an argument for this
lattermost conclusion that does not depend on the desires- or effort-
confers-value thesis:
Since our lives are constituted by our actions, our time and
energy are thus the very stuff of which we fashion our
lives. Hence, any agent who devotes a major portion of his
time and energy to achieving a goal is quite literally
making that goal a part of himself. (Page 62.
)
Persons are "constituted," in part, by the goals they desire and
diligently strive for. (Sher dedicates Chapter 9 of his book to an
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explanation and defense of this view of persons.) But persons are
valuable (P2). Hence, if the value of a thing is due to the value of
its constituents, then what persons desire and strive for is valuable.
This may be Sher’s real argument for the claim that diligent effort
confers value upon its object. If it is, then his view may be that this
claim justifies (C2). As evidence, here is the rest of the passage in
which Sher summarizes that putative justification:
...[the diligent] ought to succeed because their sustained
efforts are substantial investments of themselves - the
ultimate sources of value — in the outcomes they seek.
Reversing Marx’s aphorism that value is congealed labor, we
might express the point by saying that (sustained and goal-
directed) labor is congealed value. Of course, this
suggestion is only as convincing as the view that persons
are constituted by the specific acts they perform, and by
the specific act-related traits they possess. (Page 62.)
This argument does not show that the objects of diligent striving
are valuable. It depends on the implausible claim that persons are
"constituted" by their goals, or that a person’s goals can be "quite
literally parts of that person. To see that this view is implausible,
consider the following case. Suppose a particular statesman’s goal is
total nuclear disarmament. If Sher’s view about persons is correct,
then the statesman has total nuclear disarmament as one of his parts.
But how could the state of affairs expressed by 'total nuclear
disarmament’ be in any real sense "part" of a person? (What if total
nuclear disarmament is never achieved?)
Even if it were granted that people have their goals as parts, and
even it were granted that this gives value to those parts, Sher does not
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explain how this would justify the claim that people deserve what they
diligently strive to achieve. Sher’s justification fails at the crucial
step: namely, from the premise that what persons diligently strive to
achieve is valuable, to the desert-claim that persons deserve what they
diligently strive to achieve. It fails, I would argue, because this
step can be made only by relying on a principle akin to VD.
Sher is right, though, that the "value" of an outcome that someone
has struggled to achieve is relevant to the question of whether he
deserves it. Sher himself supplies two examples that illustrate the
point:
A safecracker does not deserve to escape with the contents
of a vault because he has spent five years tunneling into
it; neither does a political fanatic deserve to succeed at a
painstakingly plotted assassination. (Page 67.)
In cases like these, the agent strives to attain an evil. The
evil of the goal mitigates what might otherwise be the agent’s desert of
that goal. The opposite effect can occur in cases where the goal is
especially good. To see this, suppose that two people relevantly
similar to each other are striving equally hard to achieve their
respective goals. One person’s goal is neurotic: to know the precise
number of blades of grass in his lawn. The other’s altruistic: to find
a vaccine for the AIDS virus. Although there is no difference in the
intensity of their efforts, my intuition is that, other things being
equal, the AIDS researcher deserves to achieve her goal more than the
blade-counter deserves to achieve hers. The natural explanation for
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this is that the researcher’s goal is especially good, whereas the
blade-counter’s goal is, at best, neutral. If this is right, then the
"value” of a diligently pursued goal affects one’s desert of it.
However, in cases like these, the value (or disvalue) does not, as
Sher would have us believe, come from the agent’s diligent striving.
Rather, it comes from the goal itself. The desires or efforts of an
agent have no effect on the value of the goal - or if they do, this
inherited "value" has no obvious effect on the agent’s desert of the
goal. So, rather than say with Sher that diligence confers value on its
object, I would say instead that the fact that one has been diligent has
a certain "weight" that influences one’s desert, but this can be
outweighed by, among other things, the value of one’s goal.^’
Desert and wrongdoing
It is a platitude that wrongdoers deserve punishment. Sher notes
that neither the expected-consequence account nor the ef fort-confers-
value thesis justifies it. That is, neither account:
...explains why persons who have acted wrongly now deserve
to be punished. Wrongdoers do not diligently pursue their
own punishment; neither is it always predictable from their
acts. Thus, if their desert is to be understood, it must be
in terms of some third sort of justification. (Page 69.)
In Chapters 5 and 6 of Desert, Sher turns his attention to justifying
the general desert-claim:
(C3) People deserve to be punished for their wrongful acts.
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Sher s justification of C3 depends heavily on Herbert Morris’s
famous essay, "Persons and Punishment . "i® Here is how Sher understands
the essence of Morris’s argument:
...punishment is fair because it removes an advantage that
the wrongdoer has but others lack. Those who obey the rules
abjure the advantage they could obtain by interfering with
others in proscribed ways. Those who break the rules gain
this advantage. Because they gain it without giving up the
additional advantage they get from the self-restraint of
others, they end up with more than their fair share of
advantage. In punishing them, we remove their excess
advantage, and so restore a fair balance of burdens and
benefits. (Page 77.)
Morris’s suggestion is that criminal wrongdoers benefit from breaking
the law, and from the failure of others to break the law. For example,
if a thief robs a bank, he obtains a financial benefit. He also
benefits from the fact that others have not robbed the bank before he
did. So the thief benefits from the general public’s self-restraint,
and his lack of it. This supposedly upsets a fair balance of benefits
and burdens. Punishing the criminal is intended to restore that
balance. So, for example, the thief’s financial benefit (or some
equivalent) is (if possible) returned to the proper owners, and the
thief is imprisoned. He is thereby placed under a far greater degree of
restraint than law-abiding citizens. In this way, Morris seems to be
saying, punishment is "fair."
Sher modifies Morris’s view in several ways. Morris restricts his
discussion to the punishment of law-breakers. Sher wants to justify the
claim that wrongdoersy not merely law-breakers, deserve punishment. So,
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as a first step towards justifying this broader claim, Sher appeals to
the concept of "the moral law" (82). Wrongdoers violate the moral law;
criminals violate the civil law (at least). Next, Sher rejects Morris’s
suggestion that "...the wrongdoer’s extra benefit, and so too his
deserved punishment, is determined by the amount of profit he receives
from acting wrongly" (81). For in some cases moral wrongdoing, the
wrongdoer may not "profit" in any tangible way. What the moral offender
gains, on Sher’s view, is the benefit of "liberty" or "freedom" from the
tnora.1 rsstrictions that othsrs typically observe (83),
However, Sher’s view is not, as one might expect, that the
wrongdoer’s benefit is to be measured in terms of the amount of freedom
that the wrongdoer supposedly gains by flouting the moral law. Rather,
on Sher’s view, it is to be measured in terms of "...the strength of the
moral prohibition that is violated." Specifically: The stronger the
prohibition, the greater the benefit from transgressing it (82-83).
Thus, on Sher s account, wrongdoing results in an excess of a supposed
benefit: namely, transgressing the moral law.
Sher now invokes a general principle that will, he thinks, provide
the crucial step in his attempted justification of the claim that
wrongdoers deserve punishment. He calls it the "principle of diachronic
fairness"
:
DF3 For every good G, every person M, and every
period of time P, if M has less (more) of G than
he should during P, then M should have
correspondingly more (less) of G or some related
good than he otherwise should during some later
period P’. (Page 94.)
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The word 'should’ occurs several times in DF3. Let us assume, for
the moment, that it means 'deserves’. Thus interpreted, DF3 expresses a
thesis about desert and the receipt of good and evil over time. The
thesis, roughly, is that past receipt and future receipt of good or evil
are bases for what one deserves now. I find this thesis plausible. I
discuss and endorse a version of it in Chapter 7.
Sher appears to use DF3 to justify C3 in the following way.
According to Sher s account of wrongdoing, wrongdoing results in an
excess, for the wrongdoer, of the supposed benefit of transgressing the
moral law. DF3, as I am understanding it, states (in effect) that those
who enjoy an excess of some benefit at some time deserve to have less of
that benefit at some other time. Freedom is a benefit, and punishment
often takes the form of a restriction on one’s freedom. Thus, it seems
that Sher’s account of wrongdoing, conjoined with D3, justifies C3.
I find this justification implausible. First, Sher’s account of
wrongdoing is obscure: it is hard to know, and Sher does not tell us,
what the "moral laws" are. Second, even if we knew what the moral laws
are, it seems rather odd to claim that transgressing those laws is, in
general, some sort of "benefit" - unless, of course, one subscribes to a
hobbesian view of morality, but Sher never explains or defends any such
theory.
Besides, even if Sher’s account of wrongdoing were accepted, he
seems not to provide a deep justification of C3. For, on the current
interpretation of DF3, Sher’s justification of C3 amounts to this:
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1. Excessive past receipt of some good is a basis fordeserving less of some good.
2. Wrongdoing results in excessive receipt of some good(such as freedom).
3. Therefore, wrongdoing is a basis for deserving less of
some good (such as freedom, by way of punishment).
Given his overall project, which is the justification of major desert-
claims, what Sher ought to be attempting to justify is the first premise
of this argument: namely, that excessive past receipt of some good is a
basis for deserving less of some good now. Moreover, since this premise
is just a corollary of DF3, what Sher ought to justify (but never does)
is DF3. For this principle, as I have understood it thus far, is a
general desert-claim. Therefore, it cannot provide a deep justification
of other desert-claims.
Perhaps I have misunderstood DF3. My assumption thus far has been
that the word should’, as it occurs in DF3, means 'deserves*. This
assumption may be mistaken. Perhaps the word 'should’, in at least one
of its occurrences in DF3, means 'morally should’. This possibility is
suggested by Sher’s remark:
...desert of punishment ... ref lects the demands of diachronic
fairness. .. .On one natural interpretation, these demands and
requirements are precisely obligations,... (Page 196.)
Indeed, perhaps Sher’s intention is to provide a principle linking
the concept of moral obligation to the concept of desert. DF3 can be
interpreted as just such a principle:
DF3* For every good G, every person M, and every
period of time P, if M has less (more) of G than
he morally should during P, then M deserves to
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have correspondingly more (less) of G or some
related good than he otherwise deserves during
some later period P’.
Understood this way, DF3* asserts a connection between what a person
ought to receive what a person deserves. I think a simpler principle,
one that Sher may depend on here and (as we will see) later on, is this:
OD If S morally ought to receive x, then S deserves
to receive x.
OD asserts a connection between the concept of moral obligation
and desert. Moreover, OD could be used in a deep justification of C3,
the claim that wrongdoers deserve to be punished. The justification
would go something like this:
1. Wrongdoers ought to receive punishment.
2. If S morally ought to receive x, then S deserves to
receive x (OD).
3. Therefore, wrongdoers deserve punishment (C3).
If sound, this little argument would provide a deep justification of C3.
For none of its premises is itself a general desert-claim. In this
respect, it is an improvement over what appeared, on one interpretation
of DF3, to be Sher’s justification of C3.
However, the argument is not sound. Premise 2, the OD principle,
is false. There is little reason to suppose that S deserves x merely
because S morally ought to receive x. This can be seen most clearly by
considering the contrapositive of OD: namely, if it is not the case that
S deserves x, then it is not the case that S morally ought to receive x.
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So, for example, consider a lifeboat situation. A group of five people
is adrift. There is enough food for only four of them. Thus, one must
be thrown overboard if the rest are to survive. It seems safe to assume
that none deserves to be thrown overboard. However, for anyone in the
lifeboat, it may nevertheless be true that he or she morally ought to be
jettisoned. Otherwise all will die. This example suggests that OD is
false.
This is not say, however, that there is no connection between
desert and moral obligation. Indeed, I believe there is at least one
such connection. It can be brought out by considering a simple case.
So, suppose that you deserve an apology. Other things being equal, you
morally ought to receive it. This is because, other things being equal,
the person who insulted you ought to offer you an apology. This case
suggests that there is a general connection between desert and moral
obligation. The connection can be expressed as follows:
DO If S deserves x, then S ought to receive x
(other things being equal
The important thing to notice is that DO, like OD, asserts a
connection between desert and obligation. However, the connection is
reversed. Sher’s assumption appears to be that the fact that S ought to
receive x is a reason for supposing that S deserves x; that is, Sher
assumes something akin to OD. My assumption is that S’s deserving x is
a reason (though not conclusive) for supposing that S ought to receive
x; that is, I assume the truth of DO.
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It appears, then, that Sher’s justification of C3 is in trouble.
His justification of C3 depends crucially on DF3, the "principle of
diachronic fairness." On one natural interpretation, DF3 is itself a.
general desert-claim, and therefore cannot provide a deep justification
of CF3. On another natural interpretation, DF3 seems to depend on the
truth of OD. But OD is false. It reverses an ostensible connection,
expressed by DO, between desert and moral obligation. I conclude that
if there is a justification of CF3, Sher has not found it.
This is particularly unfortunate in light of the fact that Sher
invokes DF3 to justify other desert claims. In Chapter 6, Sher attempts
to justify "...a whole range of desert-claims that appear to require
some trans-temporal balancing of benefits and burdens" (91). These
include not only claims that persons deserve punishment:
...but also claims that persons deserve sums of money, or
opportunities, to compensate for wrongly inflicted harm or
suffering. In addition, they include many more modest
claims that persons deserve relief from burdens that were
not wrongfully inflicted. For example, someone who has had
persistent bad luck may be said to deserve a change of
fortune. Finally. .. they include claims that persons who
have worked for others deserve wages as compensation. (Page
91.)
Thus, the three general desert-claims that Sher attempts to justify with
the help of DF3 are as follows:
(C3) People deserve to be punished for their wrongful
acts.
(C4) People deserve compensation for the wrongful
harms they suffer.
(C5) People deserve wages for the work they do.
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Given the difficulties just discussed, I think there is little
reason to review Sher’s attempts to justify C4 and C5 with the help of
DF3. Therefore, I shall press on to a discussion of Sher’s attempt to
justify desert-claims involving merit. (Sher does have some interesting
things to say about desert of wages, but I take these up in Chapter 6.)
Desert and merit
At the beginning of Chapter 7, Sher states that his "...main aim
will be to discover why the deserving parties - in this case, the
meritorious - should have what they are said to deserve" (109). Sher
distinguishes "moral merit" from "nonmoral merit":
The morally meritorious include both people who perform
single transcendent acts of heroism or sacrifice and persons
whose generosity or compassion is woven through their lives.
The nonmorally meritorious include athletes who run faster
than others, scientists who discover cures for deadly
diseases, and job applicants who score highest on qualifying
exams. (Page 109.)
In this chapter, Sher tries to justify desert-claims involving nonmoral
merit. In particular:
(C6) People deserve prizes/good grades for performing
well according to the relevant rules.
(C7) The best qualified applicant deserves the job.
Let us take up Sher’s attempted justification of C6.
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Sher argues that "...the best competitor’s desert of victory and
the prize, and the student’s desert of his grade, reflects the demands
of veracity" (196). What, according to Sher, are the "demands of
veracity"? How are those demands supposed to justify C6?
According to Sher, there is a "principle of veracity" that
"...requires that we not say what we know to be false, but... does not
require us to say everything we know to be true" (112). Sher argues
that "something like the principle of veracity" operates in contexts
that "...presuppose conventional structures which establish tests for
excellence and rewards or prizes for passing those tests" (115). The
principle Sher has in mind is that "...where there are conventions for
evaluating performance, their dictates ought to be honored" (116). That
is:
(P4) Conventions for evaluating performance ought to
be honored.
Sher claims that by "...appealing to veracity, we can justify the
desert-claims that arise when persons display merit in conventionally
structured contexts" (117). That is, P4 is supposed to justify C6, the
desert-claim that people deserve prizes/good grades for performing well
according to the relevant rules.
Sher is not explicit about how P4 is supposed to do this. Let us
suppose that Sher is advancing the following argument:
1. Conventions for evaluating performance ought to be
honored (P4).
2. If 1, then people who perform well according to relevant
rules deserve prizes or good grades.
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3. Therefore, people who perform well according to the
relevant rules deserve prizes or good grades.
Let us grant premise 1, or P4
,
for argument’s sake. Then the
question is whether premise 2 is true. If I have understood Sher
correctly, premise 2 depends on a view about the connection between
desert and moral obligation. The view is that if S ought to receive x,
then S deserves to receive x. We have encountered this view before. It
is expressed by OD. But OD, I argued, is false. There is no reason for
supposing that the fact that S morally ought to receive x is grounds for
S s deserving x. (Quite the reverse, I claimed: S’s deserving x is
grounds for it being true that S ought to receive x. ) If this is
correct, then the above argument is unsound. It does not justify C6.
Perhaps there is an alternative interpretation of Sher’s
justification of C6. Sher may be suggesting that the mere fact that
someone has satisfied the conditions of some contest, or excelled
according to some rules, and is therefore entitled to some prize or
grade, is a basis for the person’s deserving that prize or grade. In
short, entitlement is a basis for desert. If it is, then (other things
being equal) people deserve prizes/good grades for performing well
according to the rules that entitle them to those prizes/good grades.
I happen to believe that entitlement is a basis for desert (see
Chapter 7). However, even if that is granted, the basic justificatory
question remains unanswered. For what justifies the claim that, other
things being equal, people deserve that to which they are entitled?
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Until this question is answered, Sher will not have provided a deep
justification C6.
Let us turn, then, to Sher’s attempt to justify the claim that
people deserve the positions for which they are qualified (C7). This
passage seems crucial for understanding that attempt:
...selecting by merit is a way of taking seriously the
potential agency of both the successful and the unsuccessful
applicants. Conversely, when an applicant is selected on
some other basis, there is a recognizable if elusive sense
in which he and his rivals are not taken seriously. And
this suggests that we may justify selection by merit by
arguing that persons ought to be taken seriously in the
relevant sense. I believe, in fact, that some argument of
this sort does underlie the claim that best-qualified
applicants deserve jobs and educational opportunities.
(Pages 121-122. )
The argument appears to be that if we ought to take people "seriously"
(in some sense), then people who are best qualified for jobs deserve
them. But in what sense should people be taken seriously? And how does
this justify C7? Let us begin with the first question.
Sher claims that "...the requirement that we select among
applicants on the basis of their qualifications is a consequence of the
more general requirement that we treat all persons as rational agents"
(126). So to say that we should "treat people seriously" is, for Sher,
to say that we ought to treat people as rational agents.
Sher explains that to treat persons as rational agents is to treat
them as agents who can deliberate, choose, and act autonomously (126).
When an employer takes a person’s qualifications seriously - that is, as
qualifications that the applicant has chosen to obtain and has acted
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autonomously in attaining them - the employer treats the applicant as a
rational agent.
Sher’s view is that treating people as rational agents is "..the
rationale for the claim that the best-qualified deserves to be chosen"
(127). What exactly is the rationale? Sher writes:
What needs to be shown is not that only the best-qualified
applicant is owed treatment as a rational agent, but rather
that he, and only he, is owed the contested position. To
establish this, I have argued that only selection by
qualification treats all applicants as rational agents, and
that under such selection, the best-qualified applicant, and
he alone, is owed the position. On this account, what the
best-qualified applicant alone is owed just is what he alone
deserves. (Page 127.
)
This passage suggests that Sher’s justification of C7 amounts to this:
1. People should be treated as rational agents (P5).
2. If 1, then the best-qualified applicant deserves the
job.
3. Therefore, the best-qualified applicant deserves the job
(C7).
Let us grant for argument’s sake the truth of premise 1, or P5.
For I think it is clear that premise 2 is false. It moves from a claim
about what people should or ought to receive, to a claim about what
people deserve to receive. This move assumes a mistaken view, expressed
by OD, of the connection between moral obligation and desert. (A more
plausible view of one such connection is, I believe, expressed by OD.
)
If so, then premise 2 cannot be used in a sound justification of C7
.
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Desert and virtue
Let us turn, finally, to Sher’s attempt to justify desert-claims
that mention virtue. Virtue, for Sher, is "moral merit." According to
Sher, people exhibit moral merit "...when they display a virtuous
character or perform specific acts of courage, thoughtfulness, or
generosity" (132).
As Aristotle realized, not every person who performs a virtuous
act is a virtuous person. Nevertheless, Sher thinks, persons who
perform virtuous acts deserve some sort of reward (133). Those who are
virtuous persons also, Sher believes, deserve something: "...an
excellent character seems in itself to be a significant desert-basis"
(136). Following W. D. Ross and others, Sher’s view is that the
virtuous deserve happiness (132). Thus, Sher wants to justify two
desert-claims: that persons who perform virtuous acts, but who may not
be virtuous persons, deserve rewards (C8); and that virtuous persons
deserve happiness (C9). Let us turn to Sher’s attempted justification
of C8.
People who act so as to benefit others are often said to deserve
rewards. Sher considers a number of cases: the person who returns to a
burning building to save another; the companion who looks after a widow
in her declining years; the person who assists a stranded motorist; the
foster parents who take in children nobody else wants. Because of their
virtuous acts, these people deserve some reward - whether or not they
have virtuous characters.
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Sher argues that "...where persons are said to deserve rewards for
specific acts of virtue, their desert may well be grounded in debts of
gratitude that these acts engender" (133):
Where persons make sacrifices to benefit others, those
others are standardly thought to owe them debts of
gratitude. Thus, when we say that benefactors deserve
rewards, the real point may be that their beneficiaries owe
them such debts. (Page 133.)
Sher notes that gratitude is "owed" to those who make sacrifices to
benefit others (P6). He seems to be arguing that the desert of those
who make such sacrifices is "grounded" in debts of gratitude. Put
another way, Sher seems to arguing that P6 justifies C8: "...desert of
reward for heroic or helpful acts sometimes draws force from the
requirements of gratitude" (196). In other words:
1. Gratitude is owed to those who make sacrifices to
benefit others (P6).
2. If 1, then people who perform virtuous acts deserve to
be rewarded.
3. Therefore, people who perform virtuous acts deserve to
be rewarded (C8).
Let us grant, for argument’s sake, that gratitude is owed to those
who make sacrifices to benefit others. Then the question is whether
premise 2 is true. This depends on how 'is owed to’, as it occurs in
premise 2, is understood.
If 'is owed to’ means 'is deserved by’, then premise 2 seems true.
For understood that way, premise 2 asserts this: If gratitude is
deserved by those who make sacrifices to benefit others, then people who
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perform virtuous acts deserve to be rewarded. Indeed, this is trivially
true if gratitude is a sort of reward.
If premise 2 is understood in this way, the argument fails to
provide a deep justification of C8. For if 'is owed to’ means 'is
deserved by’ in premise 2, then it must (for validity’s sake) mean the
same in premise 1. But if 'is owed to’ means 'is deserved by’ in
premise 1, then that premise asserts that gratitude is deserved by those
who make sacrifices to benefit others. This seems true. In fact, it
seems to be a platitude about desert! If so, then it cannot provide a
deep justification of another platitude about desert, such as C8.
Perhaps 'is owed to’, as it occurs in the above argument, does not
mean 'is deserved by’. Perhaps it is meant to express not the concept
of desert, but the concept of moral obligation. If so, the argument is
this: People who make sacrifices to benefit others morally ought to
receive gratitude; if so, then those people deserve rewards; therefore,
people who make sacrifices to benefit others deserve rewards.
My evaluation of this argument should come as no surprise. The
move from what people morally ought to receive to what they deserve to
receive is, in my view, illicit. It depends on a mistaken view,
expressed by OD, of the connection between desert and moral obligation.
A correct view of such a connection, I believe, is expressed by DO - but
DO cannot be used to justify C8.
What, finally, of Sher’s attempt to justify C9, the claim that
virtuous people deserve happiness? Summarizing his attempt, Sher says:
"...I defended the claim that virtuous persons deserve to be happy by
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arguing that such persons are themselves worth more than others, and
hence that their happiness must be worth more as well" (196). That is,
Sher wants to justify C9 with:
(P7) The morally virtuous have greater moral worth than
those who are not morally virtuous.
Sher defends P7 by arguing, firstly, that "seeking value is part
of what confers worth on persons;" secondly, the virtuous seek value
more than persons who are not virtuous (143). In support of the claim
that seeking value is part of what confers worth on persons, Sher admits
that he appeals only to "sketchy considerations" (143). He is
nevertheless willing to "...assume that the worth of persons is due
partly to the fact that they have a concept of value and seek to realize
it" (143). For argument’s sake let us assume it, too.
In support of the claim that the virtuous seek value more than
those who are not virtuous, Sher says this:
...the moral virtues that interest us are all heightened and
concentrated propensities to seek forms of value. When
someone is fair-minded and honest, he automatically seeks to
do what is right. When someone is generous, sympathetic,
considerate, or kind, he automatically seeks to bring good
results. In each case, the person exemplifies, to a higher
degree than others, the value-seeking propensity that is
crucial to the worth of persons. And because he does, we
may reasonably suppose that he acquires greater worth than
do others from his possession of it. (Pages 143-144.)
For argument’s sake, let us grant that the moral virtues are "heightened
and concentrated propensities to seek forms of value." Let us also
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grant that those who possess these propensities have "greater worth"
than those who do not.
So, Sher’s argument is relatively clear: "the desert of the
virtuous" can be justified by "...the fact that they seek value to a
greater degree than others, and thus have greater worth" (145). In
other words:
1. The morally virtuous have greater moral worth than those
who are not morally virtuous (P7).
2. If 1, then the happiness of those who are morally
virtuous is more valuable than the happiness of those who
are not morally virtuous.
3. If the happiness of those who are morally virtuous is
more valuable than the happiness of those who are not
morally virtuous, then virtuous people deserve happiness.
4. Therefore, virtuous people deserve happiness (C9).
Let us grant, for argument’s sake, the truth of premises 1 and 2.
The crucial question is whether premise 3 is true. Premise 3 appears to
depend on a view of the connection between value and desert. This view
can be expressed as follows:
VD’ If A’s receiving x is more valuable than B’s
receiving x, then A deserves x (more than B
deserves x).
Premise 3 is more or less an instance of VD’
.
If so, then the
plausibility of premise 3, and the soundness of Sher’s justification of
C9, depend on the truth of VD’
.
VD’ is false. To see this, suppose that you have worked hard in
the garden all day. You come inside, covered with sweat and grime, to
drink a cold beer. This gives you a moderate amount of pleasure. Now
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suppose that I, who have been lazing around the house all day, would get
a tremendous amount of pleasure - much more pleasure than you actually
get - from drinking that beer. My receiving that beer would, in this
way, be more valuable than your receiving that beer. But from this it
clearly does not follow that I deserve the beer more than you do!
Indeed, I may not deserve the beer at all. This example shows, I think,
that VD is false. It also shows that there is no reason to accept
premise 3 of Sher’s justification of C9.
This is not to say that there is no connection between desert and
value. Indeed, my view is that there are such connections. DV
expresses one such connection. Another connection, more pertinent to
the case at hand, is this:
DV’ If A deserves x more than B deserves x, then A’s
receiving x is more valuable than B’s receiving
X (other things being equal).
Like VD’
,
DV’ expresses a connection between desert and value.
The connection, however, is reversed. This suggests that Sher’s
justification of C9 gets things backwards. It suggests, in other words,
that here (as elsewhere) Sher relies on a mistaken conception of the
relation(s) between desert and other moral concepts.
Conclusion
Sher’s justificatory project seems to be a failure. My personal
opinion is that the major premises (that is, PI through P7) of Sher’s
justifications are too obscure or too controversial to provide any
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convincing justification of the targeted desert-claim. But even if we
accept those major premises (as I did, for argument’s sake), it appears
that Sher s justifications fail. This is because the minor premises of
those justifications depend on false principles (that is, VD, VD’
,
and
OD) that assert various connections between desert and the concepts of
value and moral obligation.
However, Sher’s failure is instructive for at least two reasons.
First, it forces us to recognize that desert does have connections to
the concepts of value and moral obligation. I believe that some of
these connections are expressed by DV, DV’
,
and DO. Second, Sher’s
failure to justify some major desert-claims is some evidence for
supposing that the platitudes about desert, if accepted at all, must be
accepted as among the first principles of ethics.
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4. Sometimes the form will be 'M deserves X in virtue of A’.
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16. In fairness, Sher is aware of the objection that "...many desires
prove harmful when satisfied" (56). Nevertheless, he argues that there
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...when we reflect on the preconditions for morality itself,
we do encounter a further belief that seems to lead
naturally to the desires-confer-value thesis. Put most
simply, this belief is that persons themselves matter - that
they are, in some sense, "ends in themselves". As Kant
famously discerned, we cannot even raise the question of how
we ought to act toward others unless we first assume that
each person, in and of himself, has some absolute value.
Moreover, this assumption clearly draws important support
from the fact that persons care, intensely and complexly,
both about what happens to themselves and other entities and
about the outcomes of their own actions. Not only are the
beings to which morality ascribes fundamental value capable
of taking other things to have value, but their taking those
other things to have value is central to what makes them
valuable. Thus, it does seem natural to hold that a portion
of their value devolves upon what they value - that some of
the absolute value of persons is transferred to, or
inherited by, the things they care about. If persons
themselves matter, then what matters to persons should
matter as well. This line of reasoning makes it plausible
to say that desires confer value on their objects. (Pages
57-58. )
However, as I read it, this passage merely repeats rather than defends
the inference to the desires-confer-value thesis from the principle that
persons have value. I cannot discern in this passage any defense of
that inference, nor can I think of one.
17. For more on the concept of "weight," see Chapter 7.
18. In Morris, On Guilt and Innocence (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA:
University of California Press, 1976).
19. Joel Feinberg endorses a similar principle. He writes: "That a
subject deserves X entails that he ought to get X in the pro tanto sense
of 'ought,’ but not in the 'all things considered’ or 'on balance’
sense." ("Justice and Personal Desert", in Feinberg’ s Doing and
Deserving [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press], page 60.)
20. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics^ J. A. K. Thomson, trans.
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1988), pages 91-92.
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CHAPTER 6
DESERT AND WAGES
Introduction
Women tend to earn less than their male colleagues. Furthermore,
women tend to earn less than men who hold jobs that are nominally
different but relevantly similar (in terms of skill, responsibility,
working conditions) to their own. Advocates of "comparable worth"
protest these facts. Their protest often takes this form: Those
differences in pay between men and women are undeserved.^ The argument
for this claim is simple. Some facts are relevant to the wage one
deserves for performing a given job, and some are not. In the vast
majority of cases, the argument continues, being a man or being a woman
is not relevant to the wage one deserves for performing a given job;
relevant are (say) the skill, responsibility, and working conditions
required by job. Thus, those whose jobs are comparable with respect to
these facts deserve comparable pay. Therefore, women and men who work
the very same jobs deserve equal pay. Furthermore, women and men who
work jobs that are nominally different but relevantly similar also
deserve equal pay.
This argument clearly presupposes an account of what is and what
is not a basis for deserving a wage, or a theory of desert of wages.
^
Such a theory interests not only advocates of comparable worth. It also
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interests those (like me) who believe that justice obtains to the extent
that people get what they deserve. For us, the justice of wealth-
distributions in industrialized countries cannot be assessed without a
theory of desert of wages. This is because in those countries, wages
constitute the bulk of the average person’s income.
Theories of desert of wages have been proposed. In the first few
sections of this chapter, I consider the most prominent among them.
Each suffers from unique difficulties, but they share a fundamental
defect. This defect is symptomatic of a common but (as I see it)
misguided way of thinking about desert in general. In the penultimate
section, I describe this way of thinking and suggest an alternative. I
conclude by applying this alternative to desert of wages in particular,
and sketching its implications for the comparable worth debate.
Before proceeding, some terminological points are in order. Let a
wage be whatever payment is given to a person in return for his or her
contracted work.^ The wage may be cash or some other benefit such as
food, lodging, vacation time, and so on. Work is the attempted
provision of some service, such as lawn-mowing or lawyering. Thus, a
necessary condition on deserving a wage is doing some contracted work.
Contracted work is, of course, work that has been contracted. But as I
understand them, contracts can be formal or informal, explicit or
implied. There need not be a signed document. There need only be some
sort of agreement between the relevant parties that the service will be
provided in return for some sort of payment. In some circumstances,
this agreement need not even be actual.^
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The effort theory
With those points made, let us begin by considering the effort
theory of desert of wages. Joel Feinberg describes a version of it:
...the principle of ef fort.
. .would distribute economic
products not in proportion to successful achievement but
according to the degree of effort exerted. According to the
principle of effort, justice decrees that hard-working
executives and [equally] hard-working laborers receive
precisely the same remuneration....^
Feinberg’ s statement captures the basic idea behind the effort
theory: the more effort one exerts on the job, the higher the wage one
deserves. This idea can be put as follows:
ET: Worker A deserves a higher wage than worker B
iff A exerts more effort than B; A and B deserve
the same wage iff A exerts the same amount of
effort as B.
The leading argument for ET appears to be this.® Wages are
deserved either for our efforts or for their success. Our efforts are
within our control, but their success is not. The success of one’s
efforts is matter of luck or accident. Desert, however, cannot arise
through mere luck or accident. Thus, wages are not deserved for the
success of our efforts, but rather for our efforts alone.
This is a bad argument. First, there is no reason to believe that
effort and success exhaust the possible bases for deserving a wage. At
the very least, an argument is needed to support such a claim. Second,
it is not true that desert cannot arise through mere luck or accident.
If it were true, then bad luck and horrible accidents could not make one
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deserving of, say, a stretch of good luck, or compensation.^ Finally,
it is highly implausible that the success of one’s efforts is always a
matter of luck or accident - unless this means merely that there is a
chance that one’s efforts will not succeed. That is certainly true, but
there is a difference between the possibility of one’s efforts failing,
on the one hand, and their success being "accidental" or "lucky," on the
other. For example, your efforts to read this paper may fail; but if
they succeed, this probably will not be a matter of luck or accident.
Besides, the effort theory generates implausible results. Compare
two garbage collectors. One finds it very easy to lift heavy bags of
rubbish all day, and can do it quickly. Another finds the task
difficult, and must exert three times the effort to achieve the same
results. I f ET were true, the second garbage collector would deserve a
wage perhaps three times greater than the first. That seems incorrect.
Surely it is more plausible that they deserve the same wage, or even
that the first collector, since he can perform his job more efficiently,
deserves a higher wage than the second.
Or compare two corporate executives. Each works as hard as the
other, and each works tirelessly. ET entails that each deserves a
generous wage. But one does excellent work. Her diligent efforts lead
to dramatic profits for the company. For this, she deserves a raise.
Meanwhile, the other’s efforts constantly backfire. His efforts, though
conscientious, result in substantial losses to the company. For this,
he may deserve demotion to a lower-paying position. Certainly he does
not deserve a raise.
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The advocate of ET cannot reply to these examples by saying that
other things being equal, workers who exert more effort deserve more
pay. For this is to admit that factors other than effort can affect
one s desert of a wage. This is precisely what an advocate of ET must
deny.
In rejecting ET
,
I am not rejecting the idea effort is a basis for
deserving a wage. On the contrary, I think it is. I am arguing that
effort is not the only basis for deserving a wage. Later I will discuss
some of those other bases. In the meantime, let us consider a different
theory.
Market value theories
The literature on desert of wages is sometimes characterized as a
debate between those who think that a worker’s effort is the appropriate
basis for deserving a wage, and those who believe the worker’s actual
contribution or productivity is the appropriate basis.® Typical
statements of the contribution theory of wages include;
A man’s reward should depend on the value of the
contribution which he makes to social welfare in his work
activity.
®
Justice, according to this principle [of contribution],
requires that each worker get back exactly that proportion
of the national wealth that he has himself created.
According to the contribution theory, the wage you deserve
is a function of the amount of contribution you have made.^^
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The value of a worker’s contribution is often identified with its
market value. But the contribution’s value could be identified with
something else
-say, its "intrinsic" value, or its utility. Thus, there
are several versions of the contribution theory. j discuss only
the version that identifies the contribution’s value with its market
value. I call it the "market value theory" of desert of wages.
According to the market value theory, the basis for deserving a
wage is providing a marketable service, and the amount deserved for
providing it is equal to the free-market value of that service. In
Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer describes such a theory:
the market, if it is free, gives to each person exactly what
he deserves. .. .The goods and services we provide are valued
by potential consumers in such-and-such a way, and these
values are aggregated by the market, which determines the
price that we receive. And that price is our desert, for it
expresses the only worth our goods and services can have,
the worth they actually have for other people.
A market value theory of desert of wages seems to be based partly
on the plausible intuition that unless the work one does has some sort
of value to others, then one cannot deserve a wage for it. The market
value theory then identifies this value with market value. Also, this
identification makes for a relatively simple theory. This is because
the market value of a thing - unlike its utility, or the amount of
effort that went into producing it - is relatively easy to determine (at
least in theory). As David Miller writes:
...if we want desert to form the basis of a social practice
- rather than being an idea that is used merely to form a
series of idiosyncratic judgements - we need a non-arbitrary
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public standard to measure it. In this light, the
attraction of a market-based criterion is very
considerable.
However attractive a free-market value theory of desert of wages
may be, it cannot be properly evaluated without stating it more
precisely. This will require attention to the notion of a "free
market.
"
The United States is often said to have "free market" economy.
This is because a significant portion of the means of production is in
private hands, and there is much less governmental interference in the
workings of the US economy than in the economies of, say, France,
Mexico, or Cuba. If this is the sort of "free market" that advocates of
the market value theory of desert of wages have in mind, then they must
accept that all wages currently received in the US are deserved.
Accepting this would trivialize the comparable worth debate.
Advocates of comparable worth maintain that women tend to earn less than
they deserve, given that their male colleagues, or men who work in
nominally different but relevantly similar jobs, tend to earn more. If,
however, it is a necessary truth that the wage one deserves in a US-
style "free market" is precisely the wage that one receives, then those
advocates are contradicting themselves. They would be maintaining (in
effect) that women manage to earn less-than-deserved wages, while
earning precisely what they deserve. Surely advocates of comparable
worth are not guilty of this.
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Thus, what advocates of market value theories must have in mind is
not a US-style free market, but rather an "ideal" or "perfectly free"
market. In neoclassical economics, a perfectly free market is a
hypothetical market with the following features. There is supply and
demand for goods and services. The means of production are entirely
privately owned and there is no state interference in the market’s
operations. Firms and consumers in this market are psychological
egoists: they always seek to maximize their own welfare. They also
operate under certainty: they know the outcomes of their alternative
actions. As a consequence of certainty, firms and consumers in a
perfectly free market have, in the words of economists Richard Wolff and
Stephen Resnick, "...perfect information about price and wage
movements.
This conception of a "free market" may be used to formulate a
version of the market-value theory of desert of wages:
MVTl S deserves wage W at t for providing some
service R in market M at t iff (i) S provides R
in M at t and (ii) if M were free at t, then W
would be the market price of R at t.
To find out whether someone deserves a wage for providing a
service in the actual market, MVTl directs us to consider the closest
possible perfectly free market in which that service is provided. The
price of that service in that market is the wage one deserves for
providing it in the actual market.
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I believe that MVTl is not the correct theory of desert of wages.
It entails that many people who intuitively deserve wages deserve no
wages at all. To see this, consider the case of Mr. Porkbelly. He is a
commodities trader in the actual market. Mr. Porkbelly excels at his
job. He assiduously researches the market, works long hours, and almost
always makes his clients a good deal of money. Intuitively, Mr.
Porkbelly deserves a decent wage for his work.
MVTl entails that he deserves nothing. As noted above, consumers
in a perfectly free market possess perfect information about price
movements. They do not have to speculate. But commodities trading is
speculation about the price movements of commodities. Thus, consumers
in a free market would not demand the services of commodities traders.
The price of that service would therefore be zero. It follows that Mr.
Porkbelly deserves no wage at all for the work he does. Indeed, if MVTl
is true, then most workers on Wall Street deserve nothing!
This difficulty can be avoided by adjusting the idea of a free
market. Let a free market be similar to the perfectly free market
sketched above, except that firms and consumers do not operate under
certainty. Call the theory that incorporates this conception of a free
market MVT2. MVT2 avoids the conclusion that Wall Street workers
deserve nothing. In that market, people must speculate about price
movements
.
However, MVT2 falls to the following case. Consider Ivan, who
works in a Soviet-style controlled economy. His job is to set the price
of corn for each year. This job requires a high level of mathematical
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and organizational skills. It also involves extensive training and
considerable responsibility. The working conditions are abysmal: Ivan’s
cramped office is cold and windowless. Despite this, Ivan works hard
and does his job well. Intuitively, Ivan deserves a decent wage.
MVT2 entails that Ivan deserves nothing. If the market in which
Ivan worked were free, there would be no such job as "setting the price
of corn for each year." The price of corn would be "set" entirely by
market forces. Put another way, if we go to the possible free market
closest to Ivan, we find that his service of setting the price of corn
has no market value whatsoever. Since that value or price would be
Ivan’s deserved wage, it follows that Ivan - in the actual market -
deserves nothing for doing his job.
An advocate of MVT2 might reply that Ivan has marketable skills,
e.g. mathematical and organizational, and their exercise would have a
price in a free market. That price would be Ivan’s wage for exercising
those skills, and that wage is what Ivan actually deserves for doing his
job. In other words, Ivan’s job should not be thought of as "setting
the price of corn for each year," since that would indeed be a worthless
service in a perfectly free market, but rather as "exercising such-and-
such degree of mathematical and organizational skills," which would have
a positive market value and would deserve a wage. A similar reply might
be made on behalf of Mr. Porkbelly by advocates of MVTl.
This reply assumes that exercising mathematical and organizational
skills "in the abstract" counts as a service. This is implausible. As
I see it, the exercise of a skill counts as a service only if directed
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toward some project. In Ivan’s case, the project is setting the price
of corn for each year. That project has no positive value in a free
market. Of course Ivan could apply his mathematical and organizational
skills to a different project, but the question is not whether Ivan
would deserve a wage for providing some service, but whether he deserves
a wage for the service he actually provides. MVT2 entails that Ivan
deserves nothing.
Besides, there are displays of skill that have no market value,
but that may nevertheless deserve a wage. Suppose, for example, you are
a wealthy but slightly eccentric person who lives near a sandy beach.
One day a derelict man knocks on your door asking for work. You pity
him, but have no work for him to do. So you make the following
arrangement. If only he will count grains of sand at the beach, you
will pay him some sort of wage. The man agrees to this. So every day
he counts thousands of grains of sand. This job requires tremendous
patience, steady hands, and a relatively high degree of mathematical
skill. It also involves eye and back strain, not to mention serious
sunburn. For doing this, you pay him a wage. He deserves it. This is
not because his particular display of skill has market value; it does
not.
This is not to say that the market value of the service one
provides, or the skills and talents one exhibits in providing it, are
irrelevant to the wage one deserves. It is to say that there is more to
deserving a wage. Thus, we must look elsewhere if we wish to find the
correct theory of desert of wages.
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Compensation theories
Work can be drudgery, an imposition on one’s time, or a danger to
one’s health. This has suggested to some philosophers that if wages are
deserved, they are deserved as compensation. James Dick, for example,
writes that the notion of compensation "...provides the most powerful
and important ground for justifying differences in incomes."^® Joel
Feinberg agrees: "...economic income cannot plausibly be construed as
prizes or rewards, and can be spoken of as 'deserved’ only insofar as it
is compensation...."^^ Feinberg continues:
Not only unpleasant and hazardous work but also terribly
responsible positions and functions requiring extensive
preliminary training deserve compensation. Here is the real
basis for the claim that the executive and the physician
deserve higher incomes: not that their superior abilities
deserve rewards, but rather that their heavier loads of
responsibility and worry and (for doctors) their longer
periods of impoverished apprenticeship deserve
compensation.
Feinberg’ s idea is that wages are deserved as compensation for at
least three factors: length of training, working conditions, and
responsibility. The more training and responsibility, and the worse the
conditions, the higher the wage one deserves. Let us formulate
Feinberg’ s compensation theory as follows:
CTl S deserves wage W for doing job J iff (i) S does
J; and (ii) W is adequate compensation for the
training, responsibility, and working conditions
that J involves for S.
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For purposes of evaluating CTl, it is important to be clear about
the notion of compensation. In one place, Feinberg observes that
"...persons deserve compensation for harm wrongly inflicted by others."
In another, he stipulates that 'compensation’ is deserved for "...losses
which are no one’s fault. In each case, Feinberg’ s idea is that the
basis for deserving compensation is some sort of harm or loss. CTl thus
implies that wages are deserved on the basis of harm or loss.
If taken as a general view about deserving wages, this is clearly
false. Consider the medical student who enjoys the rigors of medical
school, later thrives as an impoverished intern, and still later takes
tremendous pleasure in practicing medicine. Or consider the happy
graduate student who finds no pleasure greater than hours of intense
study, who later savors the demands and responsibilities of teaching.
Indeed, consider anyone who is happy in his or her job, and who enjoyed
qualifying for it. In all such cases, CTl entails that no wage is
deserved. This is plainly wrong.
Perhaps George Sher’s compensation theory will fare better than
CTl. Sher’s view is that "...a wage is deserved when a worker’s
receiving it would rectify the subordination of his purposes to those of
others."^® Sher’s argument is this:
...when a person works for another, his unremunerated labor
violates a standard that requires that no one’s purposes be
subordinated to the purposes of others. This situation is
clearly rectified by the restoration of equality between
what the worker has done for others and what those others
have done for him....
A
wage, which the employee can convert
to goods or services of his own choosing, is singularly well
suited to serve this function. And this, I suggest, is the
basic reason the wage is deserved.
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Sher s idea is that working involves subordinating one’s own
interests to the interests of one’s employer, and that this sort of
subordination makes one deserving of compensation or "rectification."
The deserved wage, then, adequately compensates for having one’s
interests thus subordinated; or:
CT2 S deserves wage W for doing job J iff (i) S does
J and (ii) W is adequate compensation for the
subordination of interests that S must undergo
to do J.
CT2 hinges on the assumption that work involves a subordination of
one s purposes to another’s. As Sher writes "...our account presupposes
that labor is not among workers’ primary goals. If taken as a claim
about all wage-deserving workers, this presupposition is clearly false.
There are those whose work involves no subordination to the goals of
others. If CT2 is true, then if these people deserve any pay at all,
they deserve less pay than those whose goals are being "subordinated" to
the goals others.
Sher realizes that this poses a problem for CT2: "...the stronger
intuition appears to be that willing workers deserve as much pay as
others.
Thus, to defend our account, we must somehow disarm that
intuition. This is... not difficult to do. It is a
commonplace that the most committed and willing workers are
generally also the best. Thus, although these workers come
closer than others to pursuing their own purposes, they also
generally do more to advance the purposes of others. In
part, the intuition that they deserve to be paid as much as
others may reflect a belief that these two factors cancel.^"*
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Sher’s argument is that there are (at least) two factors, rather
than the single factor of interest-subordination, determining the wage a
person deserves. These are (i) how much his work requires the
subordination of his goals to others’ goals, and (ii) how much good his
work does for others. If his work requires very little subordination,
he deserves a correspondingly lower wage - unless his work does a lot of
good for others, in which case "these two factors cancel." I presume
this means that the person deserves as much pay as a similar worker
whose goals are being subordinated but whose work does not do as much
good for others.
Apart from abandoning CT2, Sher now assumes that the most
committed workers are "generally also the best." This seems plausible,
but irrelevant. It is possible for there to be committed and willing
workers whose work is no better, or better for others, than those who
are not as committed and willing. Sher’s account implies that those
workers deserve less pay than relevantly similar workers who are not as
committed and willing. This is absurd. Other things being equal, these
workers deserve the same amount of pay.
A related difficulty arises with respect to discontented workers.
Sher’s account implies that they deserve more pay than their less
discontented workers. But, Sher asks, "...isn’t it highly
counterintuitive to say that a worker with negative attitudes deserves a
higher wage than his more constructive colleague?"^^ Sher’s response:
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Just as a very willing worker is apt to perform well, a very
unwilling one is apt to perform badly. The dissatisfied
worker s labor is likely to be relatively unproductive.
This means that he is apt to be less deserving than others
by one measure even if more deserving by another.^®
It is a plausible empirical assumption that workers who are
dissatisfied with their jobs often fail to be as productive as
colleagues who are satisfied with their jobs. But this is irrelevant.
A worker who dislikes his job may perform as well or better than a
worker who likes his job. (My father, for example, loathed selling
insurance - yet he was the best salesman in the region!) Sher’s account
implies that the unhappy worker deserves more pay than the satisfied
worker. This seems wrong.
I believe these arguments reveal the basic flaw of compensation
theories: People can deserve wages, but often not as compensation.
Job-related harms are, of course, relevant to the wage one deserves for
doing it. But it is oversimple to construe all deserved wages as
compensation.
A different approach
I believe that an acceptable theory of desert of wages will be
more complicated than any of those considered thus far. This is mainly
because the range of bases for deserving a wage is, I believe, much
broader than those theories allow. My view is that these bases include
not only the effort one makes, the value of one’s services, and one’s
working conditions, but also the wage to which one is entitled by
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contract or convention, the fact that one is a person, certain needs one
may have, one’s moral worth, one’s past and future receipt of other
goods and evils, and probably others. I believe that a theory of desert
of wages must allow that the wage one deserves may involve any of these
(and perhaps other) factors.^’
Rather than develop this suggestion in detail, I will instead
defend it against two objections. Doing this may shed a bit more light
on my view about desert of wages.
The first objection is this: My suggestion that wages can be
deserved for the reasons I mentioned contradicts a natural and
heretofore unquestioned presupposition of a standard way of thinking
about desert. This presupposition can be brought out as follows. There
are various forms of treatment that people can deserve: punishment,
reward, apology, compensation, prizes, gratitude, and so on. The
presupposition is that for each sort of deservable treatment, there is
one desert-base or small set of desert-bases unique to it. Thus, for
example, it is said that punishment is deserved for committing some
wrong (but not for anything else); reward is deserved for heroics (but
not for anything else); apology is deserved for being insulted (again,
not for anything else); compensation is deserved for being wrongfully
harmed; grades are deserved for academic performance. And wages,
depending on the theory, are deserved for effort, for providing a
marketable service, or for the training and conditions one’s work
involves. My suggestion that wages can be deserved for any number of
reasons flies directly in the face of this presupposition.
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This presupposition of the standard view is at the very core of
Joel Feinberg’s influential paper, "Justice and Personal Desert." In
that paper, which first appeared more than thirty years ago^®, Feinberg
attempts to analyze the concept of desert. His analysis proceeds in the
following way. First he draws up a list of the sorts of treatment that
people can deserve:
1. Awards of prizes
2. Assignments of grades
3. Rewards and punishments
4. Praise, blame, and other informal responses
5. Reparation, liability, and other modes of
compensation.
Then Feinberg attempts to specify the bases for deserving these
forms of treatment. In each case, the purported desert bases are unique
to the form of treatment. This is why Feinberg says "...the bases of
desert vary with the mode of deserved treatment."®® And since for
Feinberg wages are deserved as compensation, the bases for deserving a
wage are just those that are bases for deserving compensation.®^ Thus,
bases for deserving a wage are not to be confused with bases for
deserving prizes, rewards, grades, or any other sort of deservable
treatment.
Other writers have accepted Feinberg’s assumption that for each
form of deservable treatment, there is a desert base or small set of
desert bases unique to it. David Miller, for one, claims:
...the basis for desert - the characteristics in virtue of
which people are said to deserve this or that - appears to
change according to the kind of benefit in question.®^
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Robert Young, to take another example, writes:
.. .whether someone deserves to win the World Chess
Championship will be determined by utterly different
considerations from those that are relevant to whether
someone deserves to be given life imprisonment, and utterly
different again from whether someone deserves to be awarded
compensatory damages for injuries sustained as a result of
medical negligence.
I believe that this way of thinking about desert in general, and
hence about desert of wages in particular, is fundamentally misguided.
I therefore believe that it is no objection to ray view that it
contradicts the standard way of thinking about desert. To see why I
think the standard view is false, we should begin by considering
something other than wages.
Consider grades. An important basis for deserving a good grade is
(in many cases) performing well on tests and assignments. But this need
not be the only basis. Suppose there is a student with a slight
learning disability, and a physical disability that makes getting to
class difficult. This student may not perform as well as others. But
if he performs at all well, he may deserve a higher grade than
"unchallenged" students whose work is no better. Here, in addition to
performance, effort and (medical) needs seem relevant to what grade he
deserves. Or suppose a gifted freshman takes a senior seminar. Her
work may not be up to the seniors’ level. But if it is rather good, she
may deserve a higher grade than those seniors whose work is no better.
Here, age and skill seem relevant. Or suppose a student informs a
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teacher that he must receive a "B" to graduate. The teacher, who is
familiar with the student from a previous class, assures the student
that a "B" is a practical certainty. Suppose the student then struggles
in the class, and does not quite earn a "B." As I see it, the student
may nevertheless deserve one in virtue of the teacher’s assurances.
Here, something akin to entitlement is relevant.
Next, consider apologies. A condition on deserving an apology is
being insulted. But this is not the only relevant fact. Another is the
insulted party’s moral worth. If he is a scoundrel, then perhaps he
deserves only the slightest apology. Since he is a human being, he may
deserve some sort of apology, no matter how morally worthless he may
otherwise be. Also relevant is the fact that he is entitled by the
rules of etiquette to an apology. If the insulted person is especially
sensitive, and needs an apology to avoid emotional damage, then this
need may be a basis for deserving an apology.
Next, consider medical care. Need is a basis for deserving it.
But so is moral worth and being a person. For imagine that A, a morally
despicable person, and B, a morally outstanding person, need a heart.
Only one heart is available. Each deserves it insofar as each needs it,
but B may deserve it more than A in virtue of her superior moral worth.
Suppose further that A is entitled by a living will to the heart. That
too would be relevant to whether A deserved it. Suppose also that B has
had several (unsuccessful) heart transplants already, and that A has had
none. Then past receipt seems relevant to deserving the heart. Also
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relevant are the efforts that A and B have made to stay relatively
healthy.
Next, consider punishment. It can be deserved for committing some
wrong. But other factors are relevant to the offender’s desert. The
harm caused by the crime is clearly relevant. But also relevant, I
believe, are the offender’s background, his reasons for committing the
crime, the effort he put into the crime, any special medical needs he
may have, the fact that he is a person, his moral worth, and the penalty
to which offenders of that crime are usually "entitled."
I suggest that what is true of grades, apologies, medical care,
and punishment - namely, that each can be deserved for an indeterminate
number of non-exclusive reasons - is also true of wages. We have
already seen that something is plausible in each of the theories of
desert of wages considered in previous sections. Effort, the value of
one’s services, the conditions and training one’s work involves: All
are relevant to the wage one deserves. But even these do not exhaust
the bases for one’s desert of a wage. Consider, for example, a
terrifically successful but morally wicked corporate executive. My view
is that her wickedness makes her less deserving of the handsome salary
she takes home. So, wickedness should be added to the list of bases for
deserving a wage. Consider next a shoe shiner who, through no fault of
his own, is especially financially needy. As I see it, his need makes
him deserve a somewhat higher wage than the shoe shiner of equal skill
who is not as needy. So, need should be added to the list of bases for
deserving a wage. Consider next the employee who has signed a contract
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that entitles her to a certain wage. Other things being equal, the fact
that she has entered into this agreement is a basis for her deserving
the wage to which she is now entitled. So, entitlement should be added
to this list of bases for deserving a wage. Consider, finally, the man
who performs a menial and perhaps economically valueless job. He is
nevertheless a person, and this fact makes him deserving of some wagej
that is, the fact that he is a person provides a floor below which wages
cannot, without injustice, fall. So, being a person should be added to
the list of bases for deserving a wage. It begins to appear, then, that
there is a large number of factors relevant to the wage one deserves.
At this point it may be objected that I have not provided any
principled reason for deeming something a basis for desert, or that I
rely on unsupported "intuitions" about what is a desert base. To this
second objection I reply as follows: The other theories of desert of
wages are no better in this respect than mine. Effort theorists, value
theorists, compensation theorists: All rely on intuitions about what is
and is not a basis for deserving a wage. The real difference between my
theory and theirs is not that mine rests on intuitions about desert
bases and theirs do not. The difference is rather that my theory posits
more desert bases than the others. As far as appeals to intuitions go,
my theory and the others are partners in the supposed crime.
Comparable worth
I conclude by briefly noting two implications that my view of
desert of wages has for the comparable worth debate. The first
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implication is this. As noted at the outset, advocates of comparable
worth claim not only that women and men who work in the same jobs
deserve equal pay, but also that women and men who work in jobs that are
nominally different but relevantly similar deserve equal pay. These
claims imply that certain factors (for example, skill, training, and
working conditions) are relevant to the wage one deserves, and some (for
example, being a man) are not. But if my view about desert of wages is
correct, then bases for deserving a wage include many others never
mentioned by advocates of comparable worth.
The second implication is that there are inherent limitations to
current job evaluation schemes." The schemes I have in mind attempt to
specify the bases for the wage a job deserves. But people, not jobs,
deserve wages. And the wage a person deserves depends (I have
suggested) not only on facts about the person’s job, but also on facts
about the person. Unfortunately, there is no way to know all of those
facts - no way to know, for example, each person’s moral worth, need, or
the benefits and burdens a person has already received. Therefore,
there is no practical way to include these facts in job evaluation
schemes. The upshot is that job evaluation schemes, at least as we know
them, support neither the claim that women and men who work in the same
job deserve equal pay, nor the claim that women and men who work in jobs
that are nominally different but "relevantly similar" deserve equal pay.
This is because many of the relevantly similar features - that is, many
of the desert bases - are not and cannot be feasibly included in those
schemes. Simply put, all that current job evaluation schemes support is
149
the claim that other desert bases being equal, women generally earn
less-than-deserved pay. To put the point rather more contentiously:
For all that advocates of comparable worth have said, individual workers
may be getting precisely what they deserve.
Notes
1. For a book-length version of this argument, see K. E. Soltan, The
Causal Theory of Justice (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1987). For more general discussions of comparable worth that discuss
this argument, see Paula England, Comparable Worth: Theories and
Evidence (New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter, 1992); and Michael Evan Gold,
A Dialogue on Comparable Worth (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1983).
2. A theory of desert of wages might include not only a list of bases
for deserving a wage, but also a method for ranking, quantifying, and
assigning "amounts" of them to particular sums of money.
3. Why say that wages are deserved only for contracted work? Consider
the following case. While you are away on vacation, I take it upon
myself to tend to your lawn and garden. On your return, I present
myself at your doorstep and ask for payment. You may reward me for what
I have done, but to say that this reward is a wage is counterintuitive.
The reason, I suggest, is that the work I have done was not done under
any sort of contract.
Note also that on my understanding of wages, the money self-
employed people pay themselves is not a wage. This is because people
presumably cannot make contracts with themselves.
4. I have in mind the following sort of case. Suppose I am hit by a
speeding car. I am knocked unconscious. Because of my injuries, I will
die unless I receive immediate emergency surgery. Fortunately, a
surgeon witnesses the accident and comes to my aid. Though I am unable
to consent, the surgeon performs the surgery. The operation is a
success, and I survive. A few weeks later, I receive a bill from the
surgeon for services rendered. The surgeon’s argument is that there was
an implicit or "quasi" contract: If I had been able to consent to the
surgery, I would have. If so, then any payment I make to the surgeon
should count as a wage. For a case involving these facts, see Cotnam v.
Wisdom (Supreme Court of Arkansas, July 15, 1907). I thank Thomas
Kearns for this reference.
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109 110, and by James Dick, "How to Justify a Distribution ofPhilosophy and Public Affairs 4 (Spring 1975), pages 259-260.
6. David Miller offers (but does not endorse) one version of this
argument:
The argument in its favor is usually expressed as follows: a
man can deserve reward only for what it is within his power
to do. If two men try equally hard, and work for an equally
long time, they deserve equal remuneration even if one of
them, by virtue of superior ability, manages to produce more
goods, or goods of a better quality. (Social Justice, page
109. )
Another version is suggested by the following story, told by
Michael Slote, Desert, Consent, and Justice," Philosophy and Public
Affairs 2 (Summer 1973):
Imagine. .. that a certain woman has lost a book and two
friends of hers come by and volunteer to help her find it.
The friends make equally conscientious, energetic, and
intelligent efforts to find the book, and one of them
succeeds in finding it and returning it to the woman who
lost it. One might well wonder about such a case whether
the woman who actually found the book deserves more (by way
of gratitude or reward) from the friend who lost the book
than does the woman who tried equally hard but failed to
find the book. And this is a difficult question. On the
one hand, it is possible to feel that since the friends made
equal efforts, etc., in behalf of the woman who lost the
book, she is equally in their debt and should reward them
equally. It may seem that neither deserves more than the
other at her hands. We are, after all, imagining that the
person who does not find the book fails through no
intellectual, emotional, or moral defect of her own and that
her failure to find the book can be attributed to "bad luck"
or "accident". And can greater desert ... arise through mere
luck or accident? (Pages 327-328.)
Slote is talking about deserving gratitude or reward, rather than
wages. But he tells this story in the course of discussing "whether an
ideally just society ... would reward people (workers) in accordance with
their actual success in contributing to society or in accordance with
their (conscientious) efforts to contribute to society" (323). Also,
Slote does not endorse this argument, but he does not reject it either.
His comment: "It is hard to know what to say" (329).
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supposed connection(s) between desert and responsibility, see FredFeldman s Desert: Reconsideration of Some Received Wisdom," Mind 104(January 1995), pages 63-77.
8. See, for example, Julian Lament, "The Concept of Desert in
Distributive Justice," The Philosophical Quarterly AA (1994), pages 45-
64. Lament writes: "Among those who think that desert should play some
role in determining income distribution, one of the long-standing
debates has been between those who think 'effort’ should be the desert-
basis and those who think 'productivity’ should be" (57).
9. Miller, Social Justice, page 103.
10. Feinberg, Social Philosophy, page 114.
11. Soltan, The Causal Theory of Justice, page 147.
12. See Soltan, A Causal Theory of Justice (page 147) for three such
versions. Note that contribution theories will differ also according to
what counts as "contribution." In what follows, I understand a worker’s
contribution to be the service he provides. But William Galston, in
Justice and the Human Good (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1980) understands "contribution" much more broadly: "Contribution to
production has five major components: sacrifice, duration, effort,
productivity, and quality" (201). Galston’s inclusion of "sacrifice"
and ’effort" makes his theory a hybrid of effort and contribution
theories. Thus, I think Galston misleads by calling it a "contribution"
theory.
13. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983),
page 108. Walzer, however, does not accept this theory, writing:
...this is to misunderstand the meaning of desert. Unless
there are standards of worth independent of what people want
(and are willing to buy) at this or that moment in time,
there can be no deservingness at all. We would never know
what a person deserved until we saw what he had gotten. And
that can’t be right (108).
However, several authors seem to accept some version of the market value
theory of desert of wages. See, for example, Louis 0. Kelso and
Mortimer J. Adler, The Capitalist Manifesto (New York, NY: Random House,
1958), page 52-86; David Miller, Market, State, and Community (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989), pages 151-174; Jonathan Riley, "Justice Under
Capitalism," in John Chapman and J. Roland Pennock, eds.
,
Nomos XXXI:
Markets and Justice (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1989),
pages 122-162; Robert Young, "Egalitarianism and Personal Desert,"
Ethics 102 (1992), pages 319-341, especially page 330. For the claim
that neoclassical economic theory is committed to the idea that in a
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(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987). For an old
but impressive criticism of the neoclassical economic theory of justice
see Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett Publishing Company), pages 287-290. For further reflections on
the morality of a free market, see David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pages 83-112.
14. Miller, Market, State, and Community, pages 161-162.
15. Wolff and Resnick, Economics: Marxian versus Neoclassical, page
123. Neoclassical economists use these assumptions to derive all sorts
of interesting results - for example, that the prices in such a market
will remain in equilibrium; and that such a market will be "Pareto
optimal .
"
16. Dick, "How to Justify a Distribution of Earnings," page 264.
17. Joel Feinberg, "Justice and Personal Desert," in Feinberg’s Doing
and Deserving (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press), page 94.
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20.
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,
Desert, page 102.
22. Sher Desert, page 106.
23. Sher, Desert, page 107.
24. Sher, Desert, page 107.
25. Sher, Desert, page 107.
26. Sher, Desert, page 108.
27. Two important caveats. First, I do not view possession of any of
these bases as sufficient for deserving a wage. I view them as bases
for prima facie desert. Second, I accept what many authors have noted:
namely, that need and entitlement are different from desert. What I do
not accept is that need and entitlement are not bases for desert. For
further discussion of these points, see Chapter 7, "A Theory of Desert."
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28. In Noaos VI: Justice, Friedrich, C. J. and Chapman, J. W.
,
eds.(New York, NY: Atherton Press, 1963), pages 69-97. However, quotations
trom this article are from its reprinting in Feinberg’s Doing and
Deserving.
29. Feinberg, "Justice and Personal Desert," page 62. Feinberg does
not claim "taxonomic precision or completeness" for this list.
30. Feinberg, "Justice and Personal Desert," page 61.
31. Or, since there are many sorts of harm, it might be better to say
that on Feinberg’s view, wages are deserved as compensation for
workplace" harm. These "harms," according to Feinberg’s theory of
desert of wages, are training, responsibility, and working conditions.
32. Miller, Market, State, and Community, page 157.
33. Young, "Egalitarianism and Personal Desert," page 319.
34. A good discussion of different sorts of job evaluation schemes can
be found in England, Comparable Worth: Theories and Evidence, pages 189-
224.
35. I hope that readers will understand that I am not taking sides in
the comparable worth debate. I am merely suggesting that the debate
needs to be broadened to include what I have argued to be the proper
conception of desert of wages.
154
CHAPTER 7
A THEORY OF DESERT
Let us then exAinine wore closely
wherein Desert consists.
.
.
- Henry Sidgwick,
The Methods of Ethics
Introduction
My view is that the previous chapters suggest the need for a fresh
start on the topic of desert. That is the goal of this chapter, in
which I explain and defend my own theory of desert. I hasten to add
that the theory I defend lacks novelty in two important respects.
First, I believe that my conception of desert, however much it differs
from some philosophical conceptions, is more or less the ordinary or
"common sense" conception. Put another way, the theory of desert I
propose is meant to be not much more than a systematization of what I
take to be ordinary beliefs about desert. Second, the structure of my
theory of desert is not novel. In fact, its structure is strikingly
similar to that of W. D. Ross’s theory of moral rightness. It will be
useful, then, to conclude this chapter by comparing my theory of desert
to Ross’s theory of moral rightness.
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What sort of thing is desert?
There are many sorts of things: events, propositions, physical
objects, properties, sets, and perhaps more (or perhaps less). Thus, a
natural way to begin theorizing about desert is to ask: What sort of
thing is it? As I see it, the answer is clear: Desert is a property.
But desert is not a "monadic" property. It is a "polyadic" property, or
a relation.
If desert is a relation, then (like any relation) it takes a
number of relata. An interesting question is "How many?" A natural
answer is that desert takes three relata: a subject of desert, an object
of desert, and a bssis for desert. This is suggested by ordinary
desert-claims such as:
(a) Smith deserves a bonus in virtue of her
increased productivity.
However, it could be argued that (a) is incomplete. For Smith not
only deserves a bonus: she also deserves it from someone or something -
her boss, for example, or the company. So perhaps (a) should be
replaced by:
(b) Smith deserves a bonus from the company in
virtue of her increased productivity.
It could now be argued that not even (b) is complete. This is
because Smith may deserve a bonus from the company at a certain time -
immediately, say, or at the end of the year. So perhaps (b) should be
replaced by:
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(c) Smith deserves a bonus at the end of this year
from the company in virtue of her increased
productivity.
Even (c), it might be said, is incomplete. The reason is that
Smith’s desert of a bonus can change over time. So, for example. Smith
may now deserve a bonus at the end of the year. But six months ago,
prior to her increase in productivity. Smith did not deserve a bonus at
the end of this year. Thus, Smith’s desert of a bonus at the end of the
year has changed over time: at one time, she does not deserve it; at
another time, she does. So perhaps (c) should be replaced by:
(d) At this time. Smith deserves a bonus at the end
of this year from the company in virtue of her
increased productivity.
If (d) were a paradigmatic expression of the desert relation, then
desert would take six relata: (1) a subject of desert; (2) an object of
desert; (3) a basis for desert; (4) a time at which the object is
deserved by the subject; (5) a time at which it is true that the subject
deserves that object in virtue of instantiating some desert base(s); (6)
and a person from whom, or a thing from which, the subject deserves the
object. It may appear, then, that a schematic expression of the desert-
relation will have to take this form:
DC At t, S deserves x at t’ from y in virtue of F.
There is no doubt that many ordinary desert-claims, fully parsed,
will conform to DC. But some will not; for example:
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(e) At this time, Jones deserves some good luck;
he’s had only bad.
Good luck, though it can (I believe) be deserved, is not deserved
from anyone or anything. ^ Good luck is therefore unlike other
deservable things, such as a bonuses, raises, apologies, rewards, or
grades, which are deserved from someone or something. Good luck is a
limiting case, insofar as it seems impossible to distribute or bestow;
but there are things that can be bestowed and deserved without being
deserved from anyone in particular. Food, respect and medical care are
examples: Other things being equal, everyone deserves these things -
even though there may not be, for any particular deserving person, a
person or persons from whom these things are deserved. Thus, every
desert-claim that expresses a case like this will, like (e), fail to
conform to DC.
(e) fails to conform to DC in another way. Although it does
mention a time at which it is true that Jones deserves good luck, it
does not mention a time at which this good luck is deserved. True,
Jones deserves that there is some time at which he has good luck; to
deny this is to deny that Jones deserves good luck. However, it is
possible that there is not any particular time such that Jones deserves
good luck at that time. (Perhaps Jones deserves it soon, but 'soon’
does not pick out a time.) Thus, every desert-claim that expresses a
case like this will, like (e), fail to conform to DC.
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At this point, it may be tempting to posit several desert-claim
schemas, each canonical. One would express a three-place relation, and
would capture claims like (a); another would express a four-place
relation, and would capture claims like (b); another would express a
five-place relation, and would capture claims like (c); a fourth would
express a six-place relation, and would capture claims like (d); and
perhaps even more would be needed to accommodate the variety of
apparently genuine desert-claims.
This temptation should be avoided. This is because to posit
several desert-claim schemas, each canonical, is to multiply desert-
relations beyond necessity.^ Let me explain.
According to a plausible principle, any relation takes the same
number of relata each time it is instantiated.^ Take, for instance, the
relation expressed by 'taller than’. Suppose this relation takes
exactly two relata in some case. Then, according to this principle, the
taller than relation always takes two relata. Any relation that takes
more or less than two relata is not the taller than relation.
Now consider the relation of desert. Suppose this relation takes
just three relata in some case. Then, according to the principle above,
the desert relation always takes three relata. Any relation that takes
more or less than three relata is not the desert relation. Now suppose
that we posit several desert-claim schemas. Each expresses a relation,
but the number of relata taken by each relation is different. Then
according to the principle above, the relation expressed must in each
case be a different relation. Of course, it might be convenient to call
159
the relation expressed by each schema 'desert’; but, strictly speaking,
each relation is distinct from the other.
My view is that this would unnecessarily fracture the concept of
desert. I also believe that there is a way to accommodate the variety
of desert-claims without positing a multitude of distinct desert-
relations. The "trick" is fairly obvious. It is to transfer the
apparent variety of desert-claims to the desert object. This can be
done by treating objects of desert as propositions. (As is the custom,
I will name propositions by using ' that ’ -clauses. ) So, for example,
suppose that Aaron Burr deserves that Alexander Hamilton apologizes to
Burr at noon on January 1, 1800. This object of desert - that Alexander
Hamilton apologizes to Burr at noon on January 1, 1800 - is deserved
from a particular person, Hamilton, at a particular time, noon on
January 1, 1800. But as we have seen, not every object of desert will
be like this. So, for example, Jones may deserve that Jones has some
good luck. This object of desert - that Jones has some good luck - may
not be deserved at a particular time, or from a particular agent.
Nevertheless, it seems to be an object of desert in good standing, and
so does the more complex desert object deserved by Burr.
That said, I believe it would be a mistake to assert that the
canonical form for all genuine desert-claims is this:
DC* At t, S deserves x in virtue of F.
True, DC* is an improvement over DC insofar as DC* captures many more
genuine desert-claims than DC. But as I see it, DC* fails to capture
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all genuine desert-claims. This is because, according to the theory I
advocate below, there are two distinct desert relations, or two concepts
of desert: priwa facie desert and all-in desert. Later I will explain
these concepts, and why they are different. For now it is sufficient to
note that 'deserves’ as it appears in DC* is (on my view) ambiguous
between prima facie desert and all-in desert.
Thus, my view of desert requires that DC* be replaced by a pair of
schematic claims:
DCpf At t, S prima facie deserves x in virtue of F.
DCai At t, S all-in deserves x in virtue of F.
intended to capture all genuine claims of prima facie desert;
DCai is intended to capture all genuine claims of all-in desert. I
believe that DCpf and DCg^j^, together, capture all genuine desert-claims.
Accordingly, I believe that desert, whether prima facie or all-in, is a
four-place relation that obtains among a subject of desert, an object of
desert, a basis of desert, and a time at which the subject deserves that
object in virtue of that basis.
A catalogue of desert bases
The term 'desert basis’ seems to have been coined by Joel Feinberg
when he wrote:
If a person is deserving of some sort of treatment, he must,
necessarily, be so in virtue of some possessed
characteristic or prior activity. It is because no one can
deserve anything unless there is some basis or ostensible
occasion for the desert that judgments of desert carry with
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them a commitment to the giving of reasons. One cannot say,
for example, that Jones deserves gratitude although he has
done nothing in particular." If a person says that Jones
deserves patitude, then he must be prepared to answer the
question "For what?" Of course, he may not know the basis
of Jones s desert, but if he denies that there is any basis,
then he has forfeited his right to use the terminology of
desert. .. .Desert without a basis is simply not desert.'*
Feinberg is right that desert must have a basis. But this raises
more questions. What are the desert bases? How do desert bases manage
to make things deserving? As I see it, these are the two most pressing
questions for any theorist of desert. I shall now attempt to answer
them.
In Chapter 2, I accepted "pluralism" about desert bases. This is
the view that there is more than one basis for desert. I mentioned in
previous chapters some of the things I take to be bases for desert.
What follows is a more complete catalogue of desert bases. It will be
noticed that each entry in the catalogue opens with an italicized word.
In each case, the italicized word is meant to express what philosophers
might call a "determinable property" (such as being colored), of which
there may be innumerable "determinate properties" (such as being
scarlet, or being Vermillion) So, for example, the first entry in my
catalogue of desert bases is effort. This is meant to express the
determinable property of having exerted effort. Determinates of this
property include having exerted intellectual effort; having exerted
physical effort; and so on. Note that even these are determinable
properties. Having exerted intellectual effort, for example, is a
determinable property. Some of its determinates include having stayed
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up all night studying for the physics exam, and having labored for hours
under a broiling sun. Note also that determinates of determinables that
are desert bases are, in virtue of this, themselves desert bases. So,
for example, having labored for hours under a broiling sun is a desert
base in virtue of the fact that it is a determinate of the determinable
desert base of having exerted effort.^
(1) Effort. It is a truism that those who work hard become
deserving. One philosopher who accepts this truism is George Sher:
Of all the bases of desert, perhaps the most familiar and
compelling is diligent, sustained effort. Whatever else we
think, most of us agree that persons deserve things for
sheer hard work. We believe that conscientious students
deserve to get good grades, that athletes who practice
regularly deserve to do well, and that businessmen who work
long hours deserve to make money. Moreover, we warm to the
success of immigrants and the underprivileged who have
overcome obstacles of displacement and poverty. Such
persons^ we feel, richly deserve any success they may
obtain.
'
Another philosopher who accepts effort as a desert base is Wojciech
Sadurski. As I explained in Chapter 2, Sadurski’s view on this matter
is rather extreme. He claims that "..effort is the only legitimate
basis and measure of desert."®
I accept the truism that those who exert effort become deserving.
I do not accept Sadurski’s extreme view that effort is the only basis
for desert. There are many bases for desert, on my view. Nor do I
accept, what Sher’s remarks imply, that effort is always a basis for
deserving some benefit. To be sure, in many cases it is. For example,
if a person has spent many long, hot, dirty hours working in her
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vegetable garden, then she may deserve a thriving garden, the admiration
of her neighbors, the pleasure she might take in beholding and eating
the vegetables, or some other benefit. In other cases, however, effort
is a basis for deserving evil or harm. To see this, suppose a terrorist
aims to blow up some innocent people. Suppose the terrorist works quite
hard to achieve that end. The terrorist’s effort is not a basis for
deserving a benefit. It is a basis for deserving punishment. Indeed,
effort can be a basis for deserving just about anything deservable. For
there are many sorts of effort, and what is deserved in virtue of effort
will depend on what sort of effort is exerted. For example, criminal
effort deserves punishment; altruistic effort deserves admiration;
reckless effort deserves failure; intellectual effort deserves a good
grade; heroic effort deserves a reward; and so on.®
This is a convenient place to partially explain three pieces of
terminology that I will use later on to state my theory of desert. When
I say, for example, that effort deserves success, or that criminal
effort deserves punishment, I am not saying that effort is sufficient
for actually deserving success, or even that criminal effort is
sufficient for actually deserving punishment. To see why, suppose Jones
exerts criminal effort. Suppose, in other words, that Jones directs
effort towards something illegal. This is not sufficient for Jones to
deserve punishment. One reason is that the laws criminalizing the those
efforts might be morally unacceptable. Those laws might, for example,
criminalize any attempt to practice Judaism. If Jones attempts to
practice Judaism, he is engaged in illegal activities. But this is
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hardly sufficient for deserving punishment. Another reason is that even
if the laws are morally acceptable, Jones might instantiate other desert
bases that could influence the amount of punishment he deserves. For
example, Jones might be the product of horribly abusive parents. This
may mitigate the severity of the punishment he deserves; it might even
render any punishment undeserved.
However, even if Jones turns out not to actually deserve
punishment, I maintain that his criminal effort is a basis for prima
facie desert of punishment (this is the first bit of terminology). The
mere fact that Jones broke the law is, as I see it, a "point in favor"
of his deserving punishment. It is an objective fact about the act, and
is relevant to whether Jones really or all-in deserves punishment (the
second bit of terminology). Jones all-in deserves punishment if, when
all the bases for Jones’s prima facie desert of punishment are taken
into consideration, those bases in this case outweigh (the final piece
of terminology) the bases in this case for Jones’s deserving not to be
punished.
I will postpone further discussion of the notions of prima facie
desert, all-in desert, and weight until the other desert bases have been
considered. In the meantime, I will make generous use of the notion of
prima facie desert so as to avoid misunderstandings.
(2) Achievement. People are deserving in virtue of their
efforts, even if those efforts do not succeed. But people are also
deserving in virtue of their achievements, even if those achievements do
not require much effort. Think, for example, of the praise that is
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sometimes bestowed upon a brilliant composer. This praise can be
deserved even if the composer finds composing easy. What matters is the
achievement. Likewise for the wage deserved by a carpenter, say, for
whom building and installing a staircase is a matter of effortless
routine. Likewise for the punishment one might deserve for a
spontaneous murder.
There are importantly different things one can achieve, and what
is deserved for achievement depends on what is achieved. So, for
example, there is artistic achievement, which prima facie deserves
exhibition; political achievement, which prima facie deserves re-
election*, personal achievement, which prima facie deserves praise;
financial achievement, which prima facie deserves money; intellectual
achievement, which prima facie deserves publication; athletic
achievement, which prima facie deserves victory; and so on. (Note that
any instance of achievement can be an instance of many sorts of
achievement, and thereby constitute a basis for deserving several sorts
of treatment.
)
Although the word 'achievement’ customarily carries a positive
connotation, I would like to say that there are negative achievements -
for example, criminal achievements, which prima facie deserve
punishment; despicably motivated achievements, which prima facie deserve
contempt; worthless or useless achievements, which prima facie deserve
nothing; and so on.
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(3) Worth. Consider the claim that the Olympic Peninsula
deserves preservation, or that this giant Sequoia deserves not to be
turned into a bunch of Dixie cups. Let us assume for the moment that
these claims are true. What makes them so? What are the relevant bases
for desert? Perhaps something akin to effort is relevant to the
towering, ancient Sequoia’s desert. But what of the Olympic Peninsula’s
desert? It has not exerted any "effort." It has not "achieved"
anything. Thus, if it deserves anything at all, the basis for its
desert has not yet been catalogued.^®
My view is that the basis for the Olympic Peninsula’s desert is
its worth. I understand "worth" broadly. I intend it to include the
following properties: Rarity, magnificence, beauty, and so on. As I see
it, the Olympic Peninsula possesses all these properties. Furthermore,
I believe that in virtue of possessing them, the Olympic Peninsula
deserves preservation. Likewise for the giant Sequoia, the tropical
rainforest, and other things.
However, I intend "worth" to include not only the properties of
rarity, magnificence, beauty, and so on. I intend it to include also
the property of moral worth. Trees, wilderness areas, and the like do
not have moral worth. Moral worth is something that only people can
have. What is moral worth? Following tradition, I take a person’s
moral worth to be a function of his or her degree of virtue: The more
virtuous a person, the greater his or her moral worth.
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A traditional assumption is that the greater a person’s moral
worth, the greater his or her prima facie desert of happiness. If this
assumption is correct, then moral worth is a basis for desert.
I believe that this very assumption is implicit in a remark made
by W. D. Ross. Ross wrote:
If we compare two imaginary states of the universe, alike in
the total amounts of virtue and vice and of pleasure and
pain present in the two, but in one of which the virtuous
were all happy and the vicious miserable, while in the other
the virtuous were miserable and the vicious happy, very few
people would hesitate to say that the first was a much
better state of the universe than the second.
I share Ross s intuition that, other things being equal, the world in
which the virtuous are happy and the vicious unhappy is much better than
that world in which the vicious are happy and the virtuous miserable. I
share it, because I believe that moral worth is a basis for desert, and
that the world is made better to the extent that people get what they
(all-in) deserve. In typical cases, those who are virtuous all-in
deserve happiness in proportion to their virtue, and those who are
wicked all-in deserve unhappiness in proportion to their wickedness.
Therefore, other things being equal, a world in which the virtuous are
happy and the wicked unhappy is better than a world in which the wicked
are happy and the virtuous are miserable.
I suspect that if there is a desert base the possession of which
is sufficient not merely for prima facie desert, but also for all-in
desert, it is a high (or low) degree of moral worth. I find it
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difficult to imagine a case in which a moral saint deserves unhappiness,
or a case in which a truly evil person deserves happiness.
(4) Being a person. Simply in virtue of being a person, you
prima facie deserve various things. These may include a modicum of
respect; a share of happiness; a certain span of life; basic necessities
such as food, shelter, medicine, clothing; and so on. If there were any
doubt about this, it may be helpful to consider a brand new baby. It is
natural to feel that this child deserves various things - love,
attention, nurturing, education, a happy life, and so on. But since the
child has done, received, and suffered so little at this early point in
its life, it seems that the basis for its desert of these things can
only be its personhood.
This is not to say that being a person makes one all-in deserving
of these things. It is to say that being a person is a basis for prima
facie desert. So, for example, if the child grows into a wicked person,
then this person may deserve little in the way of respect or happiness.
Also, it is important to see that what is prima facie deserved in virtue
of being a person changes over time. So, for example, suppose an infant
prima facie deserves a certain amount of life - say, 70 more years. But
a 65 year-old person does not prima facie deserve 70 more years of life.
Rather, what that person prima facie deserves, as far as life is
concerned, is five more years.
What about organisms that are non-persons? There are some things
that some non-persons simply cannot deserve: for example, giant Sequoias
and blue whales cannot deserve educations, though people can. But does
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a giant Sequoia or blue whale priraa facie deserve anything simply in
virtue of being the sort of organism that it is? My opinion is that
these creatures do prima facie deserve certain forms of treatment; or,
at the very least, that they deserve to fail to suffer certain forms of
treatment. For example, I believe blue whales prima facie deserve not
to be made into dog food, and that giant Sequoias prima facie deserve
not to be made into Dixie cups. I cannot expect others to accept these
views, and I will not attempt to argue for them. I will merely note
that if being a person is a basis for prima facie desert of certain
things, then it is plausible that person-like organisms prima facie
deserve, to the extent that they are person-like, what persons prima
facie deserve in virtue of being persons.
(5) Need. I believe that need is a basis for desert. As noted
in Chapter 4, Feinberg shares this view:
A man with a chronically sick wife or child deserves
compensation since through no fault of his own he has a
greater need than others; and the same is true of a man with
a large number of dependents.
I think it is more precise to express this view by saying that
need is a basis for prima facie desert. This is because need is not
sufficient for all-in desert. To see this, suppose a person needs life-
sustaining medicine. Then this person prima facie deserves it. But
suppose this person needs medicine because he has knowingly abused his
body over the cours^=> of several years. Other things being equal, he
deserves this medicine rather less than the person who needs it and has
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taken every effort to stay relatively healthy. Or suppose a person
needs money because he has frittered away all of his funds on gambling,
drink, and sleazy entertainment. Other things being equal, he deserves
this money rather less than the person who needs money and is poor
through no fault of his own. So, need is not sufficient for all-in
desert.
Some philosophers maintain that need is not a basis for desert.
William Galston, for example, argues as follows:
If f is to serve as a desert-basis, it is a necessary
condition that x, the treatment appropriate to it, be
accorded the same normative or moral evaluation as f. If f
is regarded as good or desirable, so is x, and similarly if
f is regarded as bad. Clearly, need does not satisfy this
criterion; it is regarded as undesirable, but the treatment
to which it gives rise is considered desirable.
Galston s criterion is false. Consider wages. One basis for deserving
a wage is having to work in horrible conditions. Clearly, having to
work in horrible conditions is undesirable. If Galston’s criterion were
true, it would have to follow that wages are undesirable! Or consider
apologies. Being viciously slandered is a basis for deserving an
apology. Clearly, being viciously slandered is not at all desirable.
If Galston’s criterion were true, it would have to follow that receiving
an apology is also undesirable. These examples show that Galston’s
criterion for desert-basehood is false. There is no reason to suppose
that if / is a desert base and regarded as good (bad), then x, or what
is deserved in virtue of f, must also be regarded as good (bad). Thus,
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Galston’s criterion cannot be used to show that need is not a desert
base.
Another argument against need’s being a desert base is suggested
by those who point out, first, that we must be responsible for the bases
of our desert, and second, that we are not responsible for our needs.
But this argument fails. As I suggested in Chapter 1, and as I argued
in Chapter 2, and as I will argue further below, it simply is not true
that we must be responsible for the bases of our desert. (Innocent
suffering, which is a basis for deserving compensation, is an example.)
If this is correct, need cannot be disqualified as a basis for desert
even if we are not responsible for our needs.
(6) Receipt. What people have received in the past is a basis
for what they prima facie deserve now. Suppose, for example, that you
have suffered miserably for many years. Suppose that I have had lots of
joy. Suppose some happiness will now fall into either your life or
mine. You prima facie deserve it more than I do. The reason is that
past receipt is a basis for prima facie desert. Those who have enjoyed,
say, a lot of good are prima facie less deserving of currently available
goods than those who have enjoyed less. Conversely, those who have
suffered a lot of evil are prima facie less deserving of more evil now
than those who have suffered less.
My rejection in Chapter 2 of the view that desert is always
"backward looking" compels me to adopt a similar stance with respect to
future receipt of good and evil. Thus, I accept that those who will
enjoy an excessive amount of good are prima facie less deserving of
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currently available goods than those who will enjoy less; and,
conversely, those who will suffer an excessive amount of evil are prima
facie less deserving of more evil now than those who will suffer less.
More simply, what people will receive in the future is a basis for what
they prima facie deserve now.
(7) Suffering. Excessive past or future receipt of just about
anything is a basis for prima facie deserving less of it now. But I
would like to call special attention to suffering, and to treat it as a
distinct basis for prima facie desert. One reason for doing this is
that those philosophers who have written about desert have largely
ignored this basis for desert.^’ Another reason is that, in ordinary
life, suffering is thought to be one of the most prominent bases of
desert. It is customarily regarded as a basis for deserving
compensation, sympathy, apology, medical care, or some other such thing.
Of course, merely having suffered is not sufficient for all-in
desert. For there are many possible causes of suffering, and in any
particular case the cause of suffering can mitigate one’s desert. So,
for example, a man who loses a limb in an accident at work may all-in
deserve compensation for his suffering. But a man who intentionally
injures himself in order to cash-in on a generous disability insurance
plan may, for this, deserve no compensation whatsoever.
(8) Entitlement. The last desert base that I consider is
entitlement. (For an account of the notion of entitlement, see Chapter
3.) I believe that the relationship between desert and entitlement has
not been well understood by philosophers. Those who discuss these
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notions tend to fall into one of two extremes. At one extreme are those
who so sharply distinguish desert from entitlement that these notions
seem shorn of any interesting relationship to each other. Remarks
typical of this view include:
Deserve," "fitting," and "appropriate," on the one hand,
and "right," "entitlement," and "rule," on the other, are
terms from altogether different parts of our ethical
vocabularies.
. .
.
...desert-claims and rights-claims do seem to answer
different questions. When we say that persons deserve
things, we generally answer questions about what it would be
good for them to have; when we attribute rights, we
generally answer questions about what others ought to do or
refrain from doing.
At the other extreme are those who actually identify desert with
(a species of) entitlement. John Rawls has made remarks, already cited
in Chapter 3, that suggest his commitment to such a view:
...it is necessary to be clear about the notion of desert.
It is perfectly true that given a just system of cooperation
as a scheme of public rules and the expectations set up by
it, those who, with the prospect of improving their
condition, have done what the system announces that it will
reward are entitled to their advantages. ... ^°
The case [of justice’s relationship to moral desert] is
analogous to the relation between the substantive rules of
property and the law of property and theft. For a society
to organize itself with the aim of rewarding moral desert as
a first principle would be like having the institution of
property in order to punish thieves.
In each of the latter two passages, the implication is that desert can
arise only under a system of just rules - indeed, that to deserve
something just is to be entitled to it under these rules.
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My own view (which I briefly discussed in Chapter 3) lies between
divorcing desert from entitlement, on the one hand, and wedding them on
the other. It is that entitlement, though distinct from desert, is a
basis (one of many) for prima facie desert. I offer two arguments for
the view that entitlement is a desert base.
One argument is based on the fact that institutional theories of
desert are plausible. At any rate, they have seemed plausible to
several eminent philosophers, each of whom treats desert as a sort of
entitlement. One explanation for the plausibility of those theories
is that they are true. I think this is a poor explanation, since (as I
see it) those theories are not true. (Again, see Chapter 3.) An
alternative explanation for the allure of institutional theories is that
philosophers have confused one important basis for desert - namely,
entitlement - with desert itself. If this explanation is correct, then
entitlement is a basis for desert.
The second argument that entitlement is a basis for desert is
based on an imaginary case, and a view about the nature of justice. The
imaginary case is this. Imagine that you are legally entitled to
something - say, a piece of land. Now suppose that you are similar to
me with respect to the other desert bases. That is, suppose we have
worked the same amount, achieved the same amount, need the same amount,
are of equal moral worth, are persons, and so on. The important
difference is that you are legally entitled to the land. Suppose,
finally, that you have and enjoy the land, and I do not.
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As I see it, there is no injustice here. Furthermore, I accept
the venerable view that justice obtains to the extent that people (and
other things) get what they deserve. From this view of justice and the
facts of the case described above, it follows that you must have
deserved the land more than I did. Otherwise there would have been an
injustice in your receiving it. And since, in the case described, the
only fact that relevantly distinguishes you from me is your entitlement
to the land, it further follows that entitlement is a basis for your
desert of that land. Therefore, entitlement is a desert base.^^
Now I would like to note an interesting implication of the claim
that entitlement is a desert base. If entitlement is a desert base,
then a plausible principle about desert and responsibility is false.
The principle is this:
(P) If S deserves x in virtue of performing some
action, then S is responsible for performing
that action.^'*
(P) is plausible. It is hard to imagine a case where someone might
deserve praise or blame, punishment or reward, for performing an action
if she is not responsible for performing it.^^
Nevertheless, if entitlement is a basis for desert, then (P) is
false. A simple case illustrates this point. Suppose I am forced at
gunpoint to buy a lottery ticket. I am not responsible for this
purchase. Suppose further that this lottery ticket turns out a winner:
it entitles me to $10,000. If entitlement is a desert base, then (other
things being equal) I deserve the cash. But I am not responsible for
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buying the ticket. I was coerced into buying it. My act was not free.
Hence, if entitlement is a desert base, then it is possible to be
deserving in virtue of performing an action for which one is not
responsible
.
It may be instructive to finish off this catalogue of desert bases
by briefly mentioning some things that I do not take to be bases for
desert. An obvious point is that since, on my view, desert bases are
properties, nothing that fails to be a property is a basis for desert.
So, for example, events, times, places, people, souls, physical objects,
fairies, centers of gravity: none is a property, so none is a desert
base. Even among properties, there are some that seem not to be bases
for desert. These include gerrymandered, disjunctive properties, such
as being wooden or being the square root of 27. Other properties that
seem not to be desert bases include some perfectly natural properties,
such as having a mass of five kilograms or being positively charged. As
a general rule for deciding whether or not a property is a basis for
desert, I suggest the following: If P is neither included in the above
catalog of desert bases, nor a determinate of at least one of those
bases, then P is not a desert base.^®
A final point. In Chapter 6, I argued that consideration of
desert of wages suggests that a standard way of thinking about desert is
fundamentally flawed. According to that way of thinking, for each form
of deservable treatment, there is a desert base or small set of desert
bases unique to it. My view is different. According to it, any one (or
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any specific instance) of the desert bases catalogued above can
influence the extent to which a form of treatment is deserved.
Theories and analyses
In the previous section, I made some use of the concepts of priraa
facie desert, all-in desert, and weight. These concepts are crucial to
my theory of desert. In the next section I shall say more about them,
and state my theory explicitly. Much of what I say there depends on my
conception of the distinction between a philosophical theory and a
philosophical analysis. Thus, it may be helpful to explain my
conception of this distinction before I attempt to present my theory of
desert
.
One way to approach the distinction between analysis and theory is
by way of another: namely, the distinction between the "intension" of a
predicate and the "extension" of a predicate. The intension of a
predicate can be usefully thought of as its meaning. A traditional
assumption in the philosophy of language is that the meaning of a
predicate is the concept (or property) expressed by that predicate.
On this assumption, the meaning or intension of 'red*, for example, is,
in contemporary English, the concept of redness. The extension of a
predicate is the set of things to which that predicate correctly
applies, or the set of things that instantiate the concept expressed by
that predicate. So, for example, the extension of 'red’ is the set of
all the things that are red.
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This set or extension is different from redness, or the intension
of 'red’. This is because the set of red things could have contained
members other than those it actually contains, in which case it would
have been a different set, but without this resulting in a change in the
concept of red.
The intension/extension distinction can now be used to illuminate
the analysis/theory distinction. It might be said that theories and
analyses aim at different "targets." A theory aims at an extension. An
analysis aims at an intension. A theory of redness, for example, is
supposed to "pick out" the extension of 'red’. That is, it is supposed
to pick out all and only things that are red. This is not what an
analysis of redness is supposed to do. It aims to reveal the conceptual
structure of redness, or the intension of 'red’. Likewise for theories
and analyses generally.
There is more that can be said to illuminate the distinction
between theories and analyses. A theory of X will take the form of a
statement of conditions that are supposed to be necessary and sufficient
for a thing’s being X.^® There are two forms such a statement might
take. One is an enumeration or list of all and only the things that are
F. (Such a theory may not be very illuminating.) Another (and more
illuminating) sort of theory is a specification of some property had by
all and only those things that are F. Thus, to return to the example of
redness, instances of theories of redness include:
TRl X is red if and only if x is this apple, this
book, this chair, this cherry, this car
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TR2 X is red if and only if x would, under
appropriate conditions, emanate lightwaves of
within 4000-7000 angstrom units.
An analysis of F will take the form of an "analytic definition" of
F. This will be a statement containing the symbol Mf.=’, which will be
flanked on the left by the "analysandum, " or the concept to be analyzed,
and on the right by the "analysand," or that in terms of which the
concept IS analyzed. So, for example, an analysis of redness will look
something like this (with the blank appropriately filled):
ARl X is red =df.
.
It is important to recognize that some concepts may be
unanalyzable
,
or primitive." That is, there may be some concepts with
nothing in the way of an (informative) analysand. This is what G. E.
Moore held about the concept of intrinsic goodness. It is also what
Ross, as we shall see, held about the concept of prima facie rightness.
And it is what I shall hold about the concept of prima facie desert.
Prima facie desert, all-in desert, and weight
My view is that the concept of prima facie desert is primitive, or
not susceptible to any enlightening analysis. This does not mean that
nothing can be said about it. At the very least, I can try to indicate
what prima facie desert is not. To say that S prima facie deserves x in
virtue of F is not to say that S merely appears to deserve x in virtue
of F. Nor is it to say that S actually (or all-in) deserves x in virtue
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of F. Nor IS It to say that, in most cases, those with F all-in deserve
X. Rather, it is to say, roughly, that S has some property that is
relevant in a certain way to whether S all-in deserves x.3° In the
previous section, I discussed the properties that I take to be relevant
in that way. That is, I discussed the desert bases. I also attempted
to illustrate, by appealing to cases, that possession of these bases is
generally insufficient for all-in desert.
It is especially important to understand that I do not analyze the
notion of prima facie desert in terms of the desert bases. To see why,
consider one such attempt:
D1 S prima facie deserves x in virtue of F =df (i)
S has F, and (ii) either F is effort; an
achievement; some degree of moral worth;
personhood; need; some amount of past or future
receipt of something; suffering; or entitlement.
An obvious flaw with this putative analysis of prima facie desert
is that it makes each desert base a basis for prima facie deserving "x,"
which could be anything at all! To see this, suppose that S is a
person. S thereby satisfies the right-hand side of the analysis. So,
whatever x is, S prima facie deserves it. But suppose x is punishment.
Then S prima facie deserves punishment in virtue of being a person!
Similar arguments would, if sound, demonstrate that athletic effort is a
basis for prima facie deserving an apology; that intellectual
achievement is a basis for prima facie deserving contempt; that
wickedness is a basis for prima facie deserving admiration; and so on.^^
Clearly, these arguments are not sound. So, D1 is unacceptable.
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It might be thought that this flaw can be avoided by more
carefully specifying the sort of treatment deserved in virtue of F,
thus:
S prima facie deserves x in virtue of F =df (i)
S has F, and (ii) either F is effort and x is a
wage; or F is an achievement and x is
admiration; or F is a high (low) degree of moral
worth and x is a high (low) degree of happiness
(unhappiness); or F is personhood and x is
respect; or F is a need and x is that which S
needs; or F is an excessive (deficient) amount
of past or future receipt of something and x is
deficient (excessive) receipt of that thing; or
F suffering and x is a remedy; or F is an
entitlement and x is that to which S is
entitled.
One problem with D2 is that it presupposes the standard view that
associated with each form of deservable treatment is a desert base or
small set of desert bases unique to it. As I tried to show in Chapter
6, this view is false. Reflection on desert of wages suggests that
almost any desert base might influence the wage one deserves; mutatis
mutandis for grades, apologies, medical care, punishment, and the other
forms of deservable treatment.
Suppose it were thought that this latest defect could be avoided
by an even more careful specification - not only of the sort of
treatment deserved in virtue of F, but also of the Fs or desert bases
themselves. The analysis I have in mind would look something like this
D3 S prima facie deserves x in virtue of F =df S
has F and (ii) either F is intellectual effort
and X is publication, fame, a professorial
chair, admiration, or satisfaction; or F is
athletic effort and x is victory, a prize, fame.
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admiration, a raise; or F is artistic effort and
X is patronage, fame, admiration, respect; or F
is
There would be no point in attempting to complete this so-called
analysis of the concept of prima facie desert. The reason is that it
(as well as D1 and D2 ) suffers from a fundamental flaw. The flaw is
that It is not plausibly construed as an analysis of prima facie desert
at all. For if D3 were an analysis of prima facie desert, it would
express the weaning of 'S prima facie deserves x in virtue of F’.
Surely, though, D3 does not express the meaning of that terra. For if it
did, then a person who denies, say, that intellectual effort is a basis
for prima facie desert of admiration would be guilty of failing to
understand the concept of desert. This is because if D3 were an
analysis, then part of the meaning of *S prima facie deserves x in
virtue of F’ would be that S prima facie deserves admiration in virtue
of intellectual effort. However, it is quite possible for someone to
understand the concept of desert, yet deny that intellectual effort is a
basis for prima facie desert of admiration. D3 would, if an analysis,
make this impossible. A similar point holds for D1 and D2. In light of
this point, I suggest that prima facie desert be taken as a conceptual
primitive.
Another concept I shall take as primitive in my theory of desert
is that of weight. Here is an example to illustrate the concept.
Suppose you are participating in a foot race. You exert much effort
during training and during the race. These efforts are a basis for
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prima facie desert of the prize. Suppose, however, that you do not win
the race. This is a basis for prima facie not deserving the prize.
(You are not entitled to it.) But if your efforts were especially
strenuous, and pursued with great dedication, and if you lost the race
by only a narrow margin, this may outweigh the fact that you failed to
break the tape. If it does, and other things are equal, then you all-in
deserve the prize. That is, your effort, which is a basis for prima
facie deserving the prize, outweighs your failure to win, which is a
basis for prima facie deserving to not get the prize.
A similar example suggests that the same desert bases have
different weights in different circumstances. Return to the case of the
race. Suppose your effort was not strenuous, and you lost by a
convincing margin. Suppose also that other things are equal. Then it
may be that you do not all-in deserve the prize. If you do not, then
your effort, which is a basis for prima facie deserving the prize, is in
this case outweighed by your failure to win, which is a basis for prima
facie deserving to not get the prize.
The notions of prima facie desert and weight can now be used in a
theory of all-in desert. All-in desert is actual desert, or desert
simpliciter. It is different from prima facie desert: it is possible to
prima facie deserve something and not all-in deserve it. (However, it
is impossible to all-in deserve it without prima facie deserving it.
)
What is all-in deserved in a given case is determined by what is prima
facie deserved in that case, in the following way:
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(D) S all-in deserves x in some circumstance if and
only if the bases for prima facie deserving x
that S instantiates in that circumstance
outweigh the bases, taken together, for prima
facie not deserving x that S instantiates in
that circumstance.
(D) expresses my theory of desert. It is a theory of all-in
desert. It depends crucially on two primitive concepts: prima facie
desert and weight. I do not particularly like the fact that my theory
depends so crucially on these notions. However, I am skeptical about
the possibility of a theory of desert that does not depend on them. My
reason for skepticism is the failure of previous attempts to explain
desert in terms other than prima facie desert and weight. I explained
those failures in previous chapters.
One might conclude from those previous failures to explain desert
that desert is illusory, or utterly mysterious. I accept that desert
(along with other, philosophically problematic concepts such as truth,
beauty, goodness, life) is a bit mysterious. But I deny that it is
illusory. Such a denial would demand so radical a departure from our
ordinary understanding of the world that it could not be taken
altogether seriously. Besides, there is an alternative to denying
desert. It is to enumerate and describe the various bases for desert,
and to accept prima facie desert and weight as primitive concepts in a
theory of all-in desert.
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Rossianism
Anyone who has read W. D. Ross’s The Right and the Goocfi^ will
recognize the similarity between my theory of desert and his theory of
moral rightness. Because our theories are similar, a discussion of his
may further clarify my own. And because our theories are similar, they
are vulnerable to similar objections. Thus, I shall offer a comparison
of my theory of desert to Ross’s theory of moral rightness. It is
important to remember that Ross’s theory is not about desert. It is, I
have said, about moral rightness. It purports to state necessary and
sufficient conditions for the moral rightness of actions. Note also
that there is more than one interpretation of Ross’s theory. What
follows is my favored interpretation.^'*
A concept fundamental to Ross’s theory is prima facie duty^ or
prima facie rightness. Ross does not offer an analysis of this notion,
taking it instead as primitive.^® However, he does explain that an
action is a prima facie duty in virtue of being an action of a certain
morally significant" kind. On Ross’s view, there are seven such kinds:
fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement,
and non-maleficence (21).^®
Ross discusses each of these kinds in some detail, but his
discussion is not relevant here. The relevant points are, first, that
on Ross’s view an act of one or more of these kinds is a prima facie
duty. Second, Ross’s list of "morally significant kinds" or "right-
making characteristics" has its analogue in my catalogue of desert
bases, or what might be called "desert-making characteristics."
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Ross explains that a prima facie duty is not an act that merely
appears to be right. Rather, an act’s prima facie rightness is an
objective property of the action. Furthermore, a prima facie duty is
not necessarily an actual duty:
If, as almost all moralists except Kant are agreed, and as
most plain men think, it is sometimes right to tell a lie or
to break a promise, it must be maintained that there is a
^iffsi'^rice between prims fscie duty and actual or absolute
duty. (Page 28.)
That is, there are occasions where (for example) telling a lie or
breaking a promise is morally right. This does not change the fact that
even on those occasions, truth telling and promise keeping are prima
facie duties; mutatis mutandis for the other prima facie duties.
Ross uses this notion of prima facie rightness to state the
central idea behind his theory of moral rightness: "Whether an act is a
duty proper or actual duty depends on all the morally significant kinds
it is an instance of" (19-20). In other words, the actual moral
rightness of an act is in some way the result of all the prima facie
duties that it is. Ross explains:
Every act... viewed in some aspects, will be prima facie
right, and viewed in others, prima facie wrong, and right
acts can be distinguished from wrong acts only as being
those which, of all those possible for the agent in the
circumstances, have the greatest balance of prima facie
rightness, in those respects in which they are prima facie
right, over their prima facie wrongness, in those respects
in which they are prima facie wrong. . . . For the estimation
of the comparative stringency of these prima facie
obligations no general rules can, so far as I can see, be
laid down. (Page 41.)
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As I read this passage, Ross is attempting to explain moral
rightness in terms of prima facie rightness and "stringency." The
concept of prima facie rightness has already been discussed. What of
stringency? Ross says that there are "no general rules" for the
comparative stringency of prima facie duties. This suggests that on
Ross’s view, some prima facie duties not only are more stringent than
others, but also that their relative stringency varies from circumstance
to circumstance. So, for example, in one circumstance the prima facie
duty of non-maleficence may be more stringent than the prima facie duty
of self-improvement; in another circumstance, the opposite may be true.
As for the notion of stringency itself, Ross is silent. I suspect he
takes it as primitive. At any rate, Ross’s theory of moral rightness
seems to be this:
(R) An act is an actual duty in some circumstance if
and only if it is a prima facie duty and no
other act that the agent could perform is, in
that circumstance, a more stringent prima facie
duty.
Now we are in a position to compare (R) and (D). First, Ross’s
concept of prima facie rightness has its analogue in my notion of prima
facie desert. Each is taken as conceptually primitive. Each is
purportedly an objective property, not merely an appearance. Second,
Ross’s concept of stringency has its analogue in my concept of weight.
Each is conceptually primitive. And just as prima facie duties of
justice, benevolence (and so on) differ in stringency according to
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circumstance, so bases of prima facie desert differ in weight according
to circumstance. Third, Ross’s concept of actual duty has its analogue
in my notion of all-in desert. Just as an act’s actual rightness is
determined by a balance of prima facie duties (and prima facie wrongs)
and their relative stringencies in that circumstance, so a subject’s
all-in desert is determined by a balance of bases for prima facie desert
(and prima facie undeservingness) and their relative weights in that
circumstance. Fourth, just as any combination of Ross’s "right-making
characteristics is supposed to be able to determine the rightness of an
act, so any combination of my desert bases or "desert-making
characteristics ' is supposed to be able to determine whether a form of
treatment is all-in deserved.
Objections and replies
Ross’s theory may be vulnerable to many objections, but there are
three in particular that seem the most serious. My theory is vulnerable
to similar objections.
The first objection to Ross’s theory concerns his catalogue of
prima facie duties. The objection, in Ross’s words, is that "this
catalogue. .. is an unsystematic one resting on no logical principle"
(23). As I understand it, the idea behind the objection is this. Ross
never justifies his claim, for any putative prima facie duty, that it is
in fact a prima facie duty. He is content to list them without
appealing to any principle (or principles) that might be used to justify
his catalogue rather than another. This procedure is "unsystematic,"
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The theory of desert defended
for it rests on no "logical principle."
in this chapter is vulnerable to a similar objection: namely, that there
has been no attempt to justify the catalogue of desert bases, no appeal
to any principle that might justify this catalogue rather than another.
This is supposed to be a defect.
This is no defect in Ross s theory or mine if the respective
catalogues (i) reflect the facts, and (ii) there is no further principle
or principles that could be used to justify them. As far as the facts
are concerned, Ross’s reply is that his catalogue of prima facie duties
"makes no claim to being ultimate" (23). The same goes for mine.
Perhaps there are more (or fewer) bases for prima facie desert than I
catalogued. I concede that my list of desert bases may not reflect
perfectly the facts. But the burden of showing that it is inaccurate
now falls on the objector.
Concerning further principles that could be used to justify the
catalogue of prima facie duties, Ross maintains that there are no such
principles. Rather, the "general principles of duty... come to be self-
evident to us just as mathematical axioms do" (32). I hold a similar
view about my catalogue of desert bases. It is that this catalogue of
desert bases cannot be justified by showing that it falls out of some
deeper, further principle (or principles). This view gains some
indirect support from Sher’s failure, chronicled in Chapter 5, to
justify the major desert-claims. Sher’s failure suggests that our true
beliefs about what is and what is not a basis for prima facie desert are
epistemologically basic.
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The second objection against Ross’s theory is, I believe,
serious. It is that his theory of moral rightness is vacuous. Fred
Feldman puts this objection nicelyi
Many readers find Ross’s view to be empty, trivial, or
unenlightening. It seems to some of these people that allRoss has said is that an act is right if and only if it has
at least as much rightness as any alternative. Surely, if
this is all that Ross has said, then his view is indeed
rather trivial.^’
As I understand it, the objection is this. Ross’s notion of
stringency is really just the notion of "more-ness," and prima facie
rightness is really just the notion of rightness to some degree. If
this is correct, then Ross’s theory is indeed vacuous. It would assert
that an act is right if and only if no alternative is more right than it
is. Someone seeking an understanding of the notion of rightness is no
wiser after hearing such a theory.
My theory of desert is vulnerable to a similar objection. It is
that the notion of "weight" is really just the notion of "more-ness,"
and prima facie desert is really just the notion of desert to some
degree. If that is correct, then my theory of desert is indeed vacuous.
It would assert, in effect, that S deserves x in virtue of F if and only
if S is more deserving of x in virtue of F than not deserving of x in
virtue of anything else. Someone seeking an understanding of the notion
of desert will be no wiser for hearing such a theory.
My reply to this objection is blunt: The notion of weight is not
the notion of "more-ness," and the notion of prima facie desert is not
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the notion of desert to some degree. Weight is a primitive concept,
distinct from the concepts of prima facie desert and all-in desert. It
is introduced to account for the fact that the relative importance of
desert bases toward determining a subject’s desert fluctuates according
to circumstance. Prima facie desert is also a primitive concept. It is
introduced to account for the fact that there appears to be a range of
properties directly relevant to all-in desert, though none seems
sufficient for all-in desert. I concede that not much more can be said
about these concepts. I suspect Ross would make similar claims, and a
similar concession, regarding the concepts of stringency and prima facie
rightness.
This leads to the final and most serious objection I wish to
consider. The objection is that if Ross’s notion of stringency is left
undefined, then the theory becomes obscure; likewise if my notion of
weight is left undefined. This is a serious objection since these are
technical notions, introduced to perform certain theoretical roles.
They are not familiar, everyday notions. If they were, then taking them
as primitive would not necessarily render the theories obscure. As it
is, the notions have no natural place in our ordinary conceptual scheme.
Thus, the theories that use them are obscure. They do not illuminate
the concepts they purport to illuminate. Rather, they explain obscure
concepts (like "all-in desert") in terms of alien concepts (such as
"prima facie desert" and "weight").
I have two modest replies to this objection. One is that even if
the theory of desert defended in this chapter is somewhat obscure, it is
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not ob\iously false. So, at least it is an improvement over theories of
desert considered in the previous chapters. My second reply is that the
notions of prima facie desert and weight may not be quite so obscure.
The concept of prima facie desert is brought in to account for the fact,
illustrated several times in my catalogue of desert bases, that
properties that are relevant to a subject’s desert may not be sufficient
for (all-in) desert. And as for the concept of weight, it is brought in
to account for the fact that although desert bases determine desert,
they do this in an unsystematic way: a basis central to one’s desert in
one circumstance may play a quite minor role in determining one’s desert
in another circumstance. So, as I see it, the concepts of prima facie
desert and weight are not total strangers to our conceptual scheme.
Conclusion
In Chapter 1, I cited Barbara Goodwin’s remark that "...the
concept of desert itself is incoherent and, philosophically speaking,
unfounded. I hope that a central lesson of this chapter is that
Goodwin is wrong. The concept of desert - more precisely, the theory of
desert expounded in this chapter - is not "incoherent." Whatever its
defects, the theory I defend is at least intelligible and (apparently)
self-consistent. I confess that the theory I defend may be "unfounded"
insofar as it relies on apparently brute intuitions about what is and
what is not a basis for desert. But if, as it seems, every
philosophical theory must at some point rely on brute intuitions, then
reliance on such intuitions would condemn every philosophical theory.
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Anyway, the theory of desert I defend is not "unfounded" insofar as it
reflects and systematizes a central component of common sense morality.
It is not, in other words, a flight of philosophical fancy.
Besides that, there are several areas of philosophical interest
that are in desperate need of a defensible theory of desert. One area
is desert of wages, and in particular the issue of comparable worth. I
have discussed these in Chapter 6. As a conclusion, I will briefly
consider three other areas of philosophical discussion that need a
defensible theory of desert.
(1) Justice. From time to time, I have mentioned the venerable
view that justice obtains to the extent that people (and other things)
get what they deserve. Although few contemporary theorists of justice
accept this view, there are several who maintain that justice has at
least something to do with desert. But even those who accept this
weaker version of the venerable view of justice require some theory of
desert. If the arguments given in previous chapters are sound, it would
be a mistake for anyone to rely on the most influential theories of
desert. For if those arguments are sound, then those theories of desert
are false. What is needed, then, is an alternative theory of desert.
This is precisely what I offer.
(2) Utilitarianism. According to a standard objection, classical
(hedonistic) utilitarianism ignores justice. So, for example, classical
utilitarianism seems to make it morally obligatory for the sheriff of a
small town to hang an innocent vagabond in order to placate an otherwise
riotous and destructive populace, even though the hanging would be
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grossly unjust. '‘o Thus, it is objected, classical utilitarianism goes
wrong in this and similar cases.
Fred Feldman has recently argued that there is a form of
utilitarianism that does not fall to this sort of case.'*^ According to
this form of utilitarianism, the intrinsic value of an episode of
pleasure or pain is a function not only of the intensity and duration of
such an episode, but also the extent to which that episode of pleasure
or pain is deserved. The basic intuitions on which Feldman depends are
(i) that the value of an episode of pleasure is augmented(mitigated) to
the extent that it is deserved(undeserved)
; and (ii) that the disvalue
of an episode of pain is mitigated( augmented) to the extent that it is
deserved(undeserved)
.
The details of this form of utilitarianism are not relevant here.
The important fact is that it is supposed to yield the correct answer in
cases like the one just described. For part of that case is the
vagabond is innocent. He does not deserve to be hanged. This fact
allows Feldman to say that the disvalue of his being hanged is greatly
augmented by the fact that he does not deserve it; moreover, the value
of whatever pleasures that accrue to the bloodthirsty crowd as a result
of the hanging is significantly mitigated by the fact that they do not
deserve such pleasures. The result is supposed to be that on this form
of utilitarianism, the act of hanging the innocent vagabond is, all
things considered, morally wrong; rautatis mutandis for similar cases.
Feldman’s ingenious response to the "objection from justice"
assumes that justice is the getting of what’s deserved. More
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pertinently, it relies heavily on the concept of desert. Thus, the
acceptability of Feldman’s form of utilitarianism depends heavily on the
theory of desert it presupposes. I have just offered one such theory.
I believe (with Feldman) that it can be incorporated into a broadly
utilitarian framework. Doing this would make the case for Feldman’s
brand of utilitarianism more convincing.
(3) Punishment. In 1985, Michael Davis noted that "...the
retributive theory of punishment has recently enjoyed a startling
revival. "42 According to a standard form of retributivism, punishment
is morally justifiable" only insofar as the punishment is deserved. As
C. L. Ten explains in Crime, Guilt, and Punishment: A Philosophical
Introduction:
Contemporary retributivists treat the notion of desert as
central to the retributive theory, punishment being
justified in terms of the desert of the offender.
Despite the apparent centrality that retributivists assign to
desert, there has been (so far as I know) no attempt by retributivists
to construct a theory of desert. Thus, retributivism is yet another
area in philosophy that needs what has been offered in this chapter.
Although contemporary retributivists have not offered a general
theory of desert, at least one has offered a formula for determining a
wrongdoer’s desert of punishment. This is Nozick. In Philosophical
Explanations, Nozick endorses a retributive theory of punishment. His
formula for determining the wrongdoer’s desert of punishment is this:
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The punishment deserved depends on the magnitude H of thewrongness of the act, and the person’s degree of
theirprodJctf r magnitude to
In other words, the severity of punishment deserved by the wrongdoer is
equal (on some appropriate scale) to the product of the wrongness of the
act and the wrongdoer’s responsibility for performing that act.
It is worth noting that if Nozick were to adopt the theory of
desert defended in this chapter, then he would be forced to abandon his
formula for determining a wrongdoer’s desert. According to Nozick’s
formula, a wrongdoer’s desert is determined by only two factors: the
wrongness of the act, and the agent’s degree of responsibility for
performing it. But according to my general theory of desert, any form
of deservable treatment is deservable in virtue of the agent’s
possession of any of the desert bases. So, for example, a particular
wrongdoer s desert of punishment might, on my theory of desert, depend
not only on the wrongness of his act and the degree of responsibility he
bears for performing it, but also on other things: being a person,
having certain needs, and so on. Thus, if my general theory of desert
is correct, then Nozick’s formula for determining a wrongdoer’s desert
of punishment is, at the very least, oversimple. This suggests that
retributivists need a defensible general theory of desert not only for
adding substance to their theories, but also for avoiding what I take to
be false claims about desert of punishment.
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Notes
1. Here I am assume the falsity of certain religious views.
2. That said, there is at least one author who accepts a variety of
3. David Armstrong calls it the "Principle of Instantial Invariance."
See his A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), page 40.
4. Joel Feinberg, "Justice and Personal Desert," in his Doing and
Deserving (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press), page 58.
5. Writers on desert typically divide desert bases into two sorts:
properties and actions. Feinberg, for instance, writes: "If a person
is deserving of some sort of treatment, he must, necessarily, be so in
virtue of some possessed characteristic or prior activity" ("Justice and
Personal Desert," page 58). However, for simplicity’s sake I treat all
desert bases as properties, and include actions by taking having
performed such-and-such action as a property.
6. This last fact points to an ambiguity in the term 'desert base’:
The term can express a quite general property, such as having exerted
effort, or a quite specific property, such as having labored for hours
in the garden under the broiling sun, or even some "moderately specific"
property. However, I think this ambiguity is harmless.
7. George Sher, Desert (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press,
1987 ) , page 53
.
8. Wojceich Sadurski, Giving Desert its Due, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel
Publishing Company, 1985), page 116 (my emphasis).
9. It is important to note that these claims are consistent with a
point I tried to establish in Chapter 6. The point was that contrary to
a standard view of desert, any form of deservable treatment is
deservable in virtue of any desert base. This point is consistent with
the claim, for example, that criminal effort deserves punishment. For
this is not to say that punishment is deserved only for criminal effort.
It is to say that criminal effort is a basis - one of many - for
deserving punishment.
10. My thanks to David Waller for drawing this point to my attention.
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11. w.
Press
,
D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford:
1930), page 138.
Oxford University12.
I accept that the category of persons
of human beings.
is broader than the category
13.
Philosophers differ in their accounts of need. For interestingdiscussions, see pages 126-143 of David Miller’s Social Justice (Oxford-Clarendon Press, 1976); pages 158-183 of Wojceich Sadurski’s Giving
esert its Due; and, for an especially dense discussion, David Wiggins’sClaims of Need, in Ted Honderich, ed.
,
Morality and Objectivity: A
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Mackie (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), pages
14. Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert," page 93.
15. William Galston, Justice and the Human Good (Chicago, IL: Chicago
University Press, 1980), page 174. ^
16. J. R. Lucas, for example, writes: "I do not create my own needs;
they happen to me;" then he goes on to argue: "People ought to be doneby according to how they deserve, and how they deserve depends on how
they have done, which in turn presupposes responsibility and freedom."(On Justice [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980], pages 183 and 197.) The
implication is obvious: Need is not a basis for desert.
17. Failure to consider suffering as a basis for desert is perhaps the
only explanation for why philosophers have accepted such implausible
views of the supposed connection between desert and responsibility. See
Chapter 2, and Fred Feldman’s "Desert: Reconsideration of Some Received
Wisdom," Mind 104 (January 1995), page 72.
18. Joel Feinberg, "Justice and Personal Desert," page 86.
19. George Sher, Desert, page 201.
20. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, page 103.
21. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, page 313.
22. In addition to those philosophers, including Rawls, mentioned in
Chapter 3, there is also Thomas Scanlon, whose own views about the
"moral significance of choice" depend on an institutional conception of
desert:
In approaching the problems of justifying both penal and
economic institutions we begin with strong pretheoretical
intuitions about the significance of choice: voluntary and
intentional commission of a criminal act is a necessary
condition of just punishment, and voluntary economic
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contribution can make an economic reward just and its denial
unjust. One way to account for these intuitions is by
appeal to a preinstitutional notion of desert: certain actsdeserve punishment, certain contributions merit rewards, andinstitutions are just if they distribute benefits andburdens in accord with these forms of desert.
The strategy I am describing makes a point of avoiding
any such appeal. The only notions of desert which it
recognizes are internal to institutions and dependent upon a
prior notion of justice: if institutions are just then
people deserved the rewards and punishments which those
institutions assign them. ("The Significance of Choice," in
Sterling L. McMurrin, ed.
,
The Tanner Lectures on Human
Values VIII [Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press,
1988]
,
page 188
.
)
23. I do not pretend that this argument is conclusive, especially
insofar as it relies on the view that justice is the getting of what’sdeserved. Venerable though this view may be, the most influential
contemporary theorists of justice reject (or ignore) it. For an attempt
to diagnose the flight from desert by contemporary theorists of justice
see Chapter 1.
24. (P) is similar to, but importantly different from, a principle
mentioned in Chapter 2. According to that principle, if S deserves x in
virtue of F, then S is responsible for F. This principle is clearly
false. As I noted in Chapter 2, it is possible to be deserving in
virtue of a property, such as having suffered^ that one is not
responsible for possessing. But (P) is more narrow. It restricts the
supposed connection between desert and responsibility to actions. It
states only that actions for which one is not responsible are never
bases for desert. This is more plausible than the principle considered
in Chapter 2.
25. Actually, Susan Wolf attempts to describe such a case in Freedom
Within Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pages 79-85. One
of Wolf s major theses in this book is that although no on deserves
blame if determinism is true, it is possible to deserve praise even if
determinism is true. The example she cites in support of this
"asymmetry thesis" is this:
Two persons, of equal swimming ability, stand on equally
uncrowded beaches. Each sees an unknown child struggling in
the water in the distance. Each thinks "The child needs my
help" and directly swims out to save him. In each case, we
assume that the agent reasons correctly - the child does
need her help - and that, in swimming out to save him, the
agent does the right thing. We further assume that in one
of these cases, the agent has the ability to do otherwise,
and in the other case not. (Pages 81-82.)
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Wolf s intuition is that each person deserves praise,
them is not responsible for her actions.
even though one of
26. Provided, of course
I am not confident that
,
that my catalogue of desert bases
it is.
is complete.
27. I use the word 'concept’ to denote
conceived. Thus, as I understand them,
property.
any property that can be
concepts are a species of
accurate to say that a statement of necessary
and sufficient conditions for F is the "central element" in aphilosophical theory of F, rather than the theory itself. Like thedesert contained in this chapter, an entire philosophical
othe7th?nr''^^^^w'"°''®
^ biconditional. Typically it containsthings, such as analyses of various concepts; certain accompanying
or auxiliary principles, axioms, and theorems; commitment to a
particular ontology; and so on.
29.
G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge Universitv
Press, 1903), pages 1-36.
30. For convenience’s sake, I speak here as though desert bases are
always located in the past.
31. My own view is that personhood can be relevant to one’s desert of
punishment. But it is relevant only insofar as it is a basis for prima
facie not deserving certain sorts of punishment (say, being drawn and
quartered)
.
32. These problems cannot be avoided by revising the analysandum, thus:
S is deserving if and only if...,
thereby leaving out the problematic "x". The reason this fails is that
every case of desert is a case of deserving something.
33. Page references to this book are henceforth contained in the body
of the text.
34.
My interpretation is indebted to that found in Fred Feldman’s
Introductory Ethics (Englewood-Clif fs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978), pages
149-159.
35.
At least one reader of Ross would deny that Ross takes prima facie
rightness as primitive. See Frank Snare, "The Definition of Prima Facie
Duties," The Philosophical Quarterly XXIV (1974), pages 235-244.
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36.
Note that Ross does not claim "completeness or finality" for this
37. Feldman, Introductory Ethics, page 157.
38. Barbara Goodwin, Justice By Lottery (Chicago, IL: Chicago
University Press, 1992), page 64.
39. For references to these philosophers, see Chapter 1.
40. This case is found in Kai Neilsen, "Against Moral Conservatism," inLouis Pojman, ed.
,
Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1989), pages 181-187.
41. Fred Feldman, "Adjusting Utility for Justice," forthcoming in
Philosophy and Phenomenlogical Research (September 1995).
42. Michael Davis, "How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime," in J. R.
Pennock and J. W. Chapman, eds.
,
Criminal Justice: Nomos XXVII (New
York, NY: New York University Press, 1985), page 119.
43. C. L. Ten, Crime, Guilt, and Punishment (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1987 ) , page 46.
44. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: The
Belknap Press, 1981), page 393.
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